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Abstract      v 
Abstract 
 
Over the last two decades it has become increasingly important to promote the efficiency and 
improve the performance of natural monopolies operating within network industries. In line 
with this, different regulatory approaches have been designed aiming at preventing the abuse 
of monopoly power and at the same time enhancing the performance of regulated firms. The 
most widely adopted incentive-based regulatory schemes involve price cap (RPI-X), revenue 
cap, and yardstick regulation models. These schemes aim to give firms an incentive for 
efficient production and cost reduction. However, due to the imperfect information available 
to the regulator there are some drawbacks related to the use of price-cap regulation since the 
regulator does not know a firm’s true costs. High costs may be due to a firm’s particular 
production situation or merely to its inefficiency. Thus, in setting the initial price level and 
the yearly efficiency factor X in the price-cap formula the regulator can use some form of 
cost-based benchmarking analysis. In this case, benchmarking is used to establish a larger 
information basis for more effective regulation that reduces the informational asymmetry 
between firms and the regulator. Hence, there is a close link between efficiency 
measurements and incentive-based price regulation.  
 
Today’s price regulation of Slovenian water distribution utilities resembles the rate-of-return 
regulation scheme. Nevertheless, the current Rules on Price Determination of Obligatory 
Local Public Utilities for Environmental Protection (2004) envisage the use of benchmarking 
in the price-regulation process and defining of the best-practice performance. However, the 
Rules have not yet been put into practice since the benchmarking method has still not been 
determined. In the thesis we consider the use of parametric frontier benchmarking methods 
and suggest how the results could be used in the price-regulation process. The main method 
employed is Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA), while the Corrected Ordinary Least Squares 
(COLS) method is used to cross-check the results. A translog frontier cost function is 
estimated based on an unbalanced panel data set of 52 utilities over the 1997-2003 period. 
The cost inefficiency estimates of Slovenian water distribution utilities are obtained by 
several different parametric frontier methods. The employed models differ in their 
assumptions, method of estimation and in their ability to account for firm-specific effects 
and distinguish between firm heterogeneity and inefficiency. The pooled model does not take 
into account the panel structure of the data and is therefore unable to separate unobserved 
heterogeneity from inefficiency. While conventional fixed and random effects panel data 
models take firm-specific effects into account in the estimation of inefficiency, they treat any 
time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity as inefficiency. They, too, are found to fail when it 
comes to separating heterogeneity from inefficiency. This problem is tackled by ‘true’ fixed 
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and random effects models by adding in an additional term in the model which captures 
time-invariant and firm-specific effects and therefore separates these effects from 
inefficiency (Greene, 2002a, b). However, it remains debatable whether the time-invariant 
firm-specific effect should, in fact, be attributed to unobserved heterogeneity or to 
inefficiency. Mundlak’s (1978) formulation of the random effects model is also considered 
since it allows controlling for any correlation between unobserved heterogeneity and 
regressors. In our study it is found that the estimation results based on the conventional 
random effects models tend to highly overestimate cost inefficiency, while the true fixed 
effects (TFE) model seems to slightly underestimate it. Nevertheless, since the inefficiency 
estimates obtained by the TFE model closely correspond to the pooled model it is believed 
that these two models provide a better approximation of the actual cost inefficiency of 
Slovenian water distribution utilities, which is found to be close to or slightly above 20% on 
average. The TFE model is also found to perform the best with respect to the expected signs 
and significance of the regression coefficients. The inefficiency results indicate that 
significant cost inefficiency is present in Slovenian water distribution companies and that the 
utilities would have to considerably cut their costs in order to become efficient. This may be 
facilitated by a properly designed price regulation that introduces incentives for efficiency 
improvements. The inefficiency scores obtained from the different methods are, however, 
not found to be consistent in their levels and rankings of the utilities. A possible explanation 
of these inconsistent results can be found in the different ability of stochastic frontier 
methods to account for unobservable heterogeneity. However, since the regulator needs 
reliable estimates of the efficiency potential of a regulated firm this finding is particularly 
unwelcome. It is thus recommended to use the benchmarking results obtained by the SFA 
methods only as a starting point for providing information about the range in which the 
inefficiency score can be located. Alternatively, the estimated cost function can also be used 
to predict utilities’ costs, with this approach being in line with yardstick competition.  
 
Besides achieving cost efficiency, i.e. operating at minimum cost at a given size, important 
cost savings may result from achieving scale efficiency, i.e. operating at the size that 
minimises average production costs. The results from the different models in the latter case 
prove to be fairly consistent. Based on the obtained results, the presence of economies of 
output density and customer density in Slovenian water distribution utilities is confirmed. 
Therefore, it would be beneficial for the utilities if they managed to distribute larger volumes 
of output to their existing customers as well as to acquire new customers. With respect to 
economies of scale, medium-sized utilities are found to closely correspond to the optimal 
size of water distribution utilities in Slovenia. Economies of scale prevail in smaller utilities, 
implying they should consider expanding the scale of their operations through mergers. 
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Conversely, large utilities are found to operate at levels where economies of scale are already 
exhausted.  
 
Overall, based on the results obtained it can be concluded that there is large potential for cost 
savings in Slovenian water distribution utilities. However, no evidence of any notable 
improvements being made can be found so far. The total factor productivity growth over the 
examined period is found to be around zero where technical progress is established but, on 
the other hand, no significant improvements in cost efficiency are found. In order to facilitate 
these improvements, a new regulatory framework is needed, where the choice should be 
made among incentive-based price regulation schemes. Rate of return regulation combined 
with benchmarking as proposed by the Rules on Price Determination of Obligatory Local 
Public Utilities for Environment Protection (2004) would be one of the appropriate 
alternatives.  
 
 
Keywords: SFA, cost frontier function, cost inefficiency, price regulation, water distribution 
utilities 
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1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Background and the Study Problem 
 
Network industries (water industry, electricity, gas, telecommunications, railways etc.) used 
to be typically vertically integrated national or regional monopolies with exclusive rights to 
serve customers. One reason for this industry structure was the common assumption that one 
single firm is able to operate with lower costs than if several firms were to supply the same 
level of output. Nonetheless, since the late 1980s a wave of reform has transformed the 
institutional framework, organisation and operating environment of network industries. 
Privatisation along with the market liberalisation of utilities and network infrastructure have 
become important policy objectives in many developed and developing countries. Although 
the structure of sectors and the approaches to reform vary between countries and sectors, the 
main aim is to improve the sector’s efficiency, effectiveness and competitiveness which 
should, in turn, result in lower prices for final customers. For instance, due to technological 
progress and public pressure to decrease prices, most electric power reforms have focused on 
the introduction of competition in generation and supply, whereas due to their natural 
monopoly character transmission and distribution activities remain regulated (Jamasb and 
Pollitt, 2001). On the other hand, reforms of the water industry usually only involve the 
introduction of new incentive-based regulatory approaches since the technology does not 
facilitate the introduction of direct or side-by-side competition. Moreover, in some countries 
privatisation of the water industry has been carried out, for example, in the UK. 
 
Despite the ongoing reforms, there is clearly still a need to regulate the water sector since it 
is characterised as a natural monopoly. Moreover, the regulation should be designed in such 
a way as to provide incentives for cost reduction and more efficient production. Regulatory 
authorities world-wide have adopted a variety of approaches to regulate distribution prices. 
The most widely adopted incentive-based schemes involve price cap (RPI-X), revenue cap, 
yardstick regulation and other benchmarking methods.1 These schemes aim to give firms an 
incentive for efficient production and cost reduction. However, due to the imperfect 
information available to the regulator there are some problems with price-cap regulation 
since the regulator does not know a firm’s true costs. High costs may reflect a firm’s 
particular production situation or simply its inefficiency. Thus, if price caps are set too high 
                                               
1
 A review of different regulatory schemes can be found in Joskow and Schmalensee (1986). 
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there is a possibility of a welfare loss while very low price caps could see firms ending up 
with viability problems. To overcome this informational asymmetry problem between the 
regulator and firms, some form of benchmarking analysis can be applied in setting 
productivity or efficiency requirements for regulated firms. In this case, benchmarking 
analysis is used to establish a larger information basis for more effective price-cap 
regulation. There is thus a close link between the efficiency measurement and incentive-
based price regulation methods such as price cap and yardstick regulation. As will be 
discussed later, in some countries the regulatory authorities make direct use of benchmarking 
results in the process of setting prices.  
 
Unfortunately, the evidence from empirical studies shows that the various benchmarking 
methods often produce different results with respect to firms’ efficiency scores and 
rankings.2 A possible explanation of this inconsistency problem relates to the difficulty of 
benchmarking methods in accounting for unobservable heterogeneity in environmental and 
network characteristics across companies (Filippini, Farsi and Fetz, 2005). This is 
particularly undesirable if the results are to be used in economic policy-making. The 
regulatory authorities are typically faced with a problem of choosing the most appropriate 
technique to be put into practice. Despite extensive research carried out in the field of 
efficiency measurement, so far there is no consensus on which method has been found to 
perform the best. Since the various benchmarking methods may lead us to different results 
and none of the methods has been proven to be superior with respect to the others, it is 
important to be aware of the advantages and disadvantages of applying the different 
benchmarking approaches to measure a firm’s performance. In addition, it is important to 
study the consistency and reliability of the results obtained regarding firms’ productivity or 
efficiency. In the absence of any consensus on the most appropriate technique to use, a 
purely pragmatic approach would entail a combination of results from the different models. 
 
The current Slovenian price regulation of water utilities closely resembles the traditional 
rate-of-return regulation, which has not been shown to provide sufficient incentives for 
efficiency improvements. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the rules on price regulation 
recently issued by the government (i.e., Rules on Price Determination of Obligatory Local 
Public Utilities for Environment Protection, 2004) envisage the benchmarking of costs and 
quality combined with the rate-of-return regulation. However, the rules have not yet been put 
into practice, nor has been the benchmarking method specified. Incentive regulation like a 
price-cap scheme, yardstick competition or rate-of-return regulation combined with the 
                                               
2
 For example, see Bauer et al. (1998), Estache, Rossi and Ruzzier (2004), and Farsi and Filippini 
(2004). 
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benchmarking of the costs appears to be a good alternative to be implemented in the 
Slovenian water sector. For example, since 2003 a price-cap regulation combined with 
benchmarking has been applied to Slovenian electricity distribution utilities (AERS, 2004). 
In the EU water industry context, the two best-practice examples are the UK regulator 
OFWAT and the Italian Regulation Authority where benchmarking combined with either a 
price-cap or rate-of-return regulation is already in use (OFWAT, 1999; Massarutto, 1999).  
 
In the following thesis, the use of parametric frontier benchmarking methods is considered to 
analyse the performance of Slovenian water distribution utilities. Several different stochastic 
frontier methods are employed to estimate the cost frontier function and cost inefficiency of 
water distribution utilities. Since these utilities operate in different regions with different 
environmental and network characteristics that are only partially observed, it is essential to 
be able to distinguish between inefficiency and unobserved heterogeneity that influences the 
costs. Until recently, this issue has been neglected in empirical work since the traditional 
stochastic frontier models are unable to make a distinction between these two effects. As a 
result, heterogeneity has often been confounded with inefficiency. Since this may have 
serious financial consequences for regulated companies, it is crucial to be able to explicitly 
model cost differences that are due to heterogeneity and inefficiency. New developments in 
the field of stochastic frontier analysis, namely true random and true fixed effects proposed 
by Greene (2002a, b), can help us address this issue. Further, unobserved heterogeneity, if 
not properly accounted, might not only influence inefficiency estimates but might, if 
correlated with regressors, result in biased coefficients of the cost frontier function as well. 
To overcome this problem, Mundlak’s (1978) formulation is considered. If the results based 
on the stochastic frontier analysis are supposed to be used by regulatory authorities then their 
reliability is vital. Thus, we analyse the consistency of the cost inefficiency estimates 
obtained from both conventional panel data models and the newly proposed models. We are 
especially interested in finding out whether accounting for unobserved heterogeneity in the 
model significantly influences the results. Finally, we propose how the results of 
benchmarking analysis could be employed in regulating water prices in Slovenia.  
 
1.2 Goals  
 
The main objective of the thesis is to estimate a cost frontier function for a panel data set of 
Slovenian water distribution utilities over the 1997-2003 period by using several parametric 
approaches in order to:  
 estimate the cost inefficiency levels of water distribution companies considering the 
presence of unobserved heterogeneity in the model; 
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 analyse the reliability and consistency of the individual inefficiency estimates obtained 
by applying different parametric frontier benchmarking methods; 
 establish the existence of economies of scale and density, and ascertain the optimal 
size of the water utilities;  
 estimate and decompose the total factor productivity growth in the Slovenian water 
industry; and 
 evaluate the relevance of the results obtained for economic policy-making and propose 
how the results could be used in price-regulation process.  
 
1.3 Methodology 
 
To place stochastic frontier analysis within the larger context of metric benchmarking 
methods and to justify the choice of the method, we briefly present different benchmarking 
methods and point out some of their main advantages and disadvantages. The benchmarking 
of utilities can broadly be defined as the comparison of some measure of actual performance 
against a reference or benchmark performance. It can be used in the incentive regulation to 
promote improved efficiency by rewarding good performance relative to some pre-defined 
benchmark. Since the rewards are based on performance, two key issues that emerge are the 
choice of appropriate benchmarks and the techniques used to measure the performance. 
According to the classification suggested by Jamasb and Pollitt (2001), actual performance 
can be measured against benchmarks that are derived from the ‘best/frontier’ practice or 
some ‘representative/average’ measure of performance. The classification of benchmarking 
methods is presented in Figure 1.1.  
 
Average benchmarking methods may be used to mimic competition among firms with 
relatively similar costs or where there is a lack of sufficient data or firms with which to 
compare for the application of frontier methods. The regression-based average benchmarking 
method is the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method. OLS estimates the average production 
function or the cost function of a sample of firms which then serves as a benchmark in 
evaluating firms’ performance. In the case of a panel data set, conventional fixed and 
random effects panel data models can also be applied. Another method based on average 
performance is the use of indices as the benchmark, such as Total Factor Productivity (TFP) 
index. Input quantities, output quantities and prices are required to construct a TPF index. An 
important advantage of the index-number approach is that it requires a minimal amount of 
data. It requires only two data points, either observations of two firms in one time period or 
observations of one firm in two periods, while the parametric approaches need a number of 
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firms to be observed. However, this approach does not account for noise and measurement 
error.  
 
From a regulatory policy point of view, a big difference between average and frontier 
benchmarking is that the latter has a stronger focus on performance variations between firms. 
The frontier-based benchmarking methods identify or estimate the efficient performance 
frontier from the best practice used in an industry or a sample of firms. The efficient frontier 
then becomes a benchmark against which the relative performance of firms is measured, 
with inefficiency being viewed as a deviation from the optimal point on the frontier. Frontier 
methods can therefore be used for setting firm-specific efficiency requirements. This 
approach can be suitable in the initial stages of regulatory reform when a priority objective is 
to reduce the performance gap among utilities.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Classification of benchmarking methods according to Jamasb and Pollitt (2001) 
 
The main frontier benchmarking methods are Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), Corrected 
Ordinary Least Squares (COLS), and Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA). DEA is a non-
parametric (linear programming) approach, while COLS and SFA are parametric (statistical) 
techniques.  
 
BENCHMARKING 
Average 
Benchmarking 
Frontier 
Benchmarking 
Indices Parametric Parametric Non-parametric 
TPF OLS 
Deterministic 
DEA 
Stochastic 
COLS SFA 
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DEA was introduced by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978) and Banker, Charnes and 
Cooper (1984).3 The former paper assumes constant returns to scale, while in the latter 
variable returns to scale are assumed. DEA involves the use of linear programming methods 
to calculate (rather than estimate) a non-parametric piece-wise efficient frontier.4 Firms that 
make up the frontier envelop the less efficient firms. Efficiency measures are calculated 
relative to this frontier. The efficiency of the firms is calculated in terms of scores on a scale 
from 0 to 1 with the frontier firms receiving a score of 1. DEA does not require the 
specification of a cost or production function, which is an advantage over the parametric 
methods. However, the method does not allow for stochastic factors and measurement errors, 
which can influence the shape and position of frontier. Outliers may also notably influence 
the results. Moreover, efficiency scores tend to be sensitive to the choice of input and output 
variables. The exclusion of important input or output data can lead to biased results. In 
addition, as more variables are included in the model the number of firms on the frontier 
increases.  
 
Parametric frontier methods require the specification of a cost or production function and 
therefore involve assumptions about the technology of the firm’s production process. 
Flexible functional forms are recommended in order not to impose overly restrictive 
assumptions on the technology. The COLS method is based on regression analysis and is 
relatively simple to implement. It was introduced by Winsten (1957). One drawback of the 
COLS method is that it does not allow for stochastic errors and relies heavily on the position 
of the single most efficient unit. It assumes that all deviations from the frontier can be 
attributed solely due to inefficiency. This shortcoming can be avoided by using stochastic 
frontier methods. In contrast with the deterministic COLS method, SFA recognises the 
possibility of stochastic errors. However, accounting for stochastic errors requires the 
specification of a probability function for the distribution of the statistical noise and 
inefficiencies. Compared to DEA, the main advantages of SFA are that it allows for 
stochastic error and that conventional tests of hypotheses regarding the existence of 
inefficiency and regarding the structure of the production technology can be conducted 
(Coelli, Rao and Battese, 1998).  
 
SFA was introduced by Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and van den 
Broeck (1977). In subsequent papers, Pitt and Lee (1981) and Schmidt and Sickles (1984) 
                                               
3
 Good references for the theoretical aspects of DEA are Cooper, Seinford and Tone (2003) and Zhu 
(2003). 
4
 Another non-parametric frontier technique to be mentioned is Free Disposal Hull (FDH). For details, 
see Cooper, Seinford and Tone (2003). 
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proposed stochastic frontier models for panel data. Over the years, many extensions to the 
originally proposed stochastic frontier models have been developed.5 We will be in particular 
interested in those panel data models that are able to separate unobserved heterogeneity from 
inefficiency. Therefore, we investigate in some more detail the true fixed and true random 
effects models recently developed by Greene (2002a, 2002b), which capture the effects of 
time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity by a separate term. Mundlak’s (1978) formulation 
of the random effects model as proposed by Farsi, Filippini and Kuenzle (2005) is also 
considered since this model has the ability to control for the correlation between unobserved 
heterogeneity and explanatory variables. Nevertheless, despite the intense research effort so 
far there is no consensus on what is the best frontier benchmarking method.  
 
In the thesis we will focus on parametric frontier methods for estimating inefficiency and 
leave non-parametric methods aside. Arguments for this choice are the abovementioned 
shortcomings of DEA and the fact that parametric methods allow us to analyse in more detail 
not only the cost inefficiency but also the economies of size, output density and customer 
density. It should be also stressed that DEA is unable to account for unobserved 
heterogeneity, which may be quite high in network industries. As a result, the efficiency 
scores obtained may be considerably biased. Since one of the main focuses of the thesis is 
the separation of unobserved heterogeneity from inefficiency, this method cannot be 
regarded as appropriate for our analysis. The cost frontier function may be further utilised to 
predict costs and decompose total factor productivity growth in several components, which 
are all interesting and relevant extensions to the main analysis. Several parametric frontier 
benchmarking methods will be employed to estimate the cost frontier function on a panel 
data set of Slovenian water distribution utilities. The COLS method, which estimates the 
deterministic frontier cost function, will be used to cross-check the SFA results, the latter 
being the main methodology used in the analysis. Hence, another important issue to study is 
the consistency of inefficiency scores obtained by the different methods employed.  
 
1.4 Outline 
 
Chapter 2 investigates the current state, major changes and problems of the water sector in 
Slovenia. The legal and institutional framework of the water industry is provided, while past 
price movements and the performance of water distribution utilities are examined. The 
current regulatory framework and price-setting rules in the Slovenian water industry are 
analysed. The relevant EU legislation relating to the water policy and water pricing is also 
                                               
5
 A good review of different stochastic frontier methods is provided in Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000). 
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presented along with some best-practice examples of water price regulation in EU countries. 
Chapter 2 also provides the rationale for the regulation of network industries, examines 
different regulatory schemes and discusses their advantages and shortcomings. The 
shortcomings have to be taken into account when choosing the appropriate regulatory 
scheme. The focus is on incentive-based price regulation since it is shown to provide strong 
incentives to reduce costs and improve efficiency. Different approaches to incentive-based 
regulation are reviewed, namely the price cap (RPI-X regulation), revenue cap, yardstick 
regulation and (other) benchmarking methods. It is also shown how the regulator can 
overcome informational asymmetry problems associated with price-cap regulation by 
employing yardstick competition or some form of benchmarking analysis. Thus, a close link 
between regulation and efficiency is established.  
 
Chapter 3 explores different concepts of (in)efficiency, namely technical inefficiency, 
allocative inefficiency, cost inefficiency and scale inefficiency. Closely related to the 
concept of technical efficiency, the distance function is introduced. Similarly, the cost 
frontier is defined, which is a standard against which to measure cost efficiency. Cost-
minimisation behaviour and the properties of the cost function are studied in more detail. 
The use of short-run vs. long-run cost functions is discussed. Further, the optimal size of the 
firm and associated economies of scale and scale efficiency are examined. Cost 
subadditivity, which is a proper criterion for a natural monopoly, is also discussed. Finally, 
the distinction between economies of output density, economies of customer density and 
economies of scale (or, more accurately, economies of size) is made, this being particularly 
important in the case of network industries.  
 
Chapter 4 studies different functional forms for estimating the cost function. Traditional and 
flexible functional forms are reviewed and the criteria for choosing the most appropriate 
functional form are provided.  
 
Chapter 5 examines parametric frontier benchmarking methods for measuring cost 
(in)efficiency. The deterministic COLS method and several SFA methods are considered. 
Depending on the nature of the data set stochastic frontier methods are classified in cross-
sectional and panel data models. Special stress will be put on panel data models which allow 
for many different possibilities for estimating the cost frontier and corresponding 
inefficiencies. The panel data models are shown to be able to distinguish between 
inefficiency and unobserved heterogeneity captured by firm-specific effects, but not all panel 
data models do this equally well.  
 
Chapter 1                    9 
 
Chapter 6 estimates the frontier cost function of Slovenian water distribution utilities. 
Several parametric frontier models are employed. A literature review of studies analysing the 
costs of water distribution companies is used as a starting point for specifying the total cost 
function of Slovenian water distribution utilities. After the choice of the preferable functional 
form is made, the cost frontier function is estimated by several different methods.  
 
Chapter 7 continues the analysis from the previous chapter. Based on the cost frontier 
estimated by several models, the cost inefficiency scores of utilities are obtained and their 
consistency analysed. The choice of the best performing method is made. The presence of 
economies of output density, customer density and economies of scale is also examined. In 
addition, alternative uses of the cost function are explored, namely for the purposes of cost 
predictions and the total factor productivity growth decomposition. It is shown how the cost 
frontier function can be employed to decompose TFP growth into several components, 
namely cost efficiency change, technical change and scale efficiency change. We as well 
evaluate results from the economic policy-making perspective and discuss how the results 
could be applied in the price-regulation process.  
 
Chapter 8 summarises the main findings of the thesis and provides final conclusions on the 
cost efficiency and price regulation of Slovenian water distribution utilities.  
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2 Organisation and Regulation of the 
Slovenian Water Industry 
 
In this chapter we present the Slovenian water industry, which is part of the Slovenian 
communal sector providing public services of drinking water supply, wastewater treatment, 
solid waste management and some other services. We begin by describing the legal and 
institutional framework of the water industry and explore the current state, performance, 
price movements, major changes and problems of the communal sector in Slovenia. Before 
we investigate the price regulation of Slovenian water distribution utilities, different 
regulatory schemes are briefly reviewed – the traditional rate of return regulation and 
incentive-based regulation. Since the main focus of the thesis is efficiency, one of the central 
issues to be examined is the link between regulation and efficiency. Thus, the efficiency 
analysis introduced in the later chapters is put into the context of regulation. Yardstick 
competition and benchmarking is shown to be a useful tool in order to obtain the efficiency 
estimates needed for (incentive-based) price regulation. Since on 1 May 2004 Slovenia 
became a new EU member state it also has to comply with the EU legislation. We thus 
proceed by describing the relevant EU legislation concerning water-pricing issues. In 
addition, we provide some best-practice examples of water price regulation in EU countries. 
Finally, the current regulatory framework and price-setting rules in Slovenia’s water industry 
are analysed.  
 
2.1 Current State and Organisation of the Slovenian Water 
Sector 
 
2.1.1 Institutional Framework 
 
In Slovenia communal services, i.e. services related to water supply, wastewater treatment 
and solid waste collection and disposal, are generally managed at the local community level. 
They are classified as obligatory local public services since municipalities or local 
communities are obliged to provide these services. The core legal, regulatory and 
institutional framework addressing the issue of communal services and communal service 
providers in Slovenia consists of the following laws: the Public Utilities Act (adopted in 
1993), the Environment Protection Act (1993, 2004), the Law on Local Self-Government 
(1993), the Law on Financing Municipalities (1994), and the Law on Prices (1991) that was 
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replaced by the Law on Price Control (1999). The water sector is further regulated by the 
Water Act (2002, amended in 2004), which replaced the old Water Act (1981).  
 
Communal services in Slovenia are generally provided by public utilities. They can also be 
delegated to private entities at the local level, with the local community remaining 
responsible for regulating the service providers. The local community must control the 
quality of services and the prices charged.  
 
Public utilities have the exclusive right to provide public services in the territory of one or 
more local communities, which makes them local monopolists. Public utilities finance their 
operations in one of the following ways:  
 by charging prices for the public services delivered; the charge can also take the form 
of a tariff, tax, indemnity, compensation or reimbursement; 
 by receiving funds from the national budget or local community budget; and 
 from other sources.  
 
Prices are charged for the use of public services which are measurable and for which users 
can be defined. Public utilities can differentiate prices across different classes of consumers 
and with respect to the quantity used/supplied and the regularity/frequency of use. Prices can 
be subsidised provided that the amount and source of the subsidy are defined. Usually, 
public utilities receive subsidies from the national or local community’s budget. Public 
services which are not measurable and for which users can not be defined are financed from 
the budget. The infrastructure of public utilities can also be financed through short-term or 
long-term borrowing, where a loan is taken out by the state or local community.  
 
With respect to the ownership of communal sector public utilities, local communities are 
majority equity holders in most public utilities, while in some utilities they hold a minority 
share. The far most frequently utilised legal form of public utility that provides public 
services, in particular communal services, is the public enterprise.6 It is followed by 
concessions and joint ventures involving public capital. Usually, in smaller municipalities all 
communal activities are joined within a single company while in larger municipalities 
communal activities are provided separately by several companies. 
                                               
6
 The capital city of Ljubljana is the only one that provides local public services through a public 
holding company which consists of seven public enterprises providing the following public services: 
gas and heating, drinking and sewerage water, collecting and disposal of solid waste, city’s public 
transport, cemetery, and marketplaces.  
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2.1.2 Major Changes and Unresolved Problems Affecting the 
Sector’s Performance 
 
Before 1991, ‘socially-owned’ public enterprises were responsible for providing communal 
services as well as for investing in communal infrastructure.7 In many respects these 
enterprises were operating in a very similar way to any other enterprises of the Slovenian 
economy. Although the prices of communal services were controlled by the state at that 
time, they enabled enterprises to cover their operating costs and, besides that, the sector had 
two stable sources for funding communal infrastructure investments: depreciation charges 
and transfers from a state fund established especially for this purpose. The post-1991 period 
has witnessed dramatic changes in the legal environment and institutional framework in 
which local communities and their respective communal sector public utilities operate. These 
changes can be classified in two man groups: changes in the relationship between local 
communities and communal sector public utilities and changes in local communities’ 
legislation. Both had unfavourable impacts on the level of communal infrastructure 
investments (Mrak, 1997). 
 
Under the 1993 Public Utilities Act, the ownership of communal infrastructure was 
transferred to local communities meaning that they became owners of assets previously in 
the possession of communal sector public utilities. Accordingly, local communities as the 
new owners of communal infrastructure have become responsible for the investment 
required to maintain and upgrade communal infrastructure. Although at the conceptual level 
the 1993 law clearly defines the ownership rights of local communities regarding communal 
infrastructure, the related bylaws have not provided any precise guidelines for the law’s 
effective implementation. There were, for example, no clear accountancy instructions for the 
depreciation of communal infrastructure. As a result, depreciation has often not been 
properly included or has not been included at all in the financial statements of the new 
owners of infrastructure. The solution came in 1997 with the inclusion of special accounting 
                                               
7
 Before 1991, Slovenia was part of the Socialistic Federative Republic of Yugoslavia and had a 
market-planned economy. One of its peculiarities was that enterprises were owned neither by the state 
nor by individuals but by society as a whole. It was often said that enterprises were owned by 
everybody in general and nobody in particular. Thus, the enterprises did not have proper owners. After 
the disintegration of Yugoslavia in 1991, Slovenia became an independent state and entered into the 
transition period. The transition from a market-planned to a market economy was among others 
followed by the transformation of ownership, i.e. by nationalisation or the privatisation of previously 
socially-owned public enterprises.  
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standard (SRS 35) to the Slovenian Accounting Standards to deal with issues specific to the 
public sector. According to the SRS 35, utilities can either rent or manage the infrastructure. 
In the first case, public utilities have to pay the rent and the infrastructure does not enter their 
balance sheets while, in the second case, the infrastructure enters their balance sheets and 
they are responsible for depreciation.  
 
Another problem negatively influencing investment in communal infrastructure in Slovenia 
in recent years is the local community reform. As an integral part of this process, local 
communities were given new responsibilities yet the funding was not increased to account 
for these new duties. Further, under the 1993 Law on Local Self-Government the large 
majority of local communities were divided into two or more local communities. The 
number of local communities grew from 62 in 1991 to 192 in 2003. Since the resulting local 
communities are often very small in terms of their population (more than one-third of local 
communities in Slovenia have a population of less than 5,000 inhabitants) and weak in terms 
of their economic base, many do not have sufficient financial resources to invest in 
communal infrastructure. The issue of infrastructural investment is further complicated by 
the fact that the distribution of assets and liabilities of old local communities among the new 
ones has not yet been fully completed in all but a few cases. Some public utilities face the 
situation where they operate in more than one local community which exposes them to 
various problems as they have to deal with more than one owner of communal infrastructure 
and often with different legal regimes and tariff systems.  
 
Besides the problems related to the investment process, the poor financial performance of 
communal sector public utilities is another issue. Price determination, which is under 
government control, was based on political considerations and other macroeconomic goals 
(e.g. reducing inflation) so the prices of communal services in the post-independence period 
were increasing slower than the inflation rate, and public utilities providing communal 
services were not allowed to increase their prices to the full-cost level (Štruc, 1997). 
Consequently, the financial health of communal sector public utilities was, and still is, well 
below the financial performance of the Slovenian economy as a whole. In fact, most 
communal sector public utilities are unable to cover the total costs they incur and therefore 
operate at a loss, which is highly unsustainable in the long run. Some relevant indicators of 
the size, performance and prices of the Slovenian water sector are given in Appendix I. 
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2.1.3 Water Prices in the Post-1991 Period 
 
Since early 1992, the prices of communal services have been continuously under the control 
of the Ministry of Economic Relations and Development. Several decrees, rules and 
guidelines on the price determination of communal services have been issued by the 
government. Although various price adjustment procedures have been applied over the 
whole period up to the present time, their common feature has been to allow the prices of 
public utility services to rise by a rate lower than the industrial producer price index for the 
respective period (i.e., in real terms the prices have been decreasing). If the prices of 
communal services were not sufficiently high to cover current expenditures, utilities were, as 
an exception, allowed higher price increase. The prices of water supplied over the 1991-2000 
period are provided in Appendix I (Table I.1). 
 
This price-setting policy has not allowed communal service providers to cover all their 
operating and capital costs. In most cases, tariffs have only been sufficient to cover current 
expenditures but not to finance regular maintenance and the replacement of fixed assets, not 
to mention new investments (Hrovatin, 2002). In an analysis carried out by Kavčič (2000) it 
was discovered that in 1998 the average costs were on average 30 percent higher than the 
average price of water supplied to different customer groups. Moreover, most public utilities 
providing drinking water operated at a loss. Similar findings were also reported for 
wastewater treatment, as well as the collection and disposal of solid waste. 
 
In order to improve their poor financial position caused by the restrictive price regulation, 
communal service providers had to find ‘creative’ solutions to find new funding sources. 
One of the most commonly used practices over the examined period was the introduction of 
local environmental fees aimed at tackling the specific pollution concerns of the local 
population. Another issue to be pointed out is that there are some striking differences 
between the prices charged in different local communities. This arises from the fact that 
public utilities had very different starting positions before price control was introduced (see 
Appendix I, Table I.1). However, this issue failed to be recognised by the relevant 
authorities. So, after the price control was put in place these utilities were put in an unequal 
position and were faced with different operating environments (Hrovatin, 2002).  
 
As in many transition economies, another distinguishing feature of the prices for communal 
services in Slovenia is that there are significant differences in price levels for water supply 
between different customer groups. The prices for water supply have been by far the lowest 
for households and the highest for businesses. However, the range of prices paid by different 
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customer groups has narrowed over time (Štruc, 1997). Different prices for different groups 
of customers may sometimes be justified by differences in the costs of providing services. 
However, the policy of subsidising households and thereby addressing social policy issues 
seems to be a more plausible explanation of why the existing tariff structure weighs more 
heavily on businesses than on households. This should, however, be weighted against the 
distorting effects of low-priced services. Not only do customers receive misleading signals as 
to the real value of services, reducing their incentives for efficiency, but subsidisation also 
results in the deferment of urgent investment in communal infrastructure while private 
capital is not interested in entering such sectors and participating in the investment process. 
 
Clearly, the strategic objective of the communal sector in Slovenia should be to move 
towards the reliable and cost-efficient provision of communal services which will duly take 
account of the security of supply, safety of the population and protection of the environment 
and be in compliance with the relevant EU legislation. In order to achieve this objective, a 
whole range of co-ordinated policy measures has to be designed and put into operation. The 
following core elements of the communal sector’s transformation consistent with the EU’s 
legislation and regulatory framework have been identified (Mrak, 2000):  
 introduction of cost-reflective prices of communal infrastructure services and tariff 
reform; 
 introduction of competition for the market, restructuring of service providers and 
private sector involvement; 
 a legal and institutional framework which would provide clear rules for private sector 
involvement in communal infrastructure investment and in the provision of communal 
services; and 
 a regulatory framework: independent yet accountable regulatory authorities are needed 
to oversee utilities (instead of supervision by ministries).  
 
In what follows we primarily focus on issues related to the regulatory framework and price 
setting methodology in the Slovenian water sector. Before we analyse this issue, we briefly 
discuss the different regulatory schemes that have been the most commonly used in the water 
sector. Also, the EU legislation relating to water pricing will be presented together with two 
best-practice examples of price regulation in the EU water sector. These schemes will then 
serve as benchmarks against which the current Slovenian price regulation design will be 
judged.  
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2.2 Different Price Regulation Schemes  
 
Network industries demonstrate substantial economies of scale since by their very nature 
they are extremely capital-intensive. As fixed costs form a substantial amount of total costs, 
it is cheaper for a single company to provide services associated with the network. Network 
industries thus provide a clear example of natural monopolies.8 The competition in this case 
is ineffective since new entries would lead to the problem of excessive entry that involves 
the needless duplication of fixed costs associated with the network (Baldwin and Cave, 
1999). Even if the existence of the natural monopoly is justified, economists have long 
recognised that a monopoly does not lead to the desired market outcome since it results in 
production and allocative inefficiencies. The monopolist will, if left alone, set higher prices 
and sell lower quantities of output compared to the situation in a competitive market. The 
recognition of these problems, among other issues, has provided sound justification for the 
need for the price regulation of network industries in order to prevent the abuse of monopoly 
power. This has led to a long history of attempts to regulate natural monopolies and to a vast 
literature discussing the problems and attempts at regulation (Netz, 1999).  
 
In practice, there are two main forms of regulatory control: the traditional rate-of-return 
(RoR) regulation or cost-of-service (CoS) regulation, and incentive-based or performance-
based regulation (e.g., price cap, revenue cap). The rate-of-return regulation originates from 
the US where it has a long tradition. Utilities there tend to be privately owned rather than 
embedded in government departments and have been subject to regulation by specific rate 
commissions. The existing regulatory structure has been established over a long period of a 
formal legal procedure dating back to the late 19th century (Crew and Kleindorfer, 1986). 
Historically, most other countries chose public ownership as the common method for 
controlling natural monopolies. Because of recent shifts towards privatisation worldwide, 
other countries have also had to establish regulatory agencies and develop a regulatory 
methodology to oversee the newly privatised firms. As a response to some serious flaws in 
the rate-of-return regulation, alternative regulatory schemes such as price-cap schemes have 
been taken into consideration. Although a few American precursors can be identified, price-
cap regulation (RPI-X regulation) was first applied on the large scale in the UK. Price 
capping was initially developed as a temporary control mechanism in the transition to full 
competition for UK telecommunications (Littlechild, 1983) and then extended to other UK 
                                               
8
 The formal definition of a natural monopoly and economies of scale will be given in Chapter 3, 
Section 3.5.  
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utilities as they were privatised.9 Yet price-cap regulation is also not without its 
shortcomings. Further, since regulation and performance are closely related one of the key 
issues is how to obtain reliable efficiency and productivity indicators to be entered into the 
price-cap formula. Incentive-based regulation is thus frequently combined with some form of 
benchmarking analysis. In the water industry, for example, the rate-of-return regulation is 
typically applied in the US (Mann, 1993), the UK exercises price-cap regulation combined 
with benchmarking (OFWAT, 1999) while in Italy benchmarking or yardstick competition is 
used in the price-setting process (Massarutto, 1999).  
 
2.2.1 Rate-of-Return Regulation 
 
Rate-of-return regulation aims at preventing the exploitation of consumers by a company 
with monopoly power. It tries to prevent the abuse of monopoly power, that is the ability to 
earn excess profits by setting prices above the current long-run cost of supply for an efficient 
company. Accordingly, the regulator sets prices for the utility in such a way that they cover 
the utility’s costs and include a rate of return on capital that is sufficient to maintain the 
investor’s willingness to replace or expand the company’s assets. This is why RoR 
regulation is also known as cost-plus regulation (Baldwin and Cave, 1999). While this form 
of regulation is apparently simple and seems as if it would achieve feasible average-cost 
prices, it will be discussed below that in practice average-cost prices are not achieved 
because the regulatory mechanism in fact gives firms an incentive not to minimise their 
costs.  
 
Regulators determine the revenue required to give the utility a fair rate of return and then set 
prices so as to recover this revenue. This can be stated by means of the following cost-plus 
formula (Hill, 1995): 
 
)( ADRBRORTDepOPEXRev −×+++=  (2.1) 
 
where: 
Rev – required revenues 
OPEX – operating expenditures 
Dep – depreciation expenses for the current year 
T – taxes  
ROR – allowed rate of return 
                                               
9
 Armstrong, Cowan and Vickers (1994) described incentive regulation in the UK. 
18                                                    Organisation and regulation of the Slovenian water industry  
 
RB – rate base, i.e. gross value of the utility’s property (plant investment, including 
an allowance for working capital) 
AD – accumulated depreciation 
 
The calculation in Eq.(2.1) can be based either on historical accounting costs or projected 
costs. The value of the rate asset base depends on whether the regulator uses original costs, 
which is the typical approach, or replacement costs. If the regulator does not consider an 
item of plant used and useful, it may not be allowed in the rate base. A utility is allowed to 
earn revenues to cover all expenses plus a return on its investment in useful plant and 
equipment. Fixing ‘fair’ or ‘reasonable’ rates of return involves a balancing of the investor’s 
and consumers’ interests. For instance, from the point of view of an investor of company it is 
important that there be enough revenue not only for operating expenses but also for the 
capital costs of the business. The owner should be entitled to the return on equity that 
corresponds to the return on investments in other enterprises with comparable risks (Crew 
and Kleindorfer, 1986).  
 
Once an estimate of the overall level of required revenues is obtained, total operating and 
capital costs are assigned to different service classes (e.g. residential and business 
customers). This is done on the basis of cost-causation principles. Prices for each class of a 
utility’s service i (Pi) are the ratios of allocated costs (Ci) to historical or estimated sales (Si): 
 
iii SCP =  (2.2) 
 
where sales are expressed in physical units sold to a given class of final customers. Because 
the assigned costs are typically accounting costs rather than economic costs there is usually 
some arbitrariness in assigning them to individual customer groups (Hill, 1995). 
 
In summarising, the general principle underlying RoR regulation is that the firm should 
recover its costs (i.e., P = AC) and consumers should pay a fair price, with fairness argued on 
the basis of the cost-causation principle. The emphasis on fair rates seems to be much more 
closely related to equity than to economic efficiency. Neither efficient pricing nor productive 
efficiency seem to be directly addressed by RoR regulation. Since RoR regulation does not 
directly provide incentives for efficient production, at the least the regulator can attempt to 
control the size of all variables on the right-hand side of Eq.(2.1), disallowing certain items if 
they are excessive. While regulation does not seem to be very concerned with promoting 
productive efficiency in either a traditional static sense or in a dynamic sense by providing 
incentives for research and development, it does, however, achieve a stable basis for 
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operations as the companies are prepared to make the investments required (Crew and 
Kleindorfer, 1986). 
 
Rate-of-return regulation is subject to several flaws. The first, obvious disadvantage has 
already been established. There is a lack of an incentive to reduce costs and operate 
efficiently since the company knows it will be able to recover any growing costs through a 
subsequent price increase. Prices are primarily based on historical costs. Provided that price 
reviews take place often enough the firm pays no penalty for inefficiency. On the other hand, 
the firm benefits little from any efficiency gain. This arises because, if any cost savings are 
made, they will almost immediately be taken from the firm and given to consumers in the 
form of lower prices (Baldwin and Cave, 1999).  
 
The second disadvantage is the bias towards capital-intensive production methods. This 
phenomenon is also known as the Averch-Johnson effect. Averch and Johnson (1962) 
demonstrated that the marginal rate of technical substitution of capital for labour is lower for 
a profit-maximising regulated firm than for a cost minimiser, the latter equating this quantity 
to the cost of capital to the wage rate ratio. It follows that under this regulation capital is 
over-utilised and labour is under-utilised relative to any cost-minimising solution. Regulated 
firms have an incentive to over-invest in capital equipment since this expands the ‘rate base’ 
(i.e. the value of capital employed) against which the rate of return is measured and so 
allows higher absolute levels of profit for a given relative rate of return. As a result, this will 
skew inefficiency in the direction of the excessive use of capital (Baldwin and Cave, 1999).  
 
The Averch-Johnson result is important since it shows how rate-of-return regulation 
introduces inefficiency to the capital-labour ratio, i.e. allocative inefficiency. If the Averch-
Johnson effect were, ceteris paribus, the only result of RoR regulation, the regulation would 
be an obvious failure. However, regulation can increase output and reduce prices sufficiently 
so that, even though costs are not minimised, there is a welfare gain from regulation. It is 
argued that the primary concern of RoR regulation is with the equity aspects of monopoly, 
preventing the monopolist from exploiting consumers. It is also not possible to say in general 
that the output or capital intensity of the regulated firm will exceed that of a pure monopolist 
(Crew and Kleindorfer, 1986). 
 
Another disadvantage of RoR regulation is the extremely detailed nature of regulation in 
terms of defining the rate base and monitoring the rates of return actually achieved. The 
regulatory intervention is the commission process dictated at determining a fair rate of 
return, together with a definition of the rate base and allowable expenses. There is a scope 
for a substantial amount of ‘gaming’ between the regulatory commission and the utility. Rate 
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hearings occur on a frequent basis necessitating a large amount of effort on the part of the 
regulated utility and the regulatory body.  
 
2.2.2 Price-Cap Regulation 
 
Price-cap or RPI–X regulation has emerged as an alternative to rate-of-return regulation. In 
large part the problems arising in the RoR regulation are due to the fact that regulated firms 
do not have an incentive to operate at minimum cost. Price-cap regulatory schemes attempt 
to focus regulatory scrutiny on efficiency and performance improvements rather than the rate 
of return on the rate base, as in RoR regulation. While Littlechild (1983) developed a 
practical basis for RPI-X regulation, Vogelsang and Finsinger (1979) developed the 
theoretical basis for price-cap regulation.10 Essentially, the advantages of price control are 
that it avoids the disadvantages of rate-of-return regulation. Under price-capping, prices are 
set in advance for a period of three to five years allowing the firm to benefit from any cost 
savings made during that period, but they are then recalculated at regular intervals in order to 
bring them back into line with the underlying costs. The price cap usually permits a utility to 
increase its overall level of prices by the previous year’s rate of inflation, as measured by the 
retail price index (RPI), minus a percentage productivity factor (X) that reflects the real-cost 
reduction the regulator expects. Prices (Pt) are therefore set according to the following 
formula: 
 
1)1( −×−+= tt PXRPIP . (2.3) 
 
Unlike RoR regulation, price-cap regulation does not simply allow a firm to recover 
whatever cost it has historically incurred. Instead, the regulator makes cost projections into 
the future and sets overall prices so that they recover those expected costs. Price-cap 
regulation is thus forward-looking. If the regulated firm is able to increase its efficiency and 
reduce costs more than the regulator anticipates, its profits will go up. If it is less efficient 
than expected, its profits will go down. This system of ‘periodic’ price capping has been 
shown to give strong incentives to improve efficiency, thereby earning economic profits. 
Through economic profits, improved efficiency is revealed to the regulators who take this 
information into account at the next periodic review of price limits. The benefits arising from 
the company’s lower costs due to improved efficiency can thereby be passed on to 
                                               
10
 They developed a regulatory mechanism similar to the price cap. For discussions of price-cap 
regulation, see Vickers and Yarrow (1988).  
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consumers in the form of lower prices. The quid pro quo of higher profits today is lower 
consumer prices tomorrow (Vass, 2000).  
 
Price-cap regulation refers to a class or type of rate regulation, not to a specific scheme. The 
precise nature of this type of regulatory scheme depends upon how the basic elements in the 
rate-cap formula are defined. Some schemes apply the cap to total revenue (P in Eq.(2.3) is 
replaced by QP × ), while other schemes apply the cap to P, the weighted average price. In 
either case, the firm can increase profits by reducing costs. In the latter case, it can also 
increase profits by increasing the quantity sold. A scheme for price caps is simpler than for 
revenue caps and avoids the need to forecast volumes. It also provides an incentive to the 
regulated firm to serve new customers and develop new business. On the other hand, a price 
cap shifts the risk of fluctuations in system usage to the regulated firm. A revenue cap 
mitigates this risk (Hall, 2000). 
 
Price-cap rates are set at fixed, periodic intervals, typically three to five years. This practice 
contrasts with RoR regulation where the period between rate cases is usually variable and in 
general controlled by the utility. Frequent reviews will tend to undermine the incentive 
properties of price-cap regulation, while infrequent reviews create the possibility of prices 
deviating from costs over an extended period of time. The initial revision of the price 
structure and price levels prior to the beginning of price- cap regulation is essential. A 
regulatory failure may be at least partly avoided by setting initial prices to reflect the costs 
prior to imposing the RPI–X regulation. Under price-cap regulation the regulated prices are 
set at a level that enables the generation of sufficient revenues to cover all justified costs of 
the utilities.  
 
The productivity improvement in the price-cap formula, the X factor, assures that 
productivity improvements are passed on and that existing above-normal profits and cost 
inefficiencies are removed. The X factor assures that customers receive some price benefits 
as a result of price-cap regulation and that management will have to achieve some target 
level of efficiency improvement before stakeholders benefit from enhanced profits as a result 
of lower costs and/or additional sales. Usually, the X is set to reflect the expected growth in 
total factor productivity based on past TFP growth. The greater the X, the tighter is the 
constraint. The individual X-factor is usually based on two pieces of information – on the 
rate of productivity growth reported in the industry in recent years and on the firm’s cost 
inefficiency, i.e. on the extent that a given firm is operating below the best practice in the 
industry (Coelli et al., 2003). Productivity growth is therefore a broader concept than 
efficiency improvement. In some cases, regulators only consider the latter component of TFP 
growth.  
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However, since only imperfect information is available to the regulators they can merely 
observe the firm’s actual level of costs while the firm itself has an accurate view of what it 
can achieve. Regulators can remedy this problem by obtaining better information about the 
firm’s productive potential. In setting the yearly efficiency factors, the regulator could 
perform some form of benchmarking analysis of the utilities’ costs.11  
 
There are different ways to translate the efficiency scores, θ, obtained by the benchmarking 
analysis into the X-factors. An extreme case would be to impose a direct link. In the case of 
cost benchmarking, the efficiency score θ  reveals a utility’s efficient level of costs as 
opposed to its actually incurred costs. In other words, the utility could on average produce 
the same level of output at θ×100% of its current costs. The X-factor could then reflect the 
path from the actual cost level towards the efficient cost level through a gradual decrease in 
prices through time. If T is the duration of the regulatory period in years and θ the efficiency 
score obtained by one of the benchmarking techniques, then the yearly X-factor would be set 
such that:  
 
θ=− TX )1( . (2.4) 
 
Firms that operate at higher productivity levels would be given a higher efficiency score and 
consequently a lower X-factor reflecting the expected reduction in costs as a result of an 
increase in productivity. This introduces a degree of competitive pressure. The link between 
the benchmarking results and the X-factors can also be less direct. If the regulator believes it 
can only imperfectly perform a benchmarking analysis, rather than directly deriving the X-
factors from corresponding efficiency scores, it may wish to use the results merely as a 
starting point for setting the X-factors. The benchmarking results would in such a case 
provide information on the range in which the X-factor could be located.  
 
The regulator can also explicitly take into consideration the network quality and reliability of 
supply requirements. This is because profits can be increased not only by reducing costs but 
also by reducing service quality. With RoR regulation there is an incentive to ‘gold-plate’ 
service quality and reliability. Thus, defining a minimum standard is not a problem. With 
price-cap schemes it is vital that regulators define minimum standards and enforce them in 
order to prevent the temptation to ‘cut corners’ (Hall, 2000).  
 
                                               
11
 Recall Section 1.3, where different benchmarking methods are presented.  
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While the price cap mechanism gives firms some incentive for efficient production, it is not, 
however, without its own problems. If firms recognise that prices ultimately follow costs, 
they may well not reduce costs to efficient levels. For this reason, a regulator needs reliable 
estimates of the productivity or efficiency potential of the regulated firm. This can be 
obtained by employing yardstick competition or some form of benchmarking analysis, as 
will be further discussed in the next section. From the earlier discussion it can also be 
concluded that price-cap regulation does not exempt the regulator from the need to examine 
the utilities’ cost of capital and whether the allowed revenues will provide an adequate return 
on capital. The price-cap regulation is in this sense similar to RoR regulation since both 
models require the regulator to address the same issue, that is the need for the regulatory 
scheme to ensure that the approved rates allow investors to recover the cost of the capital 
they provide. It should also be noted that RoR regulation is not an automatic cost-pass-
through process. Rather, fixed rates are established and apply until they are changed. Usually 
the utility proposes the changes and the changes are approved by the regulator, often with 
modifications. Thus, because of the ‘rate lag’ there is another similarity between rate-of-
return regulation and price-cap regulation. Nonetheless, price-cap regulation formalises and 
simplifies the rate review process and focuses regulation on efficiency improvements in a 
way that differs from RoR regulation. The main advantages of price-cap regulation are that it 
provides incentives for efficiency improvements, provides for fixed periods between 
adjustments and can be simpler to implement than RoR regulation. On the other hand, the 
disadvantages are that it requires the regulator to establish and enforce performance, quality 
and reliability standards and it does not avoid the regulator having to ensure that the allowed 
prices will yield an adequate reward for the investors.  
 
In the literature, there is also some theoretical evidence on the performance of price cap 
regulation. Based on several developed models on the optimal regulatory policy it can be 
concluded that price-cap regulation can give firms a larger incentive to invest in cost 
reduction than rate-of-return regulation and there is some evidence that price-cap regulation 
is or can be part of the optimal regulatory mechanism.12 However, while price-cap regulation 
does have the benefit of increasing the incentive for firms to invest in cost reduction, it 
induces a variety of new problems. Subsequent theoretical work and experience from the 
implementation of price-cap regulation suggest there are also some problems with this 
scheme arising from the proper calculation of the price index and the optimal pricing 
structure, the impact on quality, and renegotiations and end-game problems. For example, 
the end-game problem may arise when a firm is regulated under a price-cap regulation for 
                                               
12
 See, for example, Cabral and Riordan (1989), Sibley (1989), Lewis and Sappington (1989), and 
Clemenz (1991). 
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some known, finite period of time, after which rate-of-return regulation is implemented. One 
problem here is that the firm may manipulate the system by shifting costs into the future 
(Netz, 1999).  
 
Part of the reason price-cap regulation works is by allowing the firm to keep the gains it 
makes from cost reductions. If regulated firms believe that price caps will be revised to 
appropriate the gain from cost savings, then their incentive to invest in cost savings is 
reduced. The length of the regulatory period also plays a role. In fact, there is a trade off: the 
longer the amount of time between reviews, the more likely it is the price will be low at the 
next review (as the firm has a greater pay off in investing in cost reduction since it retains 
profits for a longer period), but the amount of time during which the price is high is longer. 
Similar conclusions were made in Laffont and Tirole (1993) where the extensive use of 
economic modelling is used to derive optimal incentive mechanisms. The regulatory 
problems are analysed within the principal-agent framework which provides a valuable 
insight into the role of information as a source of monopoly rents. One of the main 
conclusions from their analysis is that there is a basic trade-off between incentives and rent 
extraction. Being unable to monitor the firm’s effort and having less information than the 
firm about its technology, the regulator has to promote cost reduction and extract the firm’s 
rent. As the firm improves its efficiency it earns more profits, but the incentive to improve 
efficiency would not be there if it were not able to keep these profits in the first place. 
Hence, the higher the rents that would stay with the firm the greater the incentive to improve 
efficiency. On one hand, a powerful incentive scheme (e.g. fixed-price) provides strong 
incentives to increase efforts, but only the firm has the benefit from this in terms of higher 
profits while customers do not see any gains. Under a weak incentive scheme (e.g. cost-
plus), there are no incentives to improve efforts since there is full rent extraction. Thus, a 
trade-off between incentives and rent extraction is present.  
 
2.2.3  Yardstick Competition and Benchmarking  
 
With perfect information the regulator could simply mandate efficient behaviour to the firms. 
However, given more realistic assumptions on the costs of obtaining information regulators 
will necessarily be considerably less informed than firms on such matters as technology, cost 
and demand conditions. Thus, a principal-agent problem under the incomplete information 
arises, whereby the regulators must use procedures which employ data that is relatively 
easily obtainable (e.g. arising from audited accounting records) to define incentives for 
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efficient behaviour. One way to obtain the information is to employ yardstick competition or 
some (other) form of benchmarking.13  
 
Yardstick competition is a regulatory instrument that can be used if direct competition 
between agents does not exist or does not lead to desirable outcomes. More specifically, it 
can be used where firms have little incentive to promote cost efficiency. An important reason 
to use yardstick competition is the existence of market power due to regional monopolies; 
typical examples are network industries. The framework used in the analysis is the principal-
agent model. The regulator rewards agents on the basis of their relative performance and 
therefore generates incentives for promoting efficiency. Agents are forced to compete with a 
‘shadow firm’ whose performance is determined by the average practice in the industry. If 
the regulated firm is on average more efficient than the firms to which it is compared, it will 
make above-normal profits.  
 
The theoretical framework was developed by Shleifer (1985) who proposed yardstick 
competition to regulate local or regional monopolies that produce a homogeneous output. 
Following Shleifer (1985), a one-period model is considered, with N identical risk-neutral 
firms operating in an environment without uncertainty. Each firm faces a downward-sloping 
demand curve q(p) in a separate market. Each firm has an initial constant marginal cost c0 
and can reduce it to constant marginal cost c by spending R(c). It is assumed that R(c0) = 0, 
R′(c) < 0, and R″(c) > 0. Thus, the higher is the investment in cost reduction the lower is the 
final unit cost, where cost reduction is cheap at the start but gets progressively costlier. As 
reduction expenditures result in fixed-cost, firms have decreasing average costs. The profits 
of a firm are given by:  
 
)()()( cRTpqcp −+−=pi ,  (2.5) 
 
where T is a lump-sum transfer to the firm. If the regulator chooses c, p and T so as to 
maximise the sum of consumers’ surplus and the firm’s profits, then the solution is the social 
optimum given by:  
 
**)( TcR = , 
** cp = , 
).()( ** pqcR =′−  (2.6) 
                                               
13
 Yardstick competition is also known as competition by comparison, and benchmarking can be 
referred to as a comparative analysis.  
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Thus, the transfer just covers the expenditures on cost reduction while prices are set to equal 
the marginal cost. The last equation says that the marginal cost of reduction has to be equal 
to the output. Intuitively, lowering unit costs by ∆c and thus reducing production costs by 
q(p)∆c, requires – R′(c)∆c investment in cost reduction. At the optimum, the costs and 
benefits of marginal change in c must be equal.  
 
To order firms to achieve c*, the regulator must know R(c), which is seldom the case. On the 
assumption that the regulator does not have this information, it is shown that rate-of-return 
regulation fails to deliver any cost reductions at all. Under rate-of-return regulation, the 
regulator sets p = c and T = R(c) whatever the costs are. Faced with this policy, managers 
recognise that their profits are going to be zero regardless of their costs and, since they prefer 
not to reduce costs (i.e., they prefer to minimise their effort given the level of profit), they 
keep c = c0.  
 
As an alternative to rate-of-return regulation, Shleifer (1985) introduced yardstick 
competition. He proposed to eliminate the dependence of the firm’s price on its own chosen 
cost level by using cost levels of identical firms to determine the price. Each firm i is 
assigned its own shadow firm, with the cost level being equal to the mean marginal cost of 
all other firms, ic , and with a similarly defined cost-reduction expenditure, iR . This shadow 
firm serves as a benchmark in the yardstick competition. Yardstick competition thus seeks to 
provide an incentive for utilities to strive for lower costs by inducing them to compete with 
one another for cost reductions. Shleifer (1985) showed that if the regulator sets prices so 
that ii cp =  and uses transfer rule ii RT = , then the social optimum is achieved as the 
unique equilibrium of a game in which firms simultaneously choose their unit-cost levels. 
The unique Nash equilibrium for each firm i is to pick ci = c*. Therefore, in the case of 
homogeneous output yardstick competition delivers the first best.14  
 
Shleifer (1985) also demonstrated how the yardstick competition concept can be applied to 
firms producing heterogeneous outputs if these outputs only differ in observable 
characteristics (ψ). For example, in the case of network industries the heterogeneity of output 
consists mainly of the different characteristics of distribution service areas (e.g. network size, 
differences in the mix of residential and business customers, population density, and 
                                               
14
 It is also shown that if lump-sum transfers are not available to the regulator, he must compensate the 
firm for cost-reducing expenditures by allowing higher prices. In the case of homogeneous goods this 
amounts to the average cost pricing version of yardstick competition in which all firms pick the 
second-best unit cost levels. 
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landscape). To correct the yardstick competition for heterogeneity, the regulator can use a 
multivariate estimation of the average cost function ψbaci +=ˆ . The observable 
characteristics are included as explanatory variables and will thus correct for cost differences 
that are only due to the heterogeneity of output. The regulator then sets corrected yardstick 
prices for individual firms that incorporate their differences according to the rule: ii cp ˆ= . 
 
In Section 1.3 we already introduced and briefly described different benchmarking methods. 
According to the classification of benchmarking methods provided in Section 1.3, the model 
of yardstick competition proposed by Shleifer (1985) makes use of average parametric 
benchmarking methods.15 Besides average benchmarking, frontier benchmarking methods 
are also often used in price regulation. The latter have a stronger emphasis on the efficiency 
of the regulated firms, which is one of the reasons parametric frontier benchmarking 
methods were chosen as the main method in our analysis. These methods will be analysed in 
detail in Chapter 5.  
 
However, the application of yardstick competition or other benchmarking methods in the 
price-regulation process is not without some concerns. From a regulatory point of view, it is 
encouraging that different benchmarking models provide the same results with respect to the 
utilities’ efficiency. For instance, if this were not the case, any one-to-one translation of 
efficiency scores into X-factors in price-cap regulation would be unjustified. However, the 
applied economic literature reveals either mixed or negative evidence on the cross-model 
consistency of computed efficiency scores.16 In a number of studies it was found that 
benchmarking is, to some extent, influenced by the techniques chosen, model specification 
and variables included in the model. Bauer et al. (1998) defined a set of consistency 
conditions that, if met, would make the choice of a particular method trivial. The efficiency 
estimates should be consistent in their efficiency levels, rankings, identification of best and 
worst practices, consistent over time and with competitive conditions in the market, and 
consistent with standard non-frontier measures of performance. However, in the absence of 
any consensus on the most appropriate technique to use a purely pragmatic approach would 
entail the combination of results from different models. In this case, rather than using 
efficiency estimates in a mechanistic way regulators are advised to use benchmarking as one 
of the instruments for incentive-regulation purposes. Benchmarking can thus be viewed as an 
                                               
15
 However, it should be noted that yardstick competition has an additional requirement of linking 
financial consequences to the benchmarking results, whereas no such requirement is made in the 
benchmarking case. Only comparability requirement has to be made in order to be able to perform 
benchmarking analysis (CPB, 2000). 
16
 For example, see Bauer et al. (1998), Estache et al. (2004), and Farsi and Filippini (2004). 
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effective complementary regulatory instrument in price regulation and not as the regulator’s 
main instrument for monitoring utilities’ performance.  
 
2.3 Price Regulation in the EU Water Sector  
 
As a new member state of the EU, Slovenia also has to comply with the EU’s legislation. 
Therefore, the relevant EU legislation relating to the water pricing must also be taken into 
account in the price regulation of the Slovenian water industry. The Water Pricing 
Communication (COM(2000) 477 final) plays an important role in the pricing policy by 
promoting the use of water charging that would act as an incentive for the sustainable use of 
water resources and to recover the costs of water services by economic sectors.17  
 
2.3.1 Water Pricing Communication (COM(2000) 477 final) 
 
In line with the Water Pricing Communication, pricing should be designed in a way to 
promote the more efficient and less polluting use of scarce water resources. This would, in 
turn, reduce the pressure on water resources and the environment and ensure available 
resources are efficiently allocated between water uses. As a result, water supply and 
treatment infrastructure could be more appropriately sized. This means providing water 
services and protecting the environment more cost-effectively. Efficient water pricing would 
additionally mobilise financial resources to ensure the financial sustainability of water 
infrastructure and service suppliers, and to pay for environmental protection.  
 
It is argued that the lack of importance attributed to economic and environmental issues in 
designing existing water pricing policies, as opposed to more general social or development 
objectives, has led to the current situations of inefficient use, overexploitation and 
degradation of surface and groundwater resources. To play an effective role in enhancing the 
sustainability of water resources, water-pricing policies need to reflect different cost types 
(COM(2000) 477 final): 
 Financial costs of water services, including the costs of providing and administering 
these services. They include all operating and maintenance costs, as well as capital costs. 
 Environmental costs, representing the costs of damage that water uses impose on the 
environment and ecosystems and those who use the environment (e.g. a reduction in the 
                                               
17
 More broadly, the EU legislation relating to the water policy is laid down in the Water Framework 
Directive (2000/60/EC) and the Drinking Water Directive (98/83/EC). 
Chapter 2                    29 
 
ecological quality of aquatic ecosystems or the salinisation and degradation of 
productive soils). 
 Resource costs, involving the costs of foregone opportunities which other uses suffer due 
to the depletion of the resource beyond its natural rate of recharge or recovery (e.g. 
linked to the over-abstraction of groundwater). 
 
Overall, each user should pay for the costs resulting from their use of water resources, 
including environmental and resource costs. Moreover, prices should be directly linked to 
the water quantity used or pollution produced. Pricing structures should thus include a 
variable element (i.e. volumetric rate, pollution rate) to ensure that prices have a clear 
incentive function for users to improve their water-use efficiency (i.e., to facilitate water 
conservation) and reduce pollution. Further, water prices should be set at a level that ensures 
the recovery of costs for each sector (i.e. agriculture, households, industry). It is important to 
ensure that the most polluting and least efficient sectors pay for their pollution and use. A 
significant reduction in existing pressures on water resources can be expected through a 
sectoral recovery of the costs of water services. 
 
The level of integration of economic and environmental objectives into water-pricing 
policies differs highly among member states of the EU, within member states and between 
economic sectors. Overall, the full recovery of financial costs is only partly achieved. 
Environmental and resource costs are rarely considered in pricing policies. Although most 
water-price structures for domestic water supply include fixed and variable elements and 
have an incentive role, flat water charges independent of use or pollution are still in use. The 
last few years have recorded the increasing role given to pricing in the water policies of 
many member states. Most European countries already apply two-part tariffs to the supply of 
water (Hrovatin and Bailey, 2001).  
 
Moreover, the Commission calls for a harmonised approach to pricing within the EU. The 
adoption of a common definition of key cost variables would facilitate the comparison 
between costs and prices and benchmarking for different water services, uses and countries. 
Harmonisation requires standardised accountancy practices and financial costs, for example 
in the depreciation of capital facilities and the use of replacement (rather than historic) cost 
when evaluating fixed assets. It also requires the adoption of common methodologies for the 
monetary valuation of environmental and resource costs and benefits. High information costs 
are often mentioned as a constraint on the development of water-pricing policies that better 
account for economic and environmental objectives. It is also emphasised that the 
harmonisation of approaches will not result in uniform prices due to the differences in costs 
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reflecting geographical, topographical, climate, institutional and economic factors, which 
vary considerably not only between but also within countries.  
 
As a result of the natural monopoly situation of most water suppliers (whether public or 
private), control over the water prices charged to consumers is necessary to ensure that prices 
adequately reflect existing costs and do not hide inefficiency. Benchmarking that compares 
the quality of water services, costs and prices is another key element of a communication 
strategy. Benchmarking of the suppliers’ performance can act as an incentive for them to 
improve their efficiency and quality of services and reduce their costs and prices.  
 
Decision-making with respect to water prices varies considerably between and within EU 
member states. Water-price levels and structures can be decided at the local, regional or 
national level. In most countries, price setting is decentralised either to municipalities, 
ministries or independent economic and/or environmental regulators. Nevertheless, it is rare 
that decisions on pricing are entirely decentralised with no supervisory power 
institutionalised at the national (federal) level. Municipal decision-making will inevitably 
lead to a greater diversity of pricing practices within a given country than centralised 
decisions by government ministries. To the extent municipalities have an influence over 
price levels, local interests may predominate over the regional or national interest. Likewise, 
independent regulatory authorities may have different perspectives on price setting than 
respective ministries, the former being perhaps more professional and technical in their 
approach and the latter being more political and bureaucratic. In addition, separate economic 
and environmental regulators may differ in prioritising the interests of the environment and 
water utilities (Hrovatin and Bailey, 2001).  
 
Below the two best-practice regulatory examples applied in the EU water sector are briefly 
presented, more specifically the UK and Italian price regulation schemes. So far, other 
regulatory authorities in general do not make use of incentive-based price-regulation 
approaches. The Water Pricing Communication will hopefully facilitate some changes with 
respect to this issue. 
 
2.3.2 Price Regulation in the UK  
 
Water companies in England and Wales were privatised in 1989 under the 1989 Water Act. 
The 1989 Act preserved the local monopoly status enjoyed by the water companies, 
providing a rationale for their regulation. The companies are closely regulated by a number 
of bodies to ensure drinking water quality remains high, the environment is protected and 
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improved, and the customer receives improved standards of service. There are 10 water and 
sewerage companies and 17 water only companies responsible for water supply, sewerage 
and sewage treatment and disposal (OFWAT, 1999). Prices of the water industry are 
regulated by the Office of Water Services (OFWAT) according to the RPI+K price cap. 
Under the RPI+K formula a regulated firm’s prices are allowed to rise at the rate of inflation, 
plus an amount K which reflects investment needs and expected efficiency gains, and can 
take on positive or negative values. The K factor comprises two elements: a factor X which 
reflects future efficiency gains of usual utility operations, and a factor Q to allow for 
mandatory improvements in quality standards and the environment. Hence, the formula takes 
on the form of RPI–X+Q (OFWAT, 1993). The price cap for water companies applies to a 
weighted average set of a basket of services (the tariff basket formula). The first price cap, 
for the 1989-1995 period, was set by the government. Subsequent price caps were set by the 
OFWAT (Kennedy, 1997).  
 
The OFWAT sets prices on the basis of yardstick competition. Price limits are set for five-
year periods with all companies being expected to achieve significant efficiency gains and 
with tougher targets being set for more inefficient companies. If the companies outperform 
their efficiency targets, then the shareholders earn higher returns in the five-year period at 
the end of which customers benefit through further reductions in their bills. At the OFWAT's 
1994 Periodic Review, an OLS analysis was carried out to estimate the total operating 
expenditures of the water companies (Williamson and Toft, 2001).  
 
At the 1998 Periodic Review an OLS analysis was carried out separately on (controllable) 
operating costs and capital-maintenance costs. Based on the results from different models, 
companies are ranked in performance bands. According to Table 2.1, companies are ranked 
on percentage cost differences vis-à-vis the yardstick with respect to both operating and 
capital-maintenance costs. Individual company circumstances are taken into account by 
making adjustments for factors that are not reflected in the econometric analysis. Then, the 
ranked companies are each allocated to an expenditure band: A, B, C, D or E. Some 
companies have a much better cost performance than suggested by the model – these are 
banded as ‘A’ companies. Other companies’ cost performance is not as good as the models 
suggest it should be and their actual expenditure is well above that estimated by the model – 
they are banded as ‘E’ companies (OFWAT, 1998). Table 2.1 suggests that some companies 
may have lower than expected expenditure in both areas – the A/A companies – while others 
have higher than expected expenditure in both areas – the E/E companies. There are also 
companies with low expenditure in one area but high expenditure in the other.  
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These performance bands are used to set the ‘catch-up’ factors for each company. A frontier 
company is used to assess catching up, which is actually in line with the COLS method. The 
results are then used to set company-specific X factors in a price-cap formula. The X factor 
is higher for the relatively inefficient companies than for the efficient ones. Each company 
thus has its own price caps for five-year intervals. For the 2000-05 and 2005-10 periods the 
operating expenditure catch-up factor assumes that a water service company will catch up 
60% of the assumed efficiency gap from its current performance to the frontier performance 
(i.e. a company-specific improvement). On top of that, the frontier shift of the continuing 
efficiency improvement factor (i.e. industry-wide or minimum efficiency improvement) is 
assumed. The capital-maintenance catch-up assumes reducing the efficiency gap by 40% in 
the case of cost-base comparisons and 50% in the case of estimates resulting from 
econometric analysis. In addition, the minimum efficiency improvement is set (OFWAT, 
1999 and OFWAT, 2004).  
 
Service performance adjustments are also taken into account when setting the price limits. 
Where the standard of service is assessed as being significantly better than that provided by 
the industry generally, an increase in price limits is made, whereas where the service is 
particularly poor relative to the industry a reduction is imposed (OFWAT, 1999).  
 
Table 2.1: Matrix pattern for operating and capital-maintenance costs and the corresponding 
ranking of water supply companies 
 
Capital-maintenance expenditure 
OPEX and CAPEX ranking A 
Less than 
85% of C 
B 
85–95% of 
C 
C 
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D 
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More than 
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A 
Less than 
85% of C 
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All these estimates result in annual price limits.18 It should be noticed that the total scope for 
efficiency improvement is not assumed in the price limit. In this way the companies can 
retain the benefits of outperforming for at least five years. After this five-year period prices 
are recalculated and the benefits of any improved performance are passed on to the final 
consumers. 
 
2.3.3 Price Regulation in Italy 
 
The Italian water industry is composed of approximately 6,000 companies and is highly 
fragmented. For instance, there are water companies serving less than 5,000 customers and 
companies serving more than 300,000 customers. Some water companies operate at the 
provincial level, whereas others operate at the municipal level. These companies are mostly 
public; there are only a few cases of private companies in this sector (Antonioli and 
Filippini, 2001). Sewage collection is nearly always operated by the municipality or joint 
boards of municipalities or other local authorities and is almost never integrated with water 
supply. In the past, in most cases tariffs used to be only sufficient to cover the operating 
costs of water supply and sewerage activities. Only in a few cases revenues resulting from 
tariffs allowed for new investments, and even for the depreciation of capital and 
maintenance. Investments were therefore typically financed from the public budget which 
provided funds in the form of subsidies or central grants (Massarutto, 1999).  
 
In 1994, the Italian water sector underwent (regulatory) reforms with the aim to curtail local 
budget deficits. Law 36/1994, also known as the ‘Galli law’, aimed at a comprehensive 
reorganisation of water supply and sewerage services. The reform recognised the importance 
of economies of scale and introduced the full-cost pricing principle where the state sets the 
rules regarding the tariff structure for water prices and maximum increase rates set. In 
addition, with this regulatory reform the central government wanted to promote cost 
efficiency in the water sector by incorporating benchmarking in the price regulation process 
(Massarutto, 1999). 
 
The tariffs of Italian water distribution companies are set at the local level. This autonomy is 
exercised within a general framework of rules set up at the national level concerning tariff 
structures, pricing criteria, obligations and above all maximum increase rates. In the field of 
water services these regulatory tasks are exercised by the CIPE (Interministerial Committee 
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 For example, the average price reduction of 2,8% per annum (before inflation) was set for the 2000-
05 period (OFWAT, 1999). 
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for Economic Programming). The CIPE has the following responsibilities (Massarutto, 
1999): 
 obligation to achieve full-cost recovery; 
 definition of cost that would include operating costs, maintenance costs and the costs of 
capital; and 
 price increases should be determined according to the incentive-based regulatory 
scheme. 
 
Up until 1995, maximum annual increase rates for water supply prices were set in line with 
the national policies concerning inflation. From 1996, maximum price increases have been 
set, allowing further increases for financing investments and in the case of municipalities at 
risk of bankruptcy. In 1999, the obligation to achieve at least 80% of cost recovery was 
added. This charging system was just an intermediate regime until full implementation of the 
‘Galli law’ was achieved and a new price regulation system based on the rate-of-return 
regulation introduced, where eligible costs are specified in a detailed way. A rate of return on 
capital of 7% is foreseen. This new regime also introduces the benchmarking of operating 
costs based on a yardstick approach (Massarutto, 1999).  
 
In practice, each firm defines its own tariff composed of a fixed charge and a variable 
component and submits this tariff to the regulation authority for approval. The tariff is 
approved only if the level of the variable component does not exceed a range of 
approximately 30% with respect to the benchmarking value obtained using the estimation 
results of a variable cost function. To correct the yardstick for the heterogeneity of the 
production process of water companies, the regulator uses the estimation results of a 
multivariate variable cost function. The parametric variable cost function for water 
distribution (also called ‘Metodo Tariffario Normalizzato,’ MTN) that the Italian Regulation 
Authority proposes for calculating and evaluating the tariff is the following (Antonioli and 
Filippini, 2001):19 
 
AAEEeITLVECOAP UtT
Utdm
++×××=
2,01,033,069,09,0  (2.7) 
 
where:  
COAP – the operating expenditure (million lire/year; after 2002 the currency is EUR)  
VE – the volume of water delivered (thousand m3/year)  
                                               
19
 The parameters of this mathematical expression have been obtained by estimating a variable cost 
function for a sample of 20 companies for the year 1991. 
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L – length of the distribution network (km)  
Utdm – the measured volume of water delivered to households  
UtT – the total number of consumers (sum of household and non-household users)  
EE – the electricity expenditure (million lire/year) 
AA –expenditure on water bought (million lire/year)  
IT – index for the difficulty of water treatment (in the absence of treatment, IT = 1)  
 
Hence, the Italian Regulation Authority employs benchmarking to determine the cost range 
of the country’s water distribution utilities. There is also a price limit so a price increase 
cannot exceed a certain limit calculated as a function of a starting level. The coefficient 
estimates in Eq.(2.7) may, however, be arguable since different estimates were obtained in a 
recalculation of the model using a panel data set by Antonioli and Filippini (2001). 
 
2.4 Current Price Regulation Design of the Slovenian Water 
Sector 
 
The Law on Price Control (1999) and more specifically the Decree on the Price 
Determination of Communal Services (2005) and Rules on the Price Determination of 
Obligatory Local Public Utilities for Environmental Protection (2004) form the existing 
regulatory framework for the price regulation of communal utilities in Slovenia, including 
water distribution utilities.  
 
By the Decree on the Price Determination of Communal Services (2005), the price-setting 
mechanism is defined for obligatory local public utilities for environmental protection (also 
referred to as communal services). The price of the communal public service is to be 
determined separately for the following services: (i) supply of drinking water; (ii) drainage 
of wastewater; (iii) cleaning of wastewater; (iv) collection and transportation of municipal 
solid waste; (v) processing of solid waste; and (vi) the disposal of solid waste. The price of 
the communal public service (P), which does not include taxes or other levies, is defined by 
the following formula:  
 
ITC PPP += . (2.8) 
 
The price of the communal public service (P) is composed of two parts, the part to cover 
total operating and capital costs (PTC) and the part that would be used to finance new 
infrastructure investments (PI). Price is expressed in monetary units per physical unit of 
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service provided to customers (e.g., in SIT/m3 for drinking water supply). If different users 
cause different costs to the provider of a communal public service, the price can be 
differentiated across different users or groups of users. However, this is not the case if the 
difference in costs is a result of different costs associated with access to the public service. 
The full-cost price is calculated as follows: 
 
Q
C
Q
RevP i iTC
∑
== , (2.9) 
 
where Rev is the required annual revenue, Q is the total physical quantity of service provided 
in one year (e.g., total amount of water supplied), and Ci is the i-th cost item, the sum of all 
cost items being equal to total annual cost (TC). The list of cost items Ci included in the 
calculation of full-cost price PTC is provided in Table 2.2. The price is generally set in a way 
so as to cover the eligible operation and maintenance costs and depreciation.  
 
PI is that part of the price that should enable new investments in the infrastructure of a given 
public utility (i.e., building new infrastructure objects and facilities). The average price PI is 
calculated as the investment cost per unit of service provided, divided by the number of 
years in which investment would be covered through the price of the public communal 
service. PI excludes those costs for which funds are already provided from other sources 
(e.g., the national or local community budget, regional state aid, funds of the EU). PI also 
excludes costs already taken into the account in the calculation of the full-cost price PTC 
(e.g., profit intended for further development of the utility (see Table 2.2, category 5), 
unused net cash flow from previous years).  
 
Under the Decree public utilities can increase part of their price intended to finance 
infrastructure investments, provided they have previously obtained the approval of Ministry 
of the Economy and provided that investments are planned in National Operative 
Programmes of Environmental Protection and local community development programmes up 
until the year 2008. The proposed increase must not exceed the increase in the industrial 
producer price index in the period from January 2004 until the date the application is filed. 
Further, an increase in PI has to take into account potential cost savings and additional 
revenues (due to an increased number of customers) as a result of new investments. The 
price PI can also be increased if the utility is faced with a difficult financial situation due to 
low prices not allowed to increase in previous years. The increase in the full-cost price PTC is 
allowed only if there are objective and justified reasons for an increase in costs as a result of 
meeting the required standards, or if new services are introduced in accordance with 
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environmental regulations. Again, the approval of the Ministry of the Economy is needed. 
The application to be filed for obtaining such approval is very detailed in nature. If the final 
price for communal public service P were to increase by more than 2%, then the approval of 
the Ministry of Finance is also required.  
 
Table 2.2: Specification of cost items included in the calculation of PTC and the required 
revenue calculation 
 
Nr. Cost category 
1 Direct operating costs 
1.1 Electrical energy 
1.2 Fuel 
1.3 Material 
1.4 Services 
1.5 Labour 
1.6 Direct cost of sales 
1.7 Other direct operating costs 
2 Indirect operating costs 
2.1 Depreciation 
2.2 Maintenance 
2.3 Other indirect operating costs 
3 General costs 
3.1 procurement 
3.2 overhead and administrative costs 
3.3 sales 
3.4 Interest on debt capital 
4 Total cost  (TC)   [ = 1 + 2 + 3] 
5 Profit intended for utility’s further development  
6 Required revenue   [ = 4 + 5] 
Source: Decree on the Price Determination of Communal Services (2005) 
 
It can be concluded that at present the price regulation of Slovenian water distribution 
utilities largely resembles the rate-of-return regulation. This is combined with a very 
restrictive policy with respect to allowing price increases whereby the primary objective is to 
keep the inflation rate down rather than to influence the performance of water utilities. As 
long as the Decree on the Price Determination of Communal Services (2005) is valid, the 
Rules on Price Determination of Obligatory Local Public Utilities for Environmental 
Protection (2004) will not be applied. In fact, the Decree was introduced since it had been 
realised that introduction of the Rules was too ambitious an objective for the time being. 
Probably the key novelty of the Rules is the introduction of best practice and benchmarking 
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(in Article 8). According to the Rules, the full-cost price of the best practice utility PTC is to 
be determined by the Ministry of the Environment and Spatial Planning based on results 
obtained via a questionnaire on costs and the quality of providing communal public services 
in representative areas. If the quality of communal public services does not reach the quality 
of the best practice provider, the full-cost price should be lower than in the best practice 
case. Comparative analysis or benchmarking should be performed to establish the cost of the 
best-practice utility. The comparative analysis is set to take into account the size of the utility 
(in terms of the quantity of services supplied) and thus control for any possible presence of 
economies of scale. For each group of comparable utilities in terms of size, the highest 
allowed deviation from average costs is also going to be defined. The Ministry can allow for 
a higher cost of providing communal public services if the public utility files an application 
containing an economic and technical analysis, from which it is evident that higher costs are 
the results of unfavourable natural conditions prevailing in the supply area, a low population 
density, a reduced efficiency of existing infrastructure facilities, or higher electricity and fuel 
costs. Until the best-practice operation is not defined, the full-cost price is going to be 
determined as the average cost of utilities providing communal public services.  
 
The Rules on the Price Determination of Obligatory Local Public Utilities for Environmental 
Protection (2004) thus envisage the use of benchmarking methods in the present regulatory 
scheme based on rate-of-return regulation. In this way, utilities would be given an incentive 
for more efficient production as is already the case in the UK and Italian water industries. 
The Water Pricing Communication (COM(2000) 477 final) also facilitates the use of 
benchmarking. However, it is not yet certain when the Rules will come into effect. While the 
benchmarking method and best-practice performance with respect to the cost and required 
quality standards for carrying out public services have not yet been determined, 
implementation of the Rules was postponed by introducing the Decree on the Price 
Determination of Communal Services (2005). With respect to the choice of benchmarking 
methods, the regulatory authorities can decide to implement a simple comparison of one-
dimensional measures of performance (i.e., performance indicators) or decide on more 
sophisticated benchmarking methods. In the thesis, we consider the possibility of employing 
parametric frontier benchmarking methods in the price regulation of Slovenian water 
distribution utilities. Our main objective is to obtain preliminary estimates of the cost 
inefficiency of Slovenian water distribution utilities and to establish whether the results 
obtained can be reliably used for price regulation. Therefore, several different parametric 
frontier methods will be employed in an estimation of the cost frontier function. We 
additionally consider alternative uses of the results since the estimated cost (frontier) 
function can also be used by regulatory authorities to predict utilities’ costs and to estimate 
and decompose total factor productivity (TFP) growth.  
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3 Introduction to Efficiency Analysis 
 
Classical economic theory predicts that firms or producers seek to maximise profit or 
minimise costs and to thus operate efficiently. However, evidence from practice does not 
always support this. Some firms tend to deviate from the predicted behaviour and are hence 
regarded as inefficient.20 This required the development of a new line of theory that 
explicitly takes inefficiency into account. Modern efficiency measurement began with Farrell 
(1957) who drew upon the work of Debreu (1951) and Koopmans (1951) to define a simple 
measure of firm efficiency that could account for multiple inputs and be easily generalised to 
multiple outputs. In this chapter we introduce the theoretical tools needed to define different 
efficiency concepts. The tools and concepts used are derived directly from production 
theory. Thus, we start by briefly providing the analytical foundation of production theory. A 
more detailed discussion can be found in Chambers (1988), Cornes (1992), Mas-Colell et al. 
(1995) and Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000). The general case of a multi-output, multi-input 
production technology is considered. We first utilise information on the physical quantities 
of inputs and outputs to define distance functions, which provide the boundary of the 
production possibility set. As suggested by its name, the distance function gives measures of 
the distance of a firm’s production activity to the boundary of the technology set, and is 
closely related to the concept of technical efficiency. Then, duality theory is employed to 
obtain an economic representation of the production possibility set. By considering input 
prices and under suitable behavioural assumptions the cost frontier can be defined. The cost 
frontier is then used as a standard (a benchmark, ‘best practice’ performance) against which 
cost efficiency can be measured. In particular, special stress is put on the cost frontier and 
the associated concept of cost efficiency since these two concepts are key to the cost 
efficiency analysis in the empirical part of the thesis. The optimal size of the firm and 
corresponding economies of scale and scale efficiency are also considered. Cost 
subadditivity is introduced as a necessary and sufficient condition for a natural monopoly. 
Further, a distinction between economies of scale and size is made. Besides economies of 
size, economies of output and customer density are considered as well since they play an 
important role in network industries.  
 
                                               
20
 For example, public utility companies operating in network industries typically operate as national 
or local monopolies. Since they are not faced with competitive pressures they may not have sufficient 
incentives to operate efficiently.  
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3.1 Production Technology and Input Requirement Sets 
 
The production possibility set (Chambers, 1988), production set (Mas-Colell et al., 1995), 
technology set (Coelli et al., 1998), or structure of production technology (Kumbhakar and 
Lovell, 2000) is initially described in terms of feasible sets of inputs and outputs. Let us 
assume that firms use a non-negative K×1 vector of inputs, denoted by x, to provide a non-
negative M×1 vector of outputs, denoted by y. The technology set T represents the set of 
feasible input-output combinations given the existing state of technology:21 
 
( ){ }yxyx producecan:,=T . (3.1) 
 
The technology set T satisfies the following properties:22  
 
1. T is nonempty; 
2. T is a closed set; 
3. T is a convex set;23  
4. T is bounded from above for every finite x; 
5. Weak disposability of x: if 1for),(),( ≥∈⇒∈ λλ TT yxyx ; 
6. Weak disposability of y: if 10for),(),( ≤≤∈⇒∈ λλ TT yxyx ; 
7. (0, x) ∈ T ; and (y, 0) ∈ T  ⇒  y = 0. 
 
Property 1 says that a technology exists, i.e. outputs can be produced using inputs. 
Otherwise, there would be no need to study the behaviour of firms. Property 2 requires that 
the set T includes its boundary. It guarantees the existence of technically efficient input and 
output vectors. Property 3 implies that if y, y' ∈ T and θ ∈ [0,1], then T∈′−+ yy )1( θθ . 
This convexity assumption has two important implications. Firstly, it implies nonincreasing 
returns to scale and, secondly, it captures the idea that ‘unbalanced’ input combinations are 
not more productive than ‘balanced’ ones. In particular, if production plans y and y' produce 
                                               
21
 As an alternative to Eq.(3.1), T may be also defined in terms of (K+M)-dimensional vector z that 
contains both inputs and outputs. By convention, positive numbers denote outputs and negative 
numbers denote inputs. Production vector z is usually called input-output or netput vector, or a 
production plan (Mas-Colell et al., 1995). However, in what follows it is more convenient to maintain 
a clear dichotomy between inputs and outputs. 
22
 The properties will not be proven here, we only explain their essence. Interested readers are referred 
to the literature mentioned earlier. 
23
 T is not generally required to be a convex set. This property is required occasionally. 
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exactly the same amount of output but use different input combinations then a production 
vector that uses the average of the input vectors used in these two production plans can do at 
least as well as either y or y'. Property 4 guarantees that finite input cannot produce infinite 
output. It is a mathematical regularity condition that guarantees the existence of a well-
defined extreme for the optimisation problem. Properties 5 and 6 are weak monotonicity 
properties that guarantee the feasibility of radial expansions of feasible inputs and radial 
contractions of feasible outputs. These two properties can be replaced with the single strong 
monotonicity property given by: TT ∈′′⇒∈ ),(),( yxyx , ),(),( yxyx −≤′′−∀ . If x 
can produce a given production bundle y, then a bigger input bundle can also produce a 
given output bundle. Moreover, if x can produce y it can also produce all smaller output 
bundles. In this way, we do not limit ourselves to radial expansions or contractions only but 
guarantee the feasibility of any increase in feasible inputs and any reduction in feasible 
outputs. This property is also known as a strong or free disposability property. Finally, 
Property 7 says that any nonnegative input vector can produce at least a zero output, i.e. the 
origin belongs to T, and that it is not possible to produce something from nothing (‘no free 
lunch’ property).  
 
An important characterisation of the technology set T is provided by input requirement sets, 
which is given in the following definition. The input requirement sets describe the sets L(y) 
of input vectors x that are feasible for each output vector y:24  
 
{ }TL ∈= ),(:)( yxxy , ∀ y. (3.2) 
 
From the properties of technology set T it follows that input sets L(y) satisfy the following 
properties:  
 
1. L(y) is nonempty for at least one finite output vector;25 
2. the sets L(y) are closed; 
3. L(y) is convex;  
4. x is finite   ⇒   x ∉ L(y) if y is infinite; 
5. If 1for)()( ≥∈⇒∈ λλ yxyx LL ; 
6. 10for)()( ≤≤⊆ λλyy LL ; 
                                               
24
 The input requirement set (Chambers, 1988) is also referred to as the input set (Coelli et al., 1998) 
or the input set of production technology (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000).  
25
 Property 1 of T implies that at least one feasible input-output combination exists. It does not, 
however, imply that L(y) is nonempty for all y.  
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7. 0 ∉ L(y) for y ≥ 0; and L(0) = K+ℜ . 
 
Again, if the weak monotonicity Properties 5 and 6 are replaced with the strong 
monotonicity property we get: xxyx ≥′∈ ),(L  ⇒  )(yx L∈′  and 
)()( yyyy ′⊆⇒≤′ LL . The second part of this property says that if x can produce y it 
can also produce a smaller output bundle y', while knowing that x' can produce y' does not 
necessary mean that it can also produce a bigger output bundle y. Property 7 indicates that 
non-zero output levels cannot be produced from zero input levels and that inaction is 
possible, i.e. nothing can be produced out of a given set of inputs. 
 
We now focus on the boundaries of the input requirement sets L(y), namely input isoquants 
and input efficient subsets, which play an important role in the efficiency analysis. The input 
isoquants are defined in the following way:  
 
 { }1),(),(:)( <∉∈= λλ yxyxxy LLLIsoq . (3.3) 
 
Further, the input efficient subsets are defined as: 
 
 { })(),(:)( yxxxyxxy LLLEff ∉′⇒≤′∈= . (3.4) 
 
The input isoquants describe the sets of input vectors capable of producing each output 
vector y but which, when radially contracted, become incapable of producing given output 
vector y. Alternatively, the input efficient subsets describe the sets of input vectors capable 
of producing each output vector y but which, when contracted in any dimension, become 
incapable of producing given output vector y. Isoq L(y) represents one notion of minimal 
input use and appears to provide an appealing standard against which to measure technical 
efficiency. Yet, Isoq L(y) can also include input vectors x that belong to the uneconomic 
region of input space.26 On the other hand, Eff L(y) only includes input vectors belonging to 
the economic region of input space and it holds that Eff L(y) ⊆ Isoq L(y).27 Thus, Eff L(y) 
provides a more stringent standard against which to measure the technical efficiency of input 
use.  
                                               
26
 In the two-input space this can be represented by an upward sloping isoquant.  
27
 Some functional forms employed in econometric analysis such as Cobb-Douglas do have the 
property that Eff L(y) = Isoq L(y), making the distinction irrelevant. Other functions, such as translog, 
have the property that Eff L(y) ⊂ Isoq L(y), making the distinction potentially important (Kumbhakar 
and Lovell, 2000).  
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3.2 Distance Functions 
 
We now turn to distance functions which provide a functional characterisation of the 
production technology and were introduced into economic theory by Shephard (1953, 1970). 
More precisely, distance functions allow the specification of a multiple-input, multiple-
output production technology. Alternatively, a multiple-input multiple-output production 
technology may be specified by the production possibility function or production 
transformation function, F(y, x) = 0, which provides the boundary of production possibility 
set when multiple inputs are used to produce multiple outputs. In what follows, this concept 
will not be examined any further since it is rarely used in the empirical research. Moreover, 
distance functions prove to be far more useful and straightforward in defining technical 
efficiency, as will be seen later in this chapter.28 Further, our main focus in the empirical 
analysis will be on the cost function and cost efficiency rather than on the production 
function and technical efficiency. For the purpose of our analysis it thus suffices to just 
introduce the concept of distance functions.  
 
A distance function may have either an input or an output orientation. An input distance 
function characterises the production technology by looking at the maximal proportional 
contraction of the input vector, given an output vector. An output orientation looks at how 
much the output vector may be proportionally expanded with the input vector being held 
fixed. Given that most public utility companies have an obligation to meet demand, they can 
only become more efficient by providing a predefined output level with fewer inputs. We 
therefore utilise an input orientation approach in what follows.  
 
The biggest role distance functions play is in duality theory. It can be shown that in certain 
conditions an input distance function is dual to a cost (frontier) function. Nevertheless, 
distance functions are not without their empirical value. They can be utilised to obtain 
measures of technical efficiency when firms use multiple inputs to produce multiple outputs. 
The input distance function is a function:  
 
{ })()/(:max),( yxyx LDI ∈= ρρ . (3.5) 
                                               
28
 In a single output case, technical efficiency can be as well easily defined using the production 
function: { })(:max)( yLyf ∈= xx . However, we will leave the discussion of the production function 
aside since we do not wish to limit our attention to a single output case but want to keep the 
discussion as general as possible. 
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The input distance function gives the maximum amount by which a producer’s input vector 
can be radially contracted and still remain feasible for the output vector it produces. Since 
the input distance function DI (x, y) is defined in terms of the input sets L(y), the properties 
of DI (x, y) can be easily derived from the properties of L(y). The input distance function thus 
satisfies a corresponding set of properties: 
 
1. 1),()( ≥⇒∈ yxyx IDL ; 
2. ),( yxID  is homogeneous of degree one (or, linearly homogeneous) in x: 
0for),,(),( >= λλλ yxx II DyD ; 
3. ),( yxID  is a concave function in x; 
4. ),( yxID  is an upper-semicontinuous function;  
5. 1for),(),( ≥≥ λλ yxyx II DD ; 
6. 1for),(),( ≥≤ λλ yxyx II DD . 
 
When a firm is technically efficient, DI (x, y) = 1. Clearly, we can rewrite the definition for 
input requirement sets as { }1),(:)( ≥= yxxy IDL , and respectively the definition for input 
isoquants as { }1),(:)( == yxxy IDLIsoq . The input isoquant corresponds to the set of 
input vectors having the value of input distance function equal to unity and thus being 
technically efficient. All other feasible input vectors have input distance function values 
greater than unity.  
 
3.3 Cost Functions 
 
So far, we have only used information on the quantities of inputs and outputs to describe the 
production technology. To obtain a cost function, we must introduce input prices and specify 
a behavioural objective. We thus assume that companies face a strictly positive K×1 vector 
of input prices w and that they tend to minimise the cost of producing the chosen output 
vector y. Another assumption regarding prices is that the producers are price-takers in input 
markets meaning that they do not have sufficient market power to influence the prices and 
thus take the prices as given. The existing literature on cost-minimising behaviour and cost 
functions is fairly extensive. The theory presented in the following section is based on 
Varian (1984), Chambers (1988), Jehle and Reny (1998) and Mas-Colell et al. (1995). The 
proofs will not be presented here. Interested readers are referred to the abovementioned 
literature.  
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Either the input sets or the input distance function can be used to derive a cost function. The 
cost function is defined as follows:  
 
{ }
{ }.1),(:min
)(:min),(
T
T
≥=
∈=
yxxw
yxxwwy
x
x
ID
LC
 (3.6) 
 
The cost function achieves the minimum expenditure required to produce any output vector, 
given input prices and production technology. It should be noted that the cost function 
defined above is in line with the neoclassical microeconomic theory where it is assumed that 
all firms minimise costs and are therefore cost efficient. Nevertheless, according to the 
evidence from practice some firms may fail to minimise their costs and are found to be cost 
inefficient. For example, if firms operate in non-competitive environment that does not 
provide sufficient incentives for efficient production managerial behaviour may not be 
consistent with the cost-minimising pattern. In such cases, inefficiency has to be explicitly 
taken in the account when modelling firms’ behaviour. Therefore, an empirical concept of 
the cost frontier function was developed as opposed to a purely theoretical concept of the 
cost function.29 Introduction of the cost frontier function can be viewed as a reflection of the 
fact that in practice some firms fail to attain the frontier and therefore we have to admit some 
inefficiency, i.e. the possibility of systematic divergence between observed and minimal 
costs. We turn to this and some related issues in Section 3.4 where different efficiency 
concepts are discussed.  
 
Properties of the cost function can be derived from the properties of the input sets and the 
input distance function. Hence, the cost function satisfies the following properties: 
 
1. 0for0),( ≥> ywyC  (nonnegativity) and 0),0( =wC  (no fixed costs); 
2. 0for),(),( >= λλλ wywy CC  (linear homogeneity); 
3. wwwywy ≥′≥′ for),(),( CC  (nondecreasing in w); 
4. C(y, w) is a concave and continuous function in w;  
5. 1for),(),( ≥≥ λλ wywy CC  (nondecreasing in y);30 
                                               
29
 Another empirical concept is the average cost function, where we do not allow for inefficiency. All 
deviations from the estimated cost function are attributed to random noise.  
30
 If, in addition, we would like C(y, w) to be differentiable in y for y > 0, we have to assume that C(y, 
w) is lower semicontinuous in y. This simply says that marginal costs exist for positive levels of 
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6. T is a convex set ⇒ C(y, w) is a convex function in y. 
 
Property 1 states that it is impossible to produce a positive output with no costs. This is a 
consequence of the fact that prices are assumed to be strictly positive and at least one input is 
required to produce an output. The no fixed costs property implies that it is costless to 
produce a zero output.31 Property 2 is called the linear homogeneity property and says that, 
when all prices change proportionally, then total costs will also change in the same manner 
(they will be increased or reduced by the same proportionality factor λ). This is restatement 
of the principle that only relative prices matter to economic agents. As long as the input 
prices vary only proportionately, the cost-minimising choice of inputs will not vary. Property 
3 indicates that costs will increase when at least one input price rises and the others stay the 
same. According to Property 4, when input prices increase the costs increase at most in a 
linear way. This is because of the substitution effect which allows firms to change the 
relative use of different inputs if input prices change. If substitution is technologically not 
possible, the costs rise linearly.32 Continuity is needed in order to be able to calculate partial 
derivatives with respect to wk (k = 1, …, K). Property 5 is a weak monotonicity property and 
can be replaced by the strong monotonicity property expressed by: ),(),( wywy CC ≥′  
yy ≥′for . It says that costs cannot decrease as output increases. If T is convex, then 
Property 6 holds also so that C(y, w) is a convex function in y. 
 
Under Properties 1–4, the strong monotonicity property, and Property 6, the cost function 
C(y, w) is dual to the input distance function DI (y, x), i.e. C(y, w) and DI (y, x) provide 
equivalent representations of the technology set on the assumption of cost-minimising 
behaviour and in the presence of exogenously determined input prices. As will be seen in 
Section 3.4, the duality relationship linking a cost frontier with an input distance function is 
proven to be important for the measurement and decomposition of cost efficiency.  
 
If the cost function C(y, w) is in addition differentiable with respect to input prices w, then 
there exists a unique vector of cost-minimising input demand equations that is equal to the 
gradient of C(y, w) in input prices w. That is, if x (y, w) is a unique vector of cost-
minimising input demand equations then Shephard’s (1953) lemma states that: 
 
                                                                                                                                     
output. We allow for the possibility of start-up resource needs that would give C(y, w) a jump 
discontinuity at y = 0. 
31
 This holds when we are dealing with a long-run problem where all inputs are perfectly variable. A 
discussion of long-run vs. short-run costs follows in Section 3.3.2. 
32
 The Leontief production function is such an example. 
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 ),(),( wywyx wC∇= .33  (3.7) 
 
For a cost-minimising producer, wT x = C(y, w) and x = x (y, w). An important implication 
of Shephard’s lemma is that the behaviour of derived input demands is determined by the 
cost function. Properties of the cost function place implicit conditions on the cost-minimising 
input demands. We proceed by studying these implications in more detail.  
 
3.3.1 Input Demand Elasticity and Elasticity of Substitution 
 
According to Shephard’s (1953) lemma, the conditional input demand vector is equal to the 
gradient of the cost function in input prices. Using this lemma, we can express the cost 
shares of all inputs as elasticities of the cost function with respect to the input prices:  
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It has been already established that when all input prices are increased proportionally costs 
increase in the same proportion. The linear homogeneity of the cost function then implies 
that the conditional factor demand functions are homogeneous of degree zero in input 
prices.34 If input prices change proportionately, the conditional factor demands will not 
change, i.e. only relative prices matter. Mathematically, this is expressed as: 
 
),(),( wyxwyx =t . (3.9) 
 
Further, it has already been implied that a rise in any input price causes a decline in use of 
that input. Consequently, conditional input demand curves must be downward sloping. 
Applying Shephard’s lemma gives: 
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33
 A sufficient condition for the existence of a unique cost-minimising solution is that input 
requirement set L(y) is a strictly convex set.  
34
 Since the partial derivatives of a function homogeneous of degree k are homogeneous of degree    
k–1.  
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All conditional input demand responses to input prices can thus be computed directly from 
the Hessian matrix of the cost function. Concavity in input prices and twice-continuous 
differentiability of C(y, w) imply that the Hessian matrix Hww C(y, w) is negative 
semidefinite. Thus, 0),( ≤∂∂ kk wx wy , implying that as some input becomes more 
expensive you buy less of that input. The symmetry condition expressed as 
kjjk wxwx ∂∂=∂∂ /),(/),( wywy  is merely a mechanical implication of the presumed 
differentiability properties of the cost function; there is no economic intuition behind it.  
 
Input responsiveness to changes in input prices can also be expressed by conditional input 
demand elasticity as follows: 
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The homogeneity of degree zero according to Euler’s theorem implies 
( ) 0),( =∂∂∑ j jjk wwx wy , which combined with Eq.(3.11) yields Σj єkj = 0, while the 
negative semidefiniteness of Eq.(3.10) and Eq.(3.11) implies єkk ≤ 0. In general, these 
elasticities are not symmetric, i.e. єkj ≠ єjk. However, it can be easily shown that: 
 
 єkj = 
k
j
S
S
єjk , (3.12) 
 
where Sk and Sj are the cost shares of k-th and j-th input, respectively. Further, one can also 
be interested in relative input responsiveness to changes in relative input prices. This is 
measured by the elasticity of substitution σ which, in the two input case, can be written as 
follows:  
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The elasticity of substitution can be thus interpreted as the elasticity of the input ratio with 
respect to the input price ratio.35 For convex isoquants it lies between 0 and ∞, with a larger 
value of σ implying greater substitutability between the inputs. A value of σ = ∞ occurs 
when the inputs are perfectly substitutable, while σ = 0 implies that no substitution is 
possible. With more than two inputs, however, Eq.(3.13) becomes more complex. A 
common definition is the Allen-Uzawa concept of the elasticity of substitution introduced by 
Allen (1938) and Uzawa (1962). This partial elasticity of substitution defines the elasticity of 
substitution for each pair of inputs as: 
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wywy
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CC
=σ , (3.14) 
 
where subscripts related to the cost function refer to the partial derivative(s) with respect to 
the associated input price(s). It turns out that Eq.(3.14) can be expressed in terms of factor 
elasticities, єkj, and input factor shares, Sj: 
 
 =kjσ  єkj /Sj . (3.15) 
 
In their paper Blackorby and Russell (1989) showed that the Allen elasticity of substitution 
(AES) is only an appropriate measure of substitution in specific cases and provides no 
additional information besides the factor elasticities and the factor shares. An alternative 
measure is the Morishima (1967) elasticity of substitution, which is defined as follows: 
 
 Mkj = єjk – єkk. (3.16) 
 
Blackorby and Russell (1989) showed that the Morishima elasticity of substitution (MES) 
preserves the important characteristics of the two-input elasticity in Eq.(3.13) and has several 
advantages over the (AES). They demonstrated that MES measures the curvature of an 
isoquant, it is a sufficient statistic for evaluating changes in relative prices and quantities, 
and it is a log derivative of the input quantity ratio with respect to the input price ratio. These 
                                               
35
 The original definition states that elasticity of substitution equals the elasticity of input ratio with 
respect to the marginal product ratio, the latter being equal to marginal rate of technical substitution. 
Nevertheless, the first-order conditions for cost minimisation imply that the marginal rate of technical 
substitution between the k-th and j-th input equals the ratio of the k-th to the j-th input prices. A 
generalisation of the expression for the elasticity of substitution in more than two input case is 
provided in Chambers (1988).  
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characteristics do not apply to the AES. The MES is thus a more natural extension of the 
multi-input case. An important characteristic of the MES is its inherent asymmetry. 
Asymmetry appears to be natural as the partial derivative has to be evaluated in the direction 
of the input price that actually changes. For any cost function with more than two inputs, the 
MES is only symmetric in the special case where the cost function is of the constant 
elasticity of substitution (CES) type. The AES, on the other hand, is by definition symmetric 
for all input pairs which can be seen if we put Eq.(3.12) in Eq.(3.15).  
 
3.3.2 Short vs. Long-Run Cost Function  
 
Economists refer to short-run decisions as those that involve some fixity of inputs and long-
run decisions as those that involve no fixed inputs. So far, all elements of input vector x have 
been treated as freely variable. Hence, the analysis has only encompassed long-run 
optimisation problems, with C(y, w) being a long-run (total) cost function. However, 
producers are sometimes faced with inputs that are only available in limited amounts. This 
creates an additional constraint in their cost-minimisation decision so the solutions to the 
short-run and long-run problems are not necessarily the same. Labour is typically considered 
to be a flexible input in the production process since a firm can easily alter the number of 
employees to arrive at its optimal level.36 On the other hand, the capital of a firm is 
considered to be a fixed input since time is required to adjust it to its optimal level through 
the investment process. In what follows, short-run variable and total costs are presented and 
their relation to the long-run total costs is briefly discussed.  
 
Suppose that the input vector is partitioned into two components with x1 containing perfectly 
variable inputs and x2 containing those inputs that are fixed or subject to some availability 
constraint. The restricted input requirement set is defined as: 
 
 
{ }TL ∈= ),,(:),( 2112 yxxxxy . (3.17) 
 
The short-run variable cost function VC(y, w1, x2) is then defined as follows: 
 
                                               
36
 In the real world, however, labour unions, job contracts (e.g. permanent employment) and labour 
legislation sometimes make it difficult to fire employees and the flexibility of labour can be 
questioned (i.e. employees may be considered a quasi-fixed input).  
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where w1 is the set of variable input prices. A well-defined short-run variable-cost function 
satisfies the same properties as the long-run total-cost function in terms of w1 and y. In 
addition to these properties, VC(y, w1, x2) satisfies another property that it is nonincreasing 
in x2:  
 
 ),,(),,( *2121*22 xwyxwyxx VCVC ≤⇒≥ . (3.19) 
 
If the availability of x2 increases, new choices for x1 become feasible. This opens up new 
cost-minimising opportunities. Hence, variable costs cannot increase since what is the lowest 
cost now may not have been even available before the constraint was relaxed.  
 
Since input x2 is presumably not free, no-fixed-cost property does obviously not hold in the 
short run. The short-run total cost function associated with producing the output vector y is:  
 
 2
T
2212 ),,(),,( xwxwyxwy += VCC S . (3.20) 
 
The main difference between C(y, w) and CS(y, w1, x2) is that in Eq.(3.20) the fixed inputs 
do not necessarily minimise costs. However, by definition, variable costs are minimised for 
any given x2. The relationship between the short-run and long-run total cost function is then:  
 
 2
T
221 ),,(min),( 2 xwxwywy x += VCC . (3.21) 
 
The long-run problem is decomposed into two components, that of minimising  VC(y, w1, x1) 
given x2 and then choosing x2. Long-run total costs are thus equal to short-run total costs 
evaluated at the fixed input vector, which minimises long-run costs.  
 
From Eq.(3.21) it follows that ),,(),( 2xwywy SCC ≤  and ( )),(,,),( 2 wyxwywy SCC = , 
where x2 (y, w) is the solution of Eq.(3.21). These expressions imply that C(y, w) is the 
lower envelope of the respective CS(y, w1, x1) functions in both input price and output space. 
It also follows that C(y, w) is more concave in w than CS(y, w1, x1), meaning that long-run 
conditional factor demand is more own-price elastic than short-run conditional factor 
demand.  
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From the first-order condition associated with Eq.(3.21), the vector of shadow prices for the 
fixed input can be obtained as: 
 
 ),,( 212 2 xwyw x VC−∇= . (3.22) 
 
Fixed inputs are acquired up to the point where the associated decrease in variable costs is 
just balanced by the marginal cost increment (w2).  
 
The decision to utilise either a short-run or long-run cost function in the analysis is generally 
based on our belief whether the firms use all inputs at their optimal levels. If this is the case, 
then the total cost function is used in the analysis. On the contrary, if firms do not operate at 
their static equilibrium levels the variable cost function has to be employed. Moreover, in the 
empirical analysis the decision on variable as opposed to total cost is influenced by data 
availability and econometric considerations. In empirical studies it is often the case that a 
positive relationship between variable cost and the capital stock is found. There are two 
possible explanations of this theoretically implausible sign. The first interpretation suggested 
by Cowing and Holtmann (1983) argues that the positive sign of the coefficient of capital 
stock is an indicator of an excessive amount of capital stock being employed by firms. In this 
case, an increase in the capital stock would lead to an increase in both variable and total 
costs. According to the second interpretation, the incorrect sign of the coefficient of the 
capital stock is derived from the multicollinearity between the output and the capital stock 
(Guyomard and Vermersch, 1989, and Fillipini, 1996). This problem is often combined with 
the empirical difficulty of defining and measuring the capital stock variable. Due to a lack of 
data, most studies have used physical measures of the capital stock as proxies. These proxy 
variables are usually highly correlated with the output variable and may thus cause the 
multicollinearity problem (Fillipini, 1996). 
 
3.4 Different Efficiency Concepts 
 
In this section, an input distance function and a cost frontier function are utilised to introduce 
different efficiency measures. The efficiency measures are essentially defined in such a way 
as to provide measures of distance to a respective ‘frontier’ function (e.g. an input distance 
function or a cost frontier function). The definition of the cost frontier function corresponds 
to the definition of the cost function in Eq.(3.6). The only difference is that from now on 
observed costs are allowed to deviate from the minimum or frontier costs due to the cost 
inefficiency. 
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3.4.1 Technical Efficiency 
 
According to Koopmans (1951), a producer is technically efficient if, and only if, it is 
impossible to produce more of any output without producing less of some other output or 
using more of some input. According to a formal definition of technical efficiency, an input-
output vector (x, y) ∈ T is technically efficient if, and only if, (x', y') ∉ T for                        
(–x', y') ≥ (–x, y).  
 
An input-oriented definition of technical efficiency states that input vector x ∈ L(y) is 
technically efficient if, and only if, x' ∉ L(y) for x' ≤ x or, equivalently, x ∈ Eff L(y). A 
feasible input vector is thus technically efficient if, and only if, no reduction in any input is 
feasible, holding the output vector fixed. Following this definition, we can define an input-
oriented measure of technical efficiency first proposed by Debreu (1951) and Farrell (1957) 
as a function: 
 
 
{ })(:min),( yxyx LTEI ∈= θθ . (3.23) 
 
Technical efficiency is measured in terms of an equi-proportional contraction of all inputs. If 
no such contraction is feasible, i.e. TEI (x, y) = 1, then the input vector is technically 
efficient. It should be noted that equi-proportional contractions of inputs associate technical 
efficiency with membership in input isoquants, which is a necessary but not a sufficient 
condition for membership in input efficient subsets. Consequently, the above defined 
measure of technical efficiency is necessary but not sufficient for being technically efficient 
consistent with Koopmans’ (1951) definition. However, since radial measures have nice 
technical properties a vast amount of the economic and econometric literature uses the 
Debreu (1951) and Farrell (1957) definitions. The input-oriented measure of technical 
efficiency given in Eq.(3.23) satisfies the following properties (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 
2000): 
 
1. TEI (x, y) ≤ 1; 
2. TEI (x, y) = 1   ⇔   x ∈ Isoq L(y); 
3. TEI (x, y) is nonincreasing in x; 
4. TEI (x, y) is homogeneous of degree –1 in x;  
5. TEI (x, y) is invariant with respect to the units in which y and x are measured. 
 
Property 1 is a normalisation property which states that TEI (x, y) is bounded above by unity. 
Property 2 states that TEI (x, y) uses the relaxed standard Isoq L(y) rather than the more 
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stringent standard Eff L(y) to measure technical efficiency. This is the only undesirable 
property of TEI (x, y). Alternatively, technical efficiency can be defined relative to input 
efficient subsets but this would require replacing radial efficiency measures with nonradial 
efficiency measures where the latter do not satisfy Properties 4 and 5. Property 3 is a weak 
monotonicity property saying that TEI (x, y) does not increase when the usage of any input 
increases. Property 4 is a homogeneity property saying that an equiproportionate increase in 
all inputs results in an equivalent change in an opposite direction in TEI (x, y). Property 5 is 
an invariance property saying that efficiency scores are unaffected by changing the units in 
which any input or output is measured.  
 
The input distance function is closely related to the input-oriented measure of technical 
efficiency which can be also written as: { }1),(:min),( ≥= yxyx θθ II DTE . Technical 
efficiency as defined above is equal to the inverse of the input distance function.  
 
3.4.2 Cost Efficiency 
 
While the standard against which technical efficiency is measured is provided by input 
isoquants, the cost frontier C(y, w) is an appropriate standard against which to measure cost 
(or overall) efficiency. In the first case, no behavioural objective needs to be specified 
whereas in the second case it is assumed that cost minimisation is an appropriate behavioural 
objective.  
 
A measure of cost efficiency is the following function: 
 
xwwywyx T/),(),,( CCE = . (3.24) 
 
The cost frontier function is thus closely related to a measure of cost efficiency which is 
given by the ratio of minimum/frontier to observed cost. The properties satisfied by the 
measure of cost efficiency are (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000): 
 
1. 0 < CE (x, y, w) ≤ 1; 
2. CE (x, y, w) = 1   ⇔   x = x (y, w) and wT x = C(y, w); 
3. CE (λx, y, w) = λ-1 CE (x, y, w)  for  λ > 0; 
4. CE (x, λy, w) ≥ CE (x, y, w)  for  λ ≥ 1;  
5. CE (x, y, λw) = CE (x, y, w)  for  λ > 0. 
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Property 1 says that the measure of cost efficiency is bounded between zero and one. 
Property 2 states that a firm is cost efficient if, and only if, it achieves the minimum 
expenditure required to produce a given output vector, i.e. it uses a cost-minimising input 
vector. Property 3 says that CE (x, y, w) is homogeneous of degree –1 in inputs, and 
Property 4 says that CE (x, y, w) is nondecreasing in outputs. Property 5 states that            
CE (x, y, w) is homogeneous of degree zero in input prices, indicating that the measure of 
cost efficiency depends only on relative input prices. 
 
Technical efficiency is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the achievement of cost 
efficiency. It may be the case that a technically efficient firm uses inappropriate mixes of 
inputs given the relative input prices it faces. This indicates the presence of allocative 
inefficiency in the firm.  
 
3.4.3 Allocative Efficiency 
 
A measure of input allocative efficiency can be introduced as the following function: 
 
xwwyyxwyxwyx θT/),(),(/),,(),,( CTECEAE II == . (3.25) 
 
The measure of input allocative efficiency satisfies the following properties (Kumbhakar and 
Lovell, 2000): 
 
1. 0 < AEI (x, y, w) ≤ 1; 
2. AEI (x, y, w) = 1   ⇔   ∃ λ ≤ 1: λx = x (y, w); 
3. AEI (λx, y, w) = AEI (x, y, w)  for  λ > 0; 
4. AEI (x, y, λw) = AEI (x, y, w)  for  λ > 0. 
 
Again, Property 1 says that the measure of input allocative efficiency is bounded between 
zero and one. Property 2 states that AEI (x, y, w) achieves its upper bound if, and only if, a 
radial contraction of a producer’s input vector (due to technical inefficiency) results in a 
cost-minimising input vector. If no such contraction is possible, the producer is both 
allocatively and technically efficient, that is cost efficient. Properties 3 and 4 say that         
AE (x, y, w) is homogeneous of degree 0 in inputs and input prices, respectively. These two 
properties imply that the measure of input allocative efficiency depends only on the relative 
input use and relative input prices. 
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3.4.4 Relationship between the Measures of Efficiency 
 
From Eq.(3.25), the measure of cost efficiency decomposes to:  
 
 ),,(),(),,( wyxyxwyx II AETECE ×= . (3.26) 
 
Cost efficiency has the property of multiplicative separability into input-allocative and 
technical efficiencies.37 All three efficiency measures are bounded between 0 and 1. A firm 
is cost efficient if, and only if, it is both technically and allocatively efficient.  
 
In Figure 3.1 a simple example of firms which use two inputs to produce a single output is 
illustrated. The set of input vectors x = (x1, x2)T that are feasible for a chosen output y is 
represented by the input requirement set L(y), whose boundary is given by an input isoquant 
Isoq L(y). Technically efficient firms are presented by Isoq L(y). If a given firm uses 
quantities of inputs defined by point x in Figure 3.1, it is technically inefficient since it lies 
above Isoq L(y). The technical inefficiency of the firm is represented by the distance between 
points x and θx, which is the amount by which all inputs could be proportionally reduced 
without a reduction in output. Technical efficiency θ can be expressed as the ratio between 
the distance from the origin to technically efficient input vector θx and the distance from the 
origin to input vector x.  
 
If the input price ratio, represented by the slope of isocost line wTx, is known, then a cost 
efficient input combination can be identified. A firm that uses a cost-minimising input vector 
is presented by point x*, where isocost line wTx* is a tangent to input isoquant IsoqL(y). 
Thus, the minimum costs that can be achieved for the production of a given output y are 
wTx*. From Figure 3.1 we can see that the firm operating at θx is technically efficient but 
allocatively inefficient since it operates with higher costs (isocost line wTθx lies above the 
line wTx*). The distance between αx and θx measures the allocative inefficiency of the firm. 
The allocative efficiency is defined as the ratio between the distance from the origin to αx 
and the distance from the origin to θx, whereas the total cost efficiency α can be calculated 
as the ratio between the distance from the origin to αx and the distance from the origin to x. 
It should be noted that, for a given output level y, the input combination αx is not feasible 
since it lies outside the input requirement set L(y). To reach the optimal input combination 
                                               
37
 Separability may also be exploited in order to further decompose technical efficiency into scale, 
congestion, and ‘pure’ technical efficiency, as in Färe, Grosskopf, and Lovell (1985). 
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and thus become cost efficient, the firm would have to change its relative input use in the 
direction of increasing the use of input x1 and decreasing the use of input x2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Decomposition of cost efficiency (Greene, 1997) 
 
A final remark to be made refers to the cost minimizing behaviour. A question that can be 
raised in the presence of inefficiencies in the model is whether, by employing the cost 
function, one can truly arrive at the economic representation of the production possibility set. 
The theoretical cost function satisfying all the required properties laid down in Section 3.3 
can only be derived in the presence of cost-minimising behaviour. If this is not the case, it is 
likely that some properties of the cost function, for example concavity in input prices, will 
not be satisfied by the estimated empirical cost function. There is thus no reason to assume 
that in the absence of cost-minimising behaviour the measured relationship between costs 
and outputs would represent technologically determined cost functions. One should keep in 
mind that in such cases the estimated empirical or frontier cost function cannot be viewed as 
the true cost function but rather as the ‘behavioural’ cost function (Evans, 1971, and Breyer, 
1987).  
 
3.5 Economies of Scale and Scale Efficiency 
 
So far we have held output vector y fixed and discussed how to produce a given output 
vector with minimum input use or minimum cost. The former can be done by the contraction 
of input vector x to thus achieve technical efficiency, whereas the latter in addition requires 
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changing the input combination in order to achieve allocative efficiency as well. Besides the 
efficiency concepts described so far, an important role in cost-minimising behaviour is also 
played by economies or diseconomies of scale which help us define the optimal size of a 
firm. The optimal size is defined as the output level associated with the minimal average 
costs of production. We would thus like to establish whether for a proportional increase in 
vector of outputs one needs to increase the vector of inputs proportionally, more than 
proportionally or less than proportionally. Accordingly, the production technology can 
exhibit constant, nonincreasing or nondecreasing returns to scale as defined below (Mas-
Colell et al., 1995): 
 
 Nonincreasing returns to scale:  
 if [ ]1,0for),(),( ∈∈⇒∈ ααα TT yxyx ;  
 Nondecreasing returns to scale:  
 if 1for),(),( ≥∈⇒∈ ααα TT yxyx ;  
 Constant returns to scale:  
 if 0anyfor),(),( ≥∈⇒∈ ααα TT yxyx .  
     
The technology T exhibits nonincreasing returns to scale if any feasible input-output vector 
can be scaled down. This assumption is implied by convexity and the possibility of inaction. 
The production process exhibits nondecreasing returns to scale if any feasible input-output 
vector can be scaled up. The constant returns to scale property is just a conjunction of the 
first two properties.  
 
A formal definition of economies of scale for the multi-product case states that the 
technology set T exhibits standard economies of scale at T∈),( yx  if, and only if, there is a 
δ > 1 such that for all α with 1 < α < δ, there is a γ > α with T∈),( yx γα .  
 
Hence, there are economies of scale if a small proportional increase in the levels of all input 
factors can lead to a more than proportional increase in the levels of outputs produced. It 
should be noted that whenever C(y, w) is increasing in y, this definition implies a decreasing 
ray average cost. The ray average cost (RAC) is the cost of an output vector of fixed 
proportions divided by a homogeneous measure of the size of the outputs (Baumol, 1977): 
 
γγ /),( wyCRAC = . (3.27) 
 
The condition of decreasing ray average costs is then: 
 
Chapter 3                    59 
 
C(γ y, w) < γ C(y, w) for γ > 1. (3.28) 
 
In the case of a single output Eq.(3.28) reduces to the familiar idea of declining average 
costs. It is evident that in this case one firm can produce a given output y less expensively 
than any group of firms. Hence, based on the presence of economies of scale the optimal size 
of the firm can be identified.38 A natural monopoly allegedly minimises industry costs and is 
stable against entry if economies of scale are important and prevail over the full range of 
output. On the other hand, perfect competition can be viable only if firms’ scale economies 
are exhausted at a level of output that is a small fraction of the market.  
 
With more than one output, however, decreasing ray average costs only mean that an 
equiproportionate division of a monopolist’s vector of outputs would increase industry costs. 
There may still be some division of the monopolist’s outputs among several firms that 
decreases total industry costs (Panzar, Willig, 1977). Baumol (1977) argued that 
subadditivity should be the proper criterion for defining a natural monopoly since it implies 
that every output combination is always produced more cheaply by a single firm.39  
 
Besides the standard definition of scale economies in a multi-output firm discussed above, 
there is a stronger definition according to which the technology set T exhibits economies of 
scale at T∈),( yx  if there exists r > 1 and α > 1 such that Tr ∈),( yx αα  for δα ≤≤1 .  
 
This definition, first proposed by Panzar and Willig (1977), proves to be very useful since it 
allows the defining of a concept similar to the known concept of scale elasticity in the case 
of a single-output firm. This condition is local in that it is specific to a point (x, y) and only 
requires that Tr ∈),( yx αα  for α in an arbitrarily small neighbourhood. If the production 
process were homogeneous of degree t > 1, i.e. T∈),( yx  would imply that Tt ∈),( yx αα , 
then the definition would hold for any α and with α invariant over T. In this definition, 
however, r may depend on the particular point (x, y). Scale economies according to the latter 
definition imply standard scale economies according to the former definition. 
 
The properties of T were already provided in Section 3.1. We continue by further assuming 
that T is representable by a multi-output production transformation function, which is 
continuously differentiable in x, and continuously differentiable in ym (m =1, …, M),          
                                               
38
 More on the economies of scale, size and density concepts in the case of a single output firm will be 
given in Section 3.5.2. 
39
 This discussion will be continued in Section 3.5.1. 
60  Introduction to efficiency analysis 
 
for ym > 0, at points (x, y) where x is cost efficient for y. This is a strong regularity condition 
on the smoothness of the technology which assures that isoquants have no corners. When 
this condition is satisfied, it is possible to define the degree of scale economies, S, in terms of 
multi-output technology. The degree of scale economies at T∈),( yx  is: 
 
{ }δαααδ ≤≤∈>∃= 1for),(thatsuch1:sup TrS ryx . (3.29) 
 
S is defined for all technologies since it is a local measure that is permitted to vary from 
point to point. S is positive on the assumption that inputs are always productive for all 
outputs. Economies of scale pertain if S > 1. Panzar and Willig (1977) showed that if the 
technology is homogeneous of degree t, then S = t at all cost efficient points, i.e. at all 
T∈),( yx  where wT x = C(y, w). S is thus an indicator of the local degree of homogeneity of 
technology.  
 
Further, S is a generalisation of the scale elasticity E of a scalar output production function. 
It is the standard result that E measures the ratio of average to marginal cost or, equivalently 
the ratio of cost to the revenue from marginal cost pricing when E is defined from the 
derivatives of the single-output differentiable production function. Panzar and Willig (1977) 
proved that at (x*, y), with x* = x (y, w) being cost-minimising input vector, S can be defined 
in a similar manner: ),(),(
1
wyywy m
M
m m
CCS ∑
=
= , where Cm(y, w) is a partial derivative 
with respect to ym and stands for the marginal cost of m-th output produced. S thus measures 
the ratio of the production cost to the revenue that would result from marginal cost pricing in 
the case of multi-output production.40 For a single-output production function, S = E.41 
 
Taking into account the duality theory42, we can obtain another representation of degree of 
scale economies, Sˆ :  
 
{ }δαααδ ≤≤≤>∃= 1for),(),(thatsuch1:supˆ 1 wyCwyCrS r . (3.30) 
                                               
40
 This also proves that in the presence of economies of scale, S > 1, marginal cost pricing is 
unprofitable since it does not allow a firm to cover all its costs. 
41
 The single-output case will be examined in more detail in Section 3.5.2. 
42
 According to modern duality theory, the theory of production can be developed treating the cost 
function as the primitive instead of the production set. That is, from observed behaviour in the form of 
costs, input prices and input demands, we are able to extract important characteristics of the 
technology. In McFadden’s (1978) terminology, the cost function is a ‘sufficient statistic’ for the 
technology. 
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It can be shown that S = Sˆ  (Panzar and Willig, 1977). The technology exhibits economies of 
scale, diseconomies of scale or locally constant returns to scale at (x*, y) if and only if         
Sˆ  > 1, Sˆ  < 1 or Sˆ  = 1, respectively.  
 
The relationship between scale economies and scale efficiency is discussed in Färe, 
Grosskopf and Lovell (1988). Scale efficiency is shown to correspond to constant returns to 
scale. In this case, the output level is associated with the minimal average cost of production. 
The source of input scale inefficiency can be either the production of an inefficiently small 
output vector in a region of increasing returns to scale or the production of an inefficiently 
large output vector in a region of decreasing returns to scale. If a firm chooses to operate at a 
production level where technology exhibits increasing or decreasing returns to scale it is 
regarded as scale inefficient since it can decrease its average costs by changing the 
production level to the point where constant returns to scale prevail.  
 
3.5.1 Cost Subadditivity and Natural Monopoly 
 
In essence, a natural monopoly arises if technology and demand are such that it is cheaper 
for one firm to serve the market than for several firms to do so. In such circumstances, 
competition is unfeasible and, hence, a monopoly seems to be ‘natural’. A natural monopoly 
is usually associated with economies of scale. Economies of scale are present if a 
proportional increase in the levels of all inputs leads to a more than proportional increase in 
the levels of outputs produced (as defined in the previous section). In a single output case, 
this would lead to declining average costs meaning that one firm can produce a given output 
less expensively than any group of firms. In the multi-product case, however, economies of 
scale only imply that the monopolist’s production would be cheaper than if the monopolist’s 
vector of outputs were equiproportionately divided among any given number of firms, 
whereas this might not hold for an arbitrary division of outputs. Therefore, Baumol (1977) 
introduced the notion of subadditivity to define a natural monopoly in the multiple products 
case. Subadditivity of the cost function means that the cost of the sum of any N output 
vectors is less than the sum of the costs of producing them separately. More formally, a 
multi-product cost function C(y, w) is strictly and globally subadditive in the set of outputs 
in M = 1, …, m, if for any N output vectors y1, y2, … yN of the goods in M we have (Baumol, 
1977):  
 
),(...),(),...( 11 wywywyy NN CCC ++<++ . (3.31) 
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This is a necessary and sufficient condition for a natural monopoly of any output 
combination in the industry producing (any and all) commodities in M because subadditivity 
means that it is always cheaper to have a single firm produce whatever combination of 
outputs is supplied to the market. It is possible that for some output vectors an industry will 
be a natural monopoly while for others it will not, in which case we have output-specific 
subadditivity.  
 
The examination of a multi-product firm has led to additional developments in the area of 
economies of scope. Economies of scope are an extension of the notion of joint production 
and a particular case of the more general concept of subadditivity. Economies of scope are 
said to occur when it is possible for a single firm to produce two or more products more 
cheaply than it is possible to produce them with more than one firm. In the case of two 
products y1 and y2, economies of scope exist when  
 
);,0();0,();,( 2121 wyCwyCwyyC +< , (3.32) 
 
i.e., joint production is cheaper than separate production. Panzar and Willig (1981) provided 
a more rigorous definition of this and also showed that economies of scope exist if and only 
if the cost function with respect to the input shared by each output is subadditive. 
 
3.5.2 Economies of Size, Output Density and Customer Density 
 
A vast amount of the economic literature has been devoted to the effect of output on costs. 
We now turn to an investigation of this issue and confine our attention to a single output 
case. As already established, costs cannot decrease as output increases. This implies that 
marginal cost, defined as the partial derivative of the cost function with respect to output, is 
always nonnegative.  
 
The elasticity of cost with respect to the output, or cost flexibility (Chambers, 1988), can be 
defined as follows: 
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The general definition in Eq.(3.33) applies to a multi-output case. In a single output case, 
Eq.(3.33) can be interpreted as the ratio of marginal cost divided by average cost: 
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The reciprocal of the elasticity of cost is referred to as the elasticity of size: 
 
 
1),( −= wyE yS ε . (3.35) 
 
Here, a distinction has to be made between elasticity of scale and elasticity of size. Although 
the two concepts are closely related, they are only equal if the production technology 
satisfies certain additional requirements. Elasticity of size (ES) measures the percentage 
increase in cost due to an increase in output. On the other hand, elasticity of scale (E) 
measures the percentage increase in output as a result of a proportional increase in all inputs: 
 
 E =
x
i
ln
lnT
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, (3.36) 
 
where i is a K×1 vector of ones. Due to a possible reallocation of an input-minimising bundle 
(i.e., change in relative input use) caused by the output change, a one percent change in 
output need not be associated with a one percent change in all inputs. Thus, the two 
measures are generally not the same. These two measures only correspond in the case of a 
homothetic production function (Chambers, 1988). The cost function is consistent with the 
homotheticity of the production function whenever the cost function is separable, that is 
output is separable from input prices: )()(),( ww cyhyC = . This also implies that elasticity 
of size is independent of input prices. Since any homogenous function is also homothetic, 
these results also apply to homogeneous functions.  
 
If εy (y, w) > 1 (or equivalently, ES < 1) the firm exhibits diseconomies of size and smaller-
sized operations (in terms of output produced) are more cost-effective in the sense that they 
are more scale efficient. If εy (y, w) < 1, the firm exhibits economies of size (ES > 1). Hence, 
larger-sized operations bring notable cost advantages. When εy (y, w) = 1, the firm is 
characterised by constant returns to size (ES = 1). In this case the cost increases with the 
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same proportion as the output so there are no gains or losses resulting from expanding or 
shrinking production. The firm is said to operate at the optimal level.43  
 
In the case of network industries, the output typically possesses several dimensions. Besides 
output distributed, several output characteristics such as the number of customers, size of 
service area or length of network can influence the costs. According to Caves, Christensen 
and Tretheway (1984) and Roberts (1986), the inclusion of the number of customers and the 
size of service area in the cost function allows us to distinguish between economies of output 
density, economies of customer density and economies of size.  
 
Assume that output vector y consists of the main output (Q) and two output characteristics, 
namely the number of customers (CU) and area size (AS). First, the economies of output 
density EOD are defined in the following way: 
 
 
Q
ASCUQCEOD
ln
),,,(ln
1
∂
∂= w  
 
      = 1/єQ , (3.37) 
 
where єQ is the elasticity of cost with respect to the output delivered (Q). Economies of 
output density measure the reaction of costs to an increase in output (Q), holding the number 
of customers and the size of the service area constant. It also follows that the customer 
density, defined as a ratio of the number of customers to the area size, is held constant.  
 
Second, the economies of customer density ECD are defined as follows: 
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     = 1/[єQ + єCU] , (3.38) 
 
                                               
43
 For instance, for a ‘U-shaped’ average-cost curve, average costs are minimised at the point where 
there are constant returns to size. Increasing returns to size are associated with decreasing average 
costs, whereas decreasing returns to size are associated with increasing average costs. 
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where єCU is elasticity of cost with respect to the number of customers (CU). Economies of 
customer density measure the reaction of costs due to a proportional increase in both the 
output and number of customers, holding the area size constant. In addition, it is assumed 
that, on average, new customers consume as much as the existing ones, i.e. output per 
customer is held fixed. This measure allows us to analyse an existing service area which is 
becoming more densely populated.  
 
Finally, economies of size ES are defined as: 
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  = 1/[єQ + єCU + єAS] ,  (3.39) 
 
where єAS is the elasticity of cost with respect to the area size (AS). Alternatively, one could 
also consider the network length as a proxy for area size in Eq.(3.39). Economies of size 
measure the reaction of costs when the output, number of customers and area size increase 
proportionally. This measure becomes important when analysing whether or not it is 
beneficial to expand the size of the service area. This could be, for example, achieved by 
merging utilities. It is assumed that customer density and output per customer are held fixed.  
 
It is said that there are economies, diseconomies or constant returns to size, customer density 
or output density if ES, ECD and EOD are greater than unity, less than unity or equal to unity, 
respectively.  
 
From the variable cost function one can also obtain the measure of economies of size as 
follows (Caves, Christensen and Swanson, 1981): 
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where K is the capital stock. Economies of output density and customer density can be 
obtained in a similar manner, i.e. by properly adjusting the numerator of Eq.(3.37) and 
Eq.(3.38), respectively. Measures obtained in this way refer to the long run.  
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By simply applying Eq.(3.37) and Eq.(3.38) to the variable cost function, short-run 
economies of density are obtained. Instead of short-run economies of density, some authors 
also speak of economies of utilisation (Caves, Christensen and Swanson, 1981). With respect 
to the economies of size, Garcia and Thomas (2001) point out that it is not interesting to 
consider the case where capital is not modified because merging several utilities into a single 
utility cannot be done without the consolidation of production and distribution facilities. In a 
similar way, if a utility wishes to expand its operation to cover a new area new investments 
are needed (e.g., expanding distribution network), which necessarily means expanding the 
capital stock, with this not being possible in the short run. Thus, in general one does not 
speak of short-run economies of size.  
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4 Functional Forms 
 
In order to be able to estimate the cost function, we first have to specify a functional form. 
The decision on which functional form to choose for the empirical analysis is usually not 
straightforward since the true shape of the cost or production function is unknown. When 
choosing the functional form, one must keep the goal of the study firmly in mind. Within the 
context of the problem, the form should be as general as possible and impose the fewest 
possible a priori constraints or maintained hypotheses. Choosing a functional form limits the 
range the analysis can have. Once a general model is specified, classical statistical tests can 
only be conducted on the presumption that the general model is valid. Nevertheless, classical 
statistical theory is silent about the choice of functional form. Ideally, the theory suggests the 
form but many functional forms complying with the theory can be found. Choosing a 
functional form thus requires both a judgement and knowledge (Chambers, 1988).  
 
The primary goal of an applied production analysis is to empirically measure economically 
relevant information that exhaustively characterises the behaviour of economic agents. For 
smooth technologies (i.e., those that are twice continuously differentiable), this includes the 
value of the function (the level of cost), the gradient of the function (the conditional factor 
demands) and the Hessian matrix (the conditional factor demand elasticities). One should try 
to find a form that is rich enough in parameters and can consequently estimate these effects 
independently and without imposing intrinsic restrictions or maintained hypotheses. Of 
special concern when analysing producers’ behaviour are the maintained hypotheses on 
homogeneity, homotheticity, elasticity of substitution and concavity.  
 
In the existing literature there is a wide variety of functional forms. The properties of the cost 
function established in the previous chapter will be used to determine possible advantages 
and disadvantages of applying a certain functional form when estimating the cost function. 
Some functional forms will be found to be too restrictive, imposing several restrictions upon 
the parameters of the cost function while, for the other, more flexible functional forms, we 
will have to verify whether all relevant properties of the cost function are satisfied. For 
example, Cobb-Douglas, CES and Leontief are more restrictive functional forms while 
others, like translog (or transcendental logarithmic), quadratic mean of order p and 
Generalised Leontief, are considered more flexible forms. Forms that can be either second-
order differential or second-order numerical approximations are referred to as flexible 
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functional forms.44 Flexible forms place no restrictions on the value of the function or its first 
or second derivatives at approximation point. In contrast, Cobb-Douglas is at best a first-
order approximation.  
 
It is also interesting to note that both the translog and quadratic mean of order p functional 
forms belong to a broader class of generalised quadratic forms, which is the class of locally 
flexible functional forms. Following Blackorby, Primont and Russel (1977), this class of 
functions can be expressed as: 
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where βij = βji, and each gi(zi) is a known twice continuously differentiable function of zi.  
 
Flexible forms are not without their shortcomings. As a rule, increased flexibility is 
associated with a greater need for information to adequately specify such relationships. 
Because of the increased number of parameters to be estimated, degrees of freedom are 
reduced and we might also end up with a problem of multicollinearity. Since reductions in 
maintained hypotheses come at a cost, added flexibility is not always desirable (Griffin, 
Montgomery, and Rister, 1987). The potential gains of choosing a more complex functional 
form must be balanced against difficulties involved in estimation, the structure imposed on 
the underlying production process and the ease with which parameter estimates can be 
interpreted. An ‘ideal’ functional form would minimise such a trade-off. 
 
Further, flexible forms are very inflexible in representing separable technologies since a 
certain number of restrictions is required for separability to hold. Another limitation is their 
ability to approximate arbitrary technologies, which are local in nature. As approximations 
are not truly global, they cannot be exact for a wide range of observations.45 Therefore, the 
                                               
44
 Forms that can approximate any arbitrary twice continuously differentiable function are called 
second-order differential approximations, while forms that can be interpreted as a second-order, 
Taylor-series approximation to an arbitrary function are called second-order numerical 
approximations.  
45
 The criticism of locally flexible functional forms has encouraged some authors to develop 
functional forms that are globally flexible. An example of such a functional form is the Augmented 
Fourier Form (Gallant, 1981) where no second-order restrictions are imposed anywhere in the domain. 
Augmented Fourier uses a trigonometric polynomial for the approximation and is quite a complex 
functional form. It requires the rescaling of variables so that they lie in the open interval (0, 2pi) and, 
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most likely contribution of the locally flexible forms lies in the fact that they apparently 
place far fewer restrictions prior to an estimation. They let measures like the elasticity of size 
and elasticity of substitution depend on data, i.e. they can vary across the sample and need 
not be parametric as they are for most of the more traditional forms (Chambers, 1988).  
 
In what follows we provide the traditional and (locally) flexible functional forms most 
widely used in the empirical literature as well as criteria for selecting the most suitable 
functional form.  
 
4.1 Different Functional Forms 
 
4.1.1 The Cobb-Douglas Cost Function 
 
The Cobb-Douglas cost function is empirically speaking the most widely exploited 
functional form. This functional form was introduced as a production function by Cobb and 
Douglas (1928). Since it is self-dual, the associated cost function has the same functional 
form. When firms are using K inputs to produce M outputs the Cobb-Douglas cost function 
can be written as follows: 
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where C stands for cost, y is the vector of output(s) and output characteristics and w is the 
vector of input prices. In accordance with the properties of the cost function βi > 0 and γi > 0, 
∀i. If n = K+M is the number of explanatory variables, the number of parameters to be 
estimated equals 1+n. If we take the natural logarithm of Eq.(4.2), we obtain the following 
expression:  
 
                                                                                                                                     
in addition to the constant term, linear and square terms, the inclusion of sine and cosine terms is 
required. It always has a larger number of parameters to be estimated than the locally flexible 
functional forms. In the case of relatively small samples, this form is not applicable due to the 
substantial loss of degrees of freedom. Therefore, the Fourier form will not be used in our empirical 
analysis and, accordingly, its presentation is considered to be beyond the scope of this work. Also, this 
functional form is not commonly used in production analysis.  
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Eq.(4.3) is linear in parameters (and not in explanatory variables) and thus easy to estimate. 
The results are also easy to interpret.  
 
The Cobb-Douglas cost function is linearly homogeneous in input prices if ∑k γk = 1.46 This 
restriction can be imposed in the estimation of the cost function by dividing the input prices 
and the cost by one of the input prices before taking logarithms (i.e. by the normalisation of 
input prices and costs). Another way is to impose a linear restriction in the estimation of 
Eq.(4.3). A method to test the homogeneity assumption is to estimate a restricted and 
unrestricted model and then to perform Wald test or likelihood ratio test.47  
 
By applying Eq.(3.8) to Eq.(4.3) we find that a cost share for each input k equals γk (k = 1, 
…, K). Further, one of the restrictive properties of Cobb-Douglas is that it assumes all 
elasticities of substitution are equal to 1.  
 
By applying Eq.(3.33) to Eq.(4.3) we obtain elasticities of cost with respect to each output ym 
being equal to βm (m = 1, …, M). Another restrictive assumption of the Cobb-Douglas cost 
function is constant economies of scale. Since the Cobb-Douglas functional form is 
homothetic, economies of scale coincide with economies of size. Economies of size are 
obtained as: ES = 1/∑m βm. If cost flexibility ∑m βm < 1, firms in the sample exhibit economies 
of scale and size. Economies of size that vary with output can be obtained by adding the 
square of the logarithmic output in Eq.(4.3).  
 
4.1.2 The Translog Cost Function 
 
The transcendental logarithmic function or translog was introduced by Christensen 
Jorgenson, and Lau (1971, 1973) and is one of the most commonly estimated flexible 
functional forms in the applied literature. The multi-output translog cost function is specified 
as follows: 
 
                                               
46
 In this case the number of parameters to be estimated equals n. 
47
 For example, see Greene (2000). 
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where for the cross-product terms it holds that: i ≠ j and k ≠ l. The expression in Eq.(4.4) is a 
logarithmic second-order Taylor approximation of an arbitrary function ),(ˆ wyC  evaluated 
at (yT, wT) = (1, 1, …, 1).48 Obviously, the means or medians of explanatory variables are 
considered to be much better representatives of a sample and therefore better expansion 
points. Usually, the median is considered the most appropriate approximation point since, as 
opposed to the mean, it is not affected by extreme values of explanatory variables.49  
 
The translog cost function is a generalisation of the Cobb-Douglas functional form. If all 
second-order coefficients equal zero, the translog degenerates to the Cobb-Douglas form. 
The number of parameters to be estimated in the translog form is much larger compared to 
the Cobb-Douglas results. If there are n regressors, the number of parameters equals 
)2)(1(21 ++ nn .50 As mentioned, having a large number of parameters to be estimated can 
result in a multicollinearity problem and a greater need for data.51  
 
When estimating unknown technologies using flexible functional forms, it is not necessary to 
obtain a cost function, neither locally nor globally.52 Therefore, Salvanes and Tjøtta (1998) 
proposed a procedure to calculate the consistency region, i.e. the region in which the 
                                               
48
 Thus, when taking logarithms, lnC(y, w) is evaluated around the point (0, 0, …, 0) which drops out 
of Eq.(4.4).  
49
 This is achieved by the proper transformation of variables. All variables have to be divided by their 
median values before taking logarithms or, alternatively, from variables in a logarithmic form the 
respective logarithms of median values have to be subtracted.  
50
 This is the sum of the n elements in the gradient vector, ½ n(n+1) distinctive elements of the 
Hessian and the constant term, which is the value of the function at the expansion point.  
51
 To detect a possible multicollinearity problem, Maddala (2001) suggests examining t-values. Small 
t-values are a good indicator of multicollinearity. Due to multicollinearity, some coefficients might 
even end up having the wrong sign.  
52
 Salvanes and Tjøtta (1998), for example, showed that Evans and Heckman’s estimated cost function 
for the US Bell System (Evans and Heckman, 1984) is not a cost function since it was found to have a 
negative marginal cost in most of the test areas.  
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required regularity conditions are met, for a multi-output translog cost function. These 
regularity conditions consist of already known properties of non-negative costs, non-negative 
marginal costs, homogeneity in input prices and monotonicity and concavity of input prices.  
 
Usually, the translog model is restricted to be (globally) linearly homogeneous in prices by:53 
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Symmetry conditions imply: βij = βji, γij = γji, δij = δji, ∀i, j. In the case of a twice 
continuously differentiable function they are automatically satisfied. The regularity condition 
that the estimated total cost is positive is met since ( )),(lnexp wyC  is strictly positive for 
all (y, w). The next condition is that marginal cost with respect to output is non-negative 
which holds if and only if: 
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Economies of output density, customer density and economies of size can then be estimated 
using Eq.(3.37), (3.38) and (3.39), respectively. As opposed to the Cobb-Douglas functional 
form, these measures vary with output and/or output characteristics, which is evident from 
Eq.(4.6).  
 
By applying Shephard’s lemma to Eq.(4.4) we can obtain the cost shares of each input. In 
addition, Shephard’s lemma allows us to verify whether cost is nondecreasing in input 
prices, which holds if and only if: 
 
                                               
53
 When estimating the translog, linear homogeneity is imposed in the same way as described for the 
Cobb-Douglas functional form. When linear homogeneity is imposed, the number of parameters to be 
estimated equals ½ M (M+1) + ½ K(K+1) + MK, where M and K are the number of outputs and inputs, 
respectively.  
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Since linear homogeneity is imposed, the input cost shares Si sum up to unity.54 The last 
regularity condition is that the estimated cost function is concave in input prices. This 
corresponds to the Hessian matrix with respect to input prices being negative semidefinite. 
Following Diewert and Wales (1987), this Hessian is negative semidefinite if and only if 
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is negative semidefinite. It is worth noting that the elements of the matrix Γ(y, w) depend on 
(y, w) since input shares Si depend on (y, w). Imposing global concavity in input prices 
destroys the flexibility of the translog cost function. Thus, the concavity requirement is not 
imposed and has to be tested after the estimation of the cost function.55  
 
If the translog cost function is to be consistent with a homothetic technology, the output must 
be separable from input prices. Taking ( )),(lnexp wyC  and using Eq.(4.4) it can be 
established that, if the function is to be globally homothetic, it must be true that: 
jiij ,,0 ∀=δ .  
 
Since the translog functional form is a local approximation, the estimation results are reliable 
close to the approximation point. Observations far from this point may lead to the wrong 
conclusions. White (1980) further demonstrated that Ordinary Least Squares estimators of 
Taylor-series expansions are not reliable indicators of the parameter vector of the true 
                                               
54
 The estimation of (4.4) together with the share equations requires a modification of Zellner’s (1962) 
Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) method. Since the share equations add up to one, the 
covariance matrix of disturbances is singular. Thus, one share equation has to be dropped in the 
estimation procedure.  
55
 As an alternative, Ryan and Wales (2000) propose a method for imposing concavity locally while at 
the same time maintaining flexibility in the case of the translog and generalised Leontief forms.  
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expansion of a known function. This is due to the fact that the Least Squares (LS) method 
weights all observations equally, while for the derivation of Taylor series only the 
approximation point is the point of interest. Parameters of the translog function estimated by 
the LS model are therefore almost always biased. As a consequence, predictive properties of 
locally flexible functional forms have been found to be satisfactory (for large samples), but 
inferences involving single parameter estimates are not reliable.  
 
4.1.3 The Generalised Leontief Cost Function 
 
The generalised Leontief functional form for a single output case was proposed by Diewert 
(1971) and has the following form:56 
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where h(y) is a continuous, monotonically increasing function. To satisfy the symmetry 
requirement, γij = γji ≥ 0. It is often assumed that h(y) = y, which imposes constant economies 
of scale.  
 
Since this form is not locally flexible when h(y) is not known, Diewart and Wales (1987) 
suggested a locally flexible version of a generalised Leontief, which can be expressed as: 
 
 
( ) .),( 2
111 1
2
1
ywwwwyyC
K
i
iiyy
K
i
ii
K
i
K
i
jiij 





++= ∑∑∑∑
=== =
δβγγw  (4.10) 
 
Similarly to the translog case, global concavity in input prices is not imposed in the 
estimation since this would destroy flexibility. The concavity has to be tested after the 
estimation.  
 
Since this functional form is specified only for a single output case, Hall (1973) proposed a 
hybrid Diewert multi-product cost function which has the following expression:57  
                                               
56
 Eq.(4.9) is a generalisation of Leontief in the sense that when setting γij = 0 (∀i ≠j) and h(y) = y and 
applying Shephard’s lemma, the cost-minimising input vector is given by: xi (y, w) = γii y, which 
corresponds to Leontief production function.  
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Again, symmetry requires: .jilkjiklijlkijkl αααα ===  The appeal of this functional form is 
the fact that it is linearly homogeneous in input prices without the imposition of any 
additional linear restrictions as in the translog case. Separability of the cost function in 
Eq.(4.11) is imposed by setting klijijkl γβα = , which results in: 
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Nevertheless, the hybrid Diewert multi-product cost function cannot be classified as a 
flexible functional form since not all first- and second-order effects are unrestricted. 
Therefore, it cannot be viewed as an approximation of an arbitrary functional form. For 
example, although the hybrid Diewert multi-product cost function contains no a priori 
restrictions on elasticities of substitution among factor inputs, it imposes constant returns to 
scale. Generalising this form to permit flexibility in scale economies necessitates a large 
increase in the number of parameters (Caves, Christensen and Tretheway, 1980).  
 
4.1.4 The Quadratic Cost Function  
 
A third flexible form which might be used to represent a multi-output cost function is the 
quadratic functional form suggested by Lau (1974):58 
 
                                                                                                                                     
57
 The number of parameters of this functional form equals M (M+1) K (K+1)/4, where M and K stand 
for the number of outputs and inputs. This exceeds the number of parameters in translog form, except 
when there are only two inputs and outputs.  
58
 The number of parameters to be estimated equals the translog form. When the translog is restricted 
to be linearly homogeneous in prices, the quadratic form has M+K+1 more parameters than the 
translog, where M is the number of outputs and K is the number of inputs.  
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Compared to the translog, variables in the quadratic functional form are not in logarithms 
and can therefore take on zero values as well. However, the quadratic cost function has one 
serious flaw. It is not linearly homogeneous in input prices nor can homogeneity be imposed 
by parametric restrictions without sacrificing the flexibility of the form (Caves, Christensen 
and Tretheway, 1980). Thus, the quadratic form is not an attractive form of the multi-product 
cost function and will be disregarded in what follows.  
 
4.1.5 The Quadratic Mean of Order p 
 
Besides the translog, Chambers (1988) also considers another cost function which is 
obtained as a second-order, Taylor-series approximation. Taking a second-order, Taylor-
series approximation of the transformation of function ),(ˆ wyC , ,),(ˆ pC wy  in terms of 
2),( pTT wy  in the neighbourhood of the null vector results in a quadratic mean of order p:59  
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Again, symmetry is guaranteed by βij = βji, γij = γji, δij = δji, ∀i, j. To guarantee the 
monotonicity and positivity of the cost function, it is necessary that none of the coefficients 
in Eq.(4.14) is negative. Linear homogeneity in input prices is once again not satisfied and 
we will therefore not consider this functional form as a suitable candidate for estimating the 
cost function.  
 
                                               
59
 If this approximation is not taken in the neighbourhood of (0, 0, …, 0), explanatory variables have 
to be suitably normalised. Usually this is done by subtracting the mean or median value from each 
variable.  
Chapter 4                    77 
 
It is also interesting to note that both the translog and quadratic mean of order p functional 
forms belong to a broader class of generalised quadratic forms, which is the class of locally 
flexible functional forms. At the beginning of this section we already pointed out the main 
features of locally flexible functional forms and also provided some critical notes.  
 
4.1.6 The Generalised Translog Multi-product Cost Function 
 
One of the desirable characteristics of a multi-product cost function is that it permits a value 
of zero for one or more outputs. The quadratic cost function and generalised Leontief permit 
zero output values. However, in the translog functional form all of the outputs enter in a 
logarithmic form and therefore the translog has no finite representation if any output has a 
zero value. This flaw of the translog cannot be neglected since firms in a multi-product 
industry might only produce a subset of feasible outputs.  
 
Nevertheless, the translog functional form can be generalised to permit zero output levels. It 
seems natural to retain the log metric for input prices and total cost, but for outputs to choose 
a metric that is well-defined for zero values. A metric is available that not only permits zero 
values but also contains the natural logarithm metric as a limiting case. This metric was 
proposed by Box and Cox (1964): 
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Provided that pi  is strictly positive, the Box-Cox transformation is well-defined for zero 
output levels (it equals –1/pi ). The natural log transformation is a limiting case of the Box-
Cox transformation.60 The generalised translog multi-product cost function proposed by 
Caves, Christensen and Tretheway (1980) can thus be written in the following way: 
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60
 By applying l'Hôpital's rule we obtain: ( ) ii yy ln/1lim0 =−→ pipipi . 
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By imposing pi  = 0 we obtain the translog cost function specified in Eq.(4.4). One can also 
test the standard translog against the generalised translog specification. The requirement of 
linear homogeneity in input prices is met by imposing the same restrictions as for the 
translog. Compared to the standard translog functional form the generalised translog has one 
more parameter to estimate.61 A further generalisation of Eq.(4.16) is presented in the 
following section. 
 
4.1.7 The General Box-Cox Model 
 
It is interesting to note that the generalised translog, as well as some other widely used 
alternative cost functions, is nested within the general Box-Cox model (1964): 
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where the superscripts in parentheses, φ, pi and τ, represent Box-Cox transformations. The 
generalised translog is obtained by setting φ = 0 and τ = 1, while the standard translog 
requires a further restriction, pi = 0.  
 
Pulley and Braunstein (1992) further introduced the composite cost function for multi-
product firms by setting pi = 1 and τ = 0 in Eq.(4.17). Moreover, a separable quadratic 
function can be obtained by adding another restriction to the composite cost function: δij = 0. 
The composite cost function is a combination of the log-quadratic input price structure of the 
translog form with a quadratic structure for outputs. It allows us to measure economies of 
scope, output-specific economies of scale and subadditivity even in the case of some zero 
output values.  
 
Since the general Box-Cox model is nonlinear in parameters, it has to be estimated with a 
nonlinear maximum likelihood technique. For the functional forms that are nested within the 
general Box-Cox model, the relative statistical fitness can be determined using the standard 
                                               
61
 One could further generalise the generalised translog by specifying a distinct pi for each output or by 
replacing yi(pi) with (yi + ψ)(pi). However, these generalisations needlessly complicate the estimation.  
Chapter 4                    79 
 
likelihood ratio (LR) test. Specifically, each functional form can be tested against the general 
Box-Cox model.  
 
4.1.8 The Hedonic vs. General Cost Function Specification  
 
Most econometric studies appearing up until the mid-1970s ignored the heterogeneity of 
outputs and estimated the cost function with one or the two output measures. In general, the 
use of an aggregate output will yield unbiased empirical results only if the subcomponents of 
the aggregate vary in the same proportion (Panzar and Willig, 1977). This condition is not 
likely to be met in most situations. According to Oum and Tretheway (1989), recent 
approaches to incorporate the heterogeneity of outputs may be classified roughly in the 
following categories: (i) attempts to use disaggregate outputs; (ii) use of multiple aggregate 
outputs; and (iii) the use of single or multiple aggregate outputs and attribute or quality 
variables describing outputs. Recognising the impossibility of complete output 
disaggregation, an increasing number of econometric studies of cost functions have begun 
incorporating quality or attribute variables to describe the outputs. These variables are 
introduced in order to correct for differences in output mix between firms or from one time 
period to another.  
 
Oum and Tretheway (1989) distinguished two approaches in the way output attributes are 
incorporated within the cost function. The two alternative approaches are a hedonic and a 
general specification of the cost function. The hedonic approach specifies the cost function 
in the following form: 
 
 
( )tyyCC MM ,),,(,),,( 11 wqq M1 φφ K= , (4.18) 
 
where ym is the m-th output (m = 1, …, M), qm is a 1×Lm vector of output attributes             
(lm = 1,… Lm) for m-th output, and the time variable t is included to capture the effect of 
technical change. Eq.(4.18) is a hedonic cost function, while the φm(·) imbedded in the cost 
function are referred to as hedonic output aggregator functions. The hedonic output 
specification attempts to adjust the observed outputs for the variation in their quality 
attributes.62 This aggregation requires the separability of the arguments in each hedonic 
                                               
62
 Microeconomic foundations for conducting the formal analysis and measurement of quality 
attributes were provided by the work of Lancaster (1966) and Rosen (1974). Once the existence of 
quality adjusted price and volume indices is accepted, the standard results of neoclassical theory also 
hold in quality-adjusted price and quantity spaces.  
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aggregator from all other arguments in the hedonic cost function.63 This is a restrictive 
assumption and may not be empirically valid for some problems. Restricting the hedonic 
functional form to a separable structure is certainly a limitation of the hedonic specification 
of outputs in the cost function. 
 
Usually, the hedonic cost function to be estimated is specified in the translog form. In this 
case, output aggregator functions φm take the Cobb-Douglas functional form which is another 
limitation of the hedonic specification.64 Accordingly, Eq.(4.18) can be written as: 
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The second approach is to include the output attributes in the cost function in a general 
manner without imposing any restriction on the functional structure, which can be expressed 
as follows: 
 
 ),,,,,,,( 1 tyyCC M wqq M1 KK= , (4.20) 
 
where all variables are defined in the same way as above. Eq.(4.20) is a general specification 
of the model, without any restrictions imposed. Similarly, the translog form of Eq.(4.20) 
results in: 
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 The ratios of the marginal effects of ym and qml on the cost are assumed to be independent of the 
level of any other arguments of the hedonic cost function which are not included in φm.  
64
 Formal arguments can be found in Denny and Fuss (1977). It is shown that the translog hedonic 
cost function must be either a Cobb-Douglas function of translog aggregates or a translog function of 
Cobb-Douglas aggregates. In the latter case, the Cobb-Douglas form in turn implies homotheticity of 
the hedonic aggregator as well as the separability of output ym and attributes qml from other arguments 
in the cost function. Thus, besides separability, an additional limitation is imposed in the case of the 
translog hedonic cost function.  
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In Oum and Tretheeay (1989) the hedonic translog cost function is shown to be nested within 
the general translog specification in Eq.(4.21) through a set of nonlinear constraints on the 
parameters of the general translog function. Thus, the hedonic specification can be 
empirically tested, given sufficient degrees of freedom to estimate the general translog 
function.  
 
Blackorby, Primont, and Russel (1977) showed that once separability is imposed as in 
Eq(4.19), the translog specification of the cost function is no longer capable of providing a 
second-order approximation to any unknown arbitrary separable cost function. The translog 
function with hedonic output specifications must then be interpreted as an exact form of the 
cost function, not as an approximation. This is another serious limitation of the hedonic 
specification. Further, when we embed output aggregator functions into the hedonic translog 
specification the parameters are under-identified since there are more parameters to be 
estimated than regressors. To be able to estimate the translog hedonic cost function, a 
suitable normalisation of the hedonic parameters has to be imposed.65 In the case of the 
Cobb-Douglas output aggregator function we can write:  
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Substituting Eq.(4.22) in Eq.(4.19) we arrive at the final form of the cost function. To solve 
the identification problem, researchers typically impose a normalisation of the hedonic 
parameters by constraining ηi0 = 1.66 These M restrictions seem theoretically sensible in that 
they make the hedonic (quality adjusted) outputs, φm, linearly homogeneous in observed 
                                               
65
 For details, see Oum and Tretheway (1989). 
66
 See, for example, Spady and Friedlaender (1978) and Feigenbaum and Teeples (1983). It may be as 
well noted that the latter study employed a translog hedonic cost function with the translog form of the 
cost function and the Cobb-Douglas functional form of the output aggregator function. The former 
study incorrectly used the translog functional form for both the cost function and output aggregator 
function. The resulting function in this case is not a translog hedonic cost function. Recall that either 
cost function or output aggregator should take on the Cobb-Douglas functional form. 
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outputs, ym. By substituting Eq.(4.22) in Eq.(4.19) we in fact obtain a general translog 
function. Hence, the usual procedure is to estimate the general translog function with the 
appropriate (non-linear) restrictions imposed on its parameters. The resulting system is 
nonlinear in parameters and has to be estimated with a nonlinear maximum likelihood 
technique.  
 
Up to this point it has been shown that the hedonic specification of the cost function is quite 
restrictive and it therefore seems to be unattractive for empirical research. The estimation of 
a multi-product cost function, however, requires a large data set and the general translog 
form in Eq.(4.21) needs many more parameters to be estimated than the translog hedonic 
function.67 The general form is far less restrictive but it consumes valuable degrees of 
freedom. As a result, this reduces the number of attribute variables that can be introduced in 
the cost function. There is again a trade-off and one must choose between a richer 
specification in terms of the number of attribute variables (hedonic approach) and a richer 
specification in terms of fewer arbitrary restrictions on the structure of costs. 
 
4.2 Selection Criteria for a Functional Form 
 
The researcher is never in a position to know the true functional form so the problem is to 
choose the best form for a given task. With the growing number of functional forms 
available, the model builder’s task is becoming ever more complicated. A comparison of the 
different functional forms requires some a priori selection criteria which should refer to 
mathematical, statistical and economic properties and are useful for formalising the selection 
of the functional form during the model-building process. By combining the criteria in Lau 
(1986) with those in Griffin, Montgomery and Rister (1987) the following conditions for 
selecting a functional form are defined: 
 
 theoretical consistency and domain of applicability; 
 flexibility vs. maintained hypotheses; 
 statistical estimation; and 
 general conformity to data. 
 
                                               
67
 For the case of K input prices, M outputs and L attribute variables (L = Σ Lm), the number of 
parameters to be estimated in the general translog form equals [K(K+1)/2 + M (M+1)/2+ L(L+1)/2 + 
KL + KM + ML], while the hedonic translog specification requires only [K (K+1)/2 + M (M+1)/2 + 
KM  + L] parameters.  
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To meet the theoretical consistency condition, a selected functional form has to satisfy 
certain properties indicated by economic theory. The cost function thus has to be 
nondecreasing in output, linearly homogeneous in input prices and nondecreasing and 
concave in input prices. Linear homogeneity in input prices is usually imposed prior to the 
estimation. All functional forms except for the quadratic and quadradic mean of order one 
meet this requirement. Concavity in input prices is normally not imposed ex ante since this 
would destroy the flexibility of the flexible functional forms and would thus have to be 
tested ex post. This is done by evaluating the Hessian at any point of interest. The 
consistency conditions are not necessarily met in all observed data points so another issue to 
be addressed is that of the domain of applicability. Essentially, we are interested in 
identifying regions where the required regularity conditions are met. As approximations by 
examined flexible forms are not global, the regularity conditions may not be valid for a wide 
range of observations. Once again, imposing these conditions globally would destroy the 
flexibility since additional restrictions on the parameters would have to be imposed. One can 
test after the estimation for which data points the regularity conditions are met.  
 
The second criterion deals with flexibility as opposed to maintained hypotheses. Concerns 
regarding maintained hypotheses can be used to assess the appropriateness of the functional 
form. If the maintained hypotheses implied by a certain form are acceptable or even useful, 
then the function might be considered appropriate. In the absence of a strong theoretical or 
empirical basis for adopting a given maintained hypothesis, a functional form which is 
unrestrictive with respect to this hypothesis may be considered appropriate. As already 
discussed, locally flexible functional forms place far fewer restrictions before the estimation 
than the traditional functional forms like Cobb-Douglas, Leontief or CES. Usually, flexible 
functional forms subsume one or more traditional forms as special cases. A detailed list of 
this can be found in Griffin, Montgomery and Rister (1987). The authors also provide all 
relevant properties of the functional forms most used in the production analysis.  
 
The criterion for statistical estimation encompasses several aspects. First, unknown 
parameters should be easy to estimate from the data. This holds for functional forms that are 
linear in parameters. These functions permit parameter estimation by linear least squares 
methods. Sometimes linearity in parameters is achieved after applying a known 
transformation to the function. Out of all the functions discussed, the general Box-Cox 
model, the composite cost function, the generalised translog and the translog hedonic cost 
function do not meet this condition. Second, the functional form should be expressed in an 
explicitly closed form, which holds for all the functions discussed here. Further, the choice 
of functional form is also based on data availability and the number of variables we wish to 
include in the function. Most functions require a geometrically growing number of 
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parameters to be estimated as the number of explanatory variables is increased. This is 
primarily due to the large number of interactions specified among explanatory variables. 
Fuss, McFadden and Mundlak (1978) also pointed out the presence of multicollinearity as an 
increasing number of variables is included in the model.68 Moreover, the researcher might 
take into the account the expense of estimating a large number of parameters in terms of the 
loss of degrees of freedom. This concern becomes especially important when we deal with a 
relatively small number of observations.  
 
The last criterion is related to the general conformity of data, according to which a functional 
form should be consistent with empirical facts. This criterion is related to a specific dataset 
so the findings are typically not general.  
 
To summarise, a functional form may be appropriate because of its flexibility, the 
correspondence of maintained hypotheses with the theory, the possibility and ease of 
statistical estimation, the possibility and ease of application, general conformity to the data, 
or a combination of these criteria. None of these criteria guarantee that the true relationship 
will be discovered nor do any allow a perfectly objective choice to be made. A subjective 
judgement is a necessary aspect of choice regarding the functional form. Having selected 
two or more estimable functional forms with plausible theoretical and applicative properties, 
the researcher may wish to base their final decision on statistical criteria. Such criteria 
clearly entail data-specific considerations. In the empirical part of the thesis in Chapter 6 
these considerations will be taken into account when choosing the most appropriate 
functional form for estimating the cost function for Slovenian water distribution utilities.  
 
 
                                               
68
 If multicollinearity is high, the variance of the parameter estimates is increased such that it may be 
impossible to determine how much variation in the endogenous variable is explained by different 
exogenous variables. Due to the higher parameter variances, some variables might also turn out to 
have an insignificant influence on the cost.  
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5 Parametric Methods for Estimating Cost 
Inefficiency 
 
After having introduced efficiency concepts in Chapter 3 and analysed in detail the 
properties of the (frontier) cost function and alternative functional forms in Chapter 4, we 
now turn to the problem of estimating cost (in)efficiency. The estimation of frontier cost 
functions can be viewed as an econometric problem of making the empirical implementation 
consistent with the theoretical proposition that no observed agent can exceed the ideal. Cost 
inefficiency scores can then be obtained from the estimated cost frontier function as the 
deviation from the optimal point on the cost frontier. In the literature there are many 
different methods to estimate the cost frontier. Based on whether they allow for a stochastic 
error or not, parametric frontier methods are divided into deterministic and stochastic 
methods. Deterministic frontier can be estimated by the Corrected Ordinary Least Squares 
(COLS) method, while the class of stochastic frontier methods offers a much broader choice 
of methods. Depending on the nature of the data set the SFA methods can be classified into 
cross-sectional and panel data models. Panel data models further allow for many different 
possibilities for estimating the cost frontier and corresponding inefficiencies. Since panel 
data contain observations of companies over a certain time period firm-specific effects can 
be identified, whereas in the case of a cross-section this is impossible. The panel data models 
enable us to distinguish between the heterogeneity captured by firm-specific effects and 
inefficiency. In the following sections the main features of each parametric frontier method 
are presented.  
 
5.1 Deterministic Frontier Analysis (DFA) 
 
The COLS method is based on a regression analysis. It is a deterministic frontier method 
since it does not allow for a stochastic error. The cost function is estimated using the OLS 
technique and then shifted so that all estimated residuals are positive and at least one is zero. 
The logic of this method was suggested by Winsten (1957). The cost function to be 
estimated can be written as follows:  
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where i = 1,2,…, N, C represents the observed total cost, c(·) is a suitable functional form,69 y 
the output vector (consisting of output(s) and output characteristics), w the vector of input 
prices, and ε the two-sided normally distributed random noise component. Parameter α 
represents a constant term, while β stands for the vector of regression coefficients. The 
model’s parameters, with the exception of the constant term, can be estimated consistently if 
not efficiently by OLS. After estimating the cost function in Eq.(5.1) with the OLS method, 
the deterministic cost frontier function by the COLS method is obtained by shifting the cost 
function in the following way: 
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such that { }iεαα ˆminˆ* −=  and { } 0ˆminˆ* ≥+= iiiu εε  is a once-sided disturbance 
capturing the effect of cost inefficiency. Proofs of the consistency of the COLS estimator can 
be found in Greene (1980a). The frontier cost function can thus be viewed as a regression 
that is in line with the recognition of the theoretical constraint that all observations lie above 
it. If the distribution of *iu  were known, the parameters in Eq.(5.1) could be estimated more 
efficiently by Maximum Likelihood procedure (Greene, 1997). 
 
The cost efficiency score is obtained as: 
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where Ci is the observed total cost and Ci* is the frontier or minimum cost of the i-th firm. 
The cost efficiency of the firm is expressed in terms of a score on a scale from 0 to 1 with the 
frontier firm receiving a score of 1. Alternatively, the cost inefficiency score can be 
calculated as the reciprocal of the cost efficiency score defined in Eq. (5.3).  
 
Another version of the deterministic frontier was suggested by Afriat (1972) and extended by 
Richmond (1974). The model is usually referred to as Modified OLS (MOLS). In contrast 
with the COLS, in the MOLS model the estimated OLS intercept is shifted down by the 
expectation of inefficiency:  
                                               
69
 At this point we are not interested in any specific functional form of the cost function. The only 
requirement is that the cost function is linear in parameters. The choice of the most appropriate 
functional form will be made in the empirical part of the thesis.  
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This, in turn, requires an additional assumption regarding the distribution of the inefficiency 
component. The MOLS method is a little less orthodox than the COLS method since it is 
unlikely to result in a full set of negative residuals.  
 
One drawback of the deterministic frontier methods is that they do not allow for stochastic 
errors and rely heavily on the position of a single most efficient unit. It is assumed that all 
deviations of observations from the theoretical minimum are attributed solely to the 
inefficiency of firms. One should note that deviations from the frontier might not be entirely 
under the control of the firm being studied. However, in the interpretation of the 
deterministic frontier, for example, an unusually high number of random equipment failures 
or even bad weather might ultimately appear to the analyst as inefficiency. Moreover, any 
error or imperfection in the specification of the model or measurement of the variables under 
consideration could likewise translate into increased inefficiency measures. In contrast with 
the deterministic frontier, the stochastic frontier specification recognises the possibility of 
stochastic errors.  
 
5.2 Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) 
 
Stochastic Frontier Analysis allows for inefficiency yet it also acknowledges the fact that 
random shocks outside the control of producers can affect costs. These models allow for the 
presence of stochastic errors which embody measurement errors, any other statistical noise, 
and random variation of the frontier across firms (Greene, 1997). Figure 5.1 provides a basic 
classification of the stochastic frontier methods. As already noted, we first distinguish 
between cross-sectional and panel data models. When a cross-sectional model is applied to a 
panel data set we speak of a pooled model. Panel data models can be further categorised as 
time-invariant and time-varying inefficiency models. New developments in the field of panel 
data stochastic frontier models will also be presented. 
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5.2.1 Cross-Sectional Models 
 
5.2.1.1 The Basic Model 
 
Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977) independently 
introduced stochastic production frontier models. The estimation procedure can be 
analogously applied to cost frontier models. The stochastic frontier cost function can be 
written as:  
 
iiiii uvcC ++= ),;,(ln βwy α . (5.5) 
 
The error term (εi) is now composed of two parts: a stochastic error (vi), capturing the effect 
of noise, and a one-sided non-negative disturbance capturing the effect of inefficiency 
(ui ≥ 0). The stochastic frontier cost function is illustrated in Figure 5.2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Stochastic frontier cost function70 
                                               
70
 A modification of a similar figure in Battese (1992, p.182) in which the stochastic frontier 
production function is presented. 
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Two firms, operating at output levels Yi and Yj, are considered. They produce given output 
levels with respective total observed costs Ci and Cj. The deterministic cost frontier is 
illustrated by the function C(y, w). If we did not account for the stochastic noise and were to 
perform a deterministic frontier analysis, the inefficiency component would be captured by 
the terms εi and εj, respectively. In the stochastic frontier analysis, inefficiency is measured 
by the terms ui and uj while the remaining part of the error term ε is attributed to stochastic 
errors. For firm i the symmetric error component vi is positive, implying an unfavourable 
production environment or the presence of a positive measurement error. On the contrary, 
firm j operates in a comparatively more favourable environment or there is a negative 
measurement error present, resulting in a negative value for vj. Since firms cannot influence 
the stochastic errors v they are not included in the inefficiency term. Therefore, cost 
inefficiency is represented by the ratio Ci*/Ci, where Ci* represents the frontier of the 
minimum cost level for the i-th firm.  
 
Accounting for stochastic errors requires the specification of a probability function for the 
distribution of statistical noise and inefficiencies. To estimate the stochastic cost frontier 
using the Maximum Likelihood (ML) Method, the following distributional assumptions have 
to be made: 
 
(i) ),0(iid~ 2vi Nv σ ; 
(ii) ),0(iid~ 2ui Nu σ+ ;71 and  
(iii) vi and ui are distributed independently of each other and of the regressors. 
 
Following Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000), this model is referred to as a Normal-Half Normal 
Model. The individual density functions of v and 0≥u  are respectively:  
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Given the independence assumption, the joint density function of u and v is the product of 
the two:  
                                               
71
 Alternative distributional assumptions on ui will be discussed at the end of this section.  
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Since uv +=ε , the joint density function for u and ε is: 
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The marginal density function of ε is then: 
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where 2/122 )( vu σσσ += , vu σσλ /= , and )(⋅Φ  and )(⋅φ  are the standard normal 
cumulative distribution and density functions. The marginal density function f(ε) is 
asymmetrically distributed with the mean piσε /2)()( uuEE ==  and the variance 
22 /)2()( vuV σpipiσε +−= .  
 
Parameter λ provides an indication of the relative contributions of u and v to ε. When λ 
approaches 0 we are back to the OLS method, whereas when λ goes to infinity we end up 
with a deterministic frontier with no noise. Coelli (1995) proposed a statistical test of the 
hypothesis that λ = 0. The appropriate one-sided likelihood ratio test statistic was shown to 
be asymptotically distributed as a mixture of χ2 distributions rather than as a single χ2 
distribution.  
 
This model can be estimated using the Maximum Likelihood estimation method originally 
proposed by Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977). Using Eq.(5.10), the log likelihood function 
for a sample of N producers is: 
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where ),;,(ln βwy αε iiii cC −= . The log likelihood function can be maximised with 
respect to the parameters to obtain maximum likelihood estimates of all the parameters (α, β, 
σ, λ). However, the focus of the SFA is not on estimating the frontier cost function but rather 
on the error term, especially the inefficiency component. Therefore, the next step is to obtain 
estimates of the cost efficiency of each firm. We have estimates of εi = ui + vi, which 
obviously contain information on ui. We can extract or obtain this information from the 
conditional distribution of ui given εi, which contains whatever information εi encompasses 
concerning ui. The conditional distribution of u given ε as proposed by Jondrow et al. (1982) 
is: 
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where 22
*
/σεσµ u=  and 2222* /σσσσ vu= . The mean of this distribution can then serve as 
the point estimator for cost inefficiency ui: 
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Cost efficiency scores (CEi) are then calculated using Eq.(5.3). Undesirably, the estimates of 
cost inefficiency are inconsistent since the variation associated with the distribution of (ui|εi) 
is independent of i and so the variance of the conditional mean of (ui|εi) for each individual 
producer does not go to zero as the size of the sample increases (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 
2000). However, this is the best that can be achieved with cross-sectional data. 
 
Our analysis so far has been based on the assumption that inefficiency term ui is distributed 
as a non-negative half-normal. This distributional assumption is plausible and tractable and 
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so it is typically employed in empirical work. Other distributional assumptions on the one-
side error component ui can also be used. Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen 
and van den Broeck (1977) suggested the exponential distribution for ui. Stevenson (1980) 
introduced a truncated normal distribution of ui, which is a generalisation of the half-normal 
distribution. The mean of the underlying normal distribution of inefficiency is allowed to be 
nonzero, hence ),(iid~ 2ui Nu σµ+ . This has the effect of allowing the efficiency 
distribution to shift to the right, which will allow the mode to move to the right of zero and 
allow more observations to be further from zero. Moreover, Greene (1980a, 1980b) and 
Stevenson (1980) assumed that ui follows a gamma distribution which is a generalisation of 
the exponential distribution. The latter formulation was further extended by Greene (1990).  
 
We do not intend to go into any more detail here regarding the different assumptions on ui, 
but instead address another issue. We focus our attention on different ways to accommodate 
environmental and non-discretionary factors in the cost efficiency analysis. These factors are 
considered as exogenous since they are beyond managerial control, but because they can 
affect the performance of the firm they should be included in the efficiency analysis. We 
consider different cross-sectional models which can be easily extended to the panel data 
context.  
 
5.2.1.2 Accounting for Exogenous Factors  
 
For regulated public utilities operating within a network industry, such as water distribution 
utilities, the size of the service area, population density, type of customers, water treatment, 
water losses and quality of water are supposedly exogenous factors. These factors are 
normally included in the model to control for cost differences that occur due to the 
heterogeneity of output. Let z denote L×1 vector of exogenous variables. If z influences the 
production process directly, as is the case with network industries, it is appropriate to include 
z as a vector of explanatory variables in a stochastic cost frontier (along with y and w). The 
model can be rewritten as:  
 
 iiiiii uvcC ++= ),,;,,(ln γβzwy α , (5.14) 
 
where γ is a vector of regression coefficients associated with exogenous variables in z. In this 
case the analysis carried out in the previous section is essentially unchanged. The estimation 
with the ML procedure requires that the elements of zi are uncorrelated with disturbance 
components vi and ui. According to this characterisation, the exogenous variables influence 
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performance by influencing the production process and not by influencing efficiency. In this 
way, the frontier cost function is more accurately specified. Variation in efficiency on the 
other hand is left unexplained by this formulation.  
 
An alternative approach tries to explain variation in efficiency with variation in exogenous 
variables. In this formulation, environmental and non-discretionary variables influence costs 
indirectly through its effect on estimated efficiency. Initially, a two-stage procedure was 
proposed to estimate the model. In the first stage, the inefficiency effects are assumed to be 
independently and identically distributed in order to use the same approach as in Section 
5.2.1.1. The stochastic cost frontier is estimated excluding exogenous variables. It is 
assumed that elements of yi and wi are uncorrelated with zi since otherwise we get biased 
estimators due to the omission of zi. In the second stage, the estimated inefficiencies are 
regressed against the exogenous variables. In contrast with the previous approach, it is 
desired for the elements of zi to be correlated with ui. Since now ui are a function of the 
exogenous variables, this implies they are not identically distributed as was assumed in the 
first stage. The two-stage formulation thus has serious econometric flaws.72  
 
To overcome this problem, Kumbhakar, Ghost and McGuckin (1991) proposed a single-
stage stochastic production frontier model.73 Likewise, the stochastic cost frontier model can 
be specified as: 
 
 iiiii uvcC ++= ),;,(ln βwy α , (5.15) 
 ,iii eu +′= zγ  (5.16) 
 
where the cost inefficiency term ui has a systematic component γ´zi associated with 
exogenous variables and a random component ei. Cost inefficiency is assumed to follow a 
truncated normal distribution: ),(~ 2uii Nu σzγ′+ . Inserting the expression for ui in 
Eq.(5.16) in the cost frontier function in Eq.(5.15) yields: 
 
 iiiiii evcC +′++= zγβwy ),;,(ln α . (5.17) 
 
                                               
72
 Wang and Schmidt (2002) argue that if there are any interesting effects to be observed in the second 
step, then it follows from considerations of omitted variables that the first-step estimators are biased 
and inconsistent.  
73
 The deterministic version of the model was earlier proposed by Deprins and Simar (1989a, b). 
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This model can be estimated in a single stage by the ML procedure. The log-likelihood 
function is a straightforward generalisation of that of the truncated normal model introduced 
by Stevenson (1980) with ii zγ′=µ  replacing the constant mean µ. Reifschneider and 
Stevenson (1991) and Huang and Liu (1994) proposed models similar to those of 
Kumbhakar, Ghost and McGuckin (1991).74 Reifschneider and Stevenson (1991) specified 
the inefficiency term as iii egu += );( γz , while Huang and Liu (1994) expanded the 
function )(⋅g  to allow for interactions between elements of zi and explanatory variables 
included in the stochastic frontier function. Battese and Coelli (1995) extended these 
approaches to accommodate panel data, where ititit eu +′= zγ  and ),(~ 2uitit Nu σzγ′+ .  
 
So far, we have relaxed the constant-mean property of the truncated normal distribution and 
allowed the mean to be a function of exogenous variables. This, in turn, allows inefficiency 
to depend on exogenous variables. In addition, it is also possible to relax the constant-
variance property of the truncated normal distribution (or some alternative distribution) by 
allowing the variance to be a function of the exogenous variables. Since inefficiency also 
depends on the variance, this also allows inefficiency to depend on exogenous variables. The 
latter was done in a model developed independently by Simar, Lovell and Eeckaut (1994) 
and Caudill, Ford and Gropper (1995). Let us assume that the inefficiency term is specified 
as: 
 
 iii eu ⋅′= )exp( zγ , (5.18) 
 
with ei being iid with ei ≥ 0, E(ei) = 1 and V(ei) = σe2. Under these assumptions ui ≥ 0 with 
E(ui) = )exp( izγ′  and V(ui) = 2)2exp( ei σ⋅′zγ . Thus, the variance of ui is producer-specific. 
By inserting Eq.(5.18) in Eq.(5.15) the following stochastic cost frontier model is 
formulated:  
 
 
,)exp(),;,(
)exp(),;,(ln
iiii
iiiiii
c
vecC
εα
α
+′+=
+⋅′+=
zγβwy
zγβwy
 (5.19) 
 
where )1()exp()(lnln −⋅′+=−= iiiiii evCEC zγε . The εis are independently but not 
identically distributed. If the distribution for ei is specified, estimators can be obtained with 
                                               
74
 The models slightly differ in the distributional assumptions and conditions imposed to ensure that 
ui ≥ 0. All three models are estimated by the ML procedure. 
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the ML techniques. Caudill, Ford and Gropper (1995) derived the log likelihood function for 
the case in which ei is exponentially distributed, while Simar, Lovell and Eeckaut (1994) 
derived the log likelihood function for the gamma and truncated normal distribution (as well 
as for their exponential and half-normal special cases).  
 
Wang (2002) extended the model of Caudill, Ford and Gropper (1995) combined with the 
model of Battese and Coelli (1995) to the panel data case. The inefficiency component is 
assumed to follow a truncated normal distribution, i.e. ),(~ 2ititit Nu σµ+ , with itit zγ′=µ  
and )exp(2 itit zγ′=σ . 
 
The final point to be made is that exogenous variables may belong in the cost frontier or they 
may belong in the one-sided error component (mean and/or variance of ui). In most cases, 
however, it is not obvious whether a certain exogenous variable is a characteristic of 
production technology or a determinant of inefficiency and a decision has to be made based 
on the researcher’s judgment. This issue was first recognised by Deprins and Simar (1989b).  
 
In the following section we turn to the panel data models which offer much broader 
possibilities for analysing a firm’s inefficiency compared to cross-sectional data and enable 
us to distinguish between firm-specific effects and inefficiency.  
 
5.2.2 Panel Data Models 
 
In the panel data case, Eq.(5.5) can be rewritten as follows: 
 
ititititit uvcC ++= ),;,(ln βwy α , (5.20) 
 
where i = 1,…, N;  t = 1,…, T. The cross-sectional model presented in Section 5.2.1.1 can 
also be employed in the case of a panel data set. We simply consider repeated observations 
of a given firm as independent observations and thus employ the pooled model. However, in 
this way we do not exploit the panel aspect of the data.  
 
A panel data set consists of repeated observations on each producer and thus contains more 
information than a cross-section. Consequently, access to panel data will either result in 
estimates of cost efficiency with more desirable statistical properties or enable some of the 
strong distributional assumptions used with cross-sectional data to be relaxed. The 
Maximum Likelihood estimation requires an assumption that the inefficiency error 
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component be independent of the regressors, although it might be the case that cost 
inefficiency is correlated with the input vectors producers choose. Having access to panel 
data enables us to adapt conventional panel data estimation techniques to the cost 
inefficiency measurement problem and not all of these techniques rest on strong 
distributional assumptions.  
 
5.2.2.1 Time-Invariant Cost Inefficiency Models 
 
We first consider panel data cost frontier models in which cost inefficiency is allowed to 
vary across producers but is assumed to be constant over time. We can formulate this by 
simply replacing uit in Eq.(5.20) by ui. In this framework several conventional panel data 
models can be adapted. The resulting fixed and random-effects models were proposed by 
Schmidt and Sickles (1984). Another alternative is to extend the Maximum Likelihood 
model employed in the cross-sectional case to a panel data setup as was done by Pitt and Lee 
(1981). 
 
5.2.2.1.1 Fixed-Effects Model 
 
If we do not make any distributional assumptions on time-invariant cost inefficiency ui and 
also relax the assumption that ui are uncorrelated with vit and with the regressors, we can use 
the fixed-effects approach to estimate the following model: 
 
itititiit vcC ++= );,(ln βwyα , (5.21) 
 
where ii u+= αα  are firm-specific intercepts, ui ≥ 0 is time-invariant cost inefficiency and 
vit represents random statistical noise. We assume that vit are ),0(iid 2vσ  and are uncorrelated 
with the regressors. The model can be estimated by Least Square Dummy Variables (LSDV) 
or a ‘Within Groups’ estimator. The estimate of β is obtained by a least squares regression of 
group mean deviations ( iit yy − ) on explanatory variables. The individual specific dummy 
variable coefficients can be estimated using the group specific averages of residuals. After 
estimation the cost frontier intercept is estimated as { }ii αα ˆminˆ =  and ui are estimated from 
αα ˆˆˆ −= iiu , which ensures that all 0ˆ ≥iu . Efficiency estimation in this model is only with 
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respect to the ‘best’ firm in the sample. Efficiency scores in all panel data models are also 
obtained by Eq.(5.3).  
 
The fixed-effects model has the virtue of simplicity and has nice consistency properties. 
Under the assumptions of the linear regression model it follows that βˆ  is a consistent 
estimator of β when N → ∞. The main advantage of the fixed-effects specification is that this 
estimator is consistent even if the individual effects ui are correlated with explanatory 
variables and the random error vit. This is of a vast importance in the network industries 
where heterogeneity of the output is typically higher than in other industries. Besides the 
output distributed, one also has to take into account the area size, customer density and 
several other network characteristics. It may often be the case that some unobserved 
heterogeneity is present in the specified model and that individual effects may be correlated 
with explanatory variables. It is thus important to have an estimator that produces unbiased 
results of coefficients even in the presence of such ‘irregularities’. Furthermore, the 
consistency property does not require the assumption that vit be normally distributed. 
 
However, the fixed-effects model has quite a few shortcomings. The individual effects αi are 
each estimated with only T group specific observations and, since T might be small, the 
estimator of α is inconsistent. This is referred to as the ‘incidental parameter’ problem in 
estimating firm-specific effects (Hsiao, 2003). As a result, firm-specific inefficiency 
estimates are inconsistent. Nonetheless, this inconsistency is not transmitted to β since it is 
not a function of αi. Also, in contrast to the ML cross-sectional model, the fixed-effects 
panel data model does provide consistent estimates of firm-specific cost inefficiency when T 
→ ∞ (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000).  
 
Further, by the fixed-effects model parameters of the model are estimated from the deviation 
of the variables from their respective firm-specific means. Therefore, estimation of this 
model requires that the variables for a given company show enough variation over time. If 
the within variation is relatively small, the accuracy of the within estimator is limited 
(Cameron and Trivedi, 2005).  
 
The serious shortcoming of the fixed-effects model is that time-invariant firm characteristics 
cannot be included in the model as explanatory variables. This implies that the cost 
inefficiency estimates also capture the effects of all phenomena that vary across producers 
but are time-invariant for each producer. In network industries many time-invariant 
characteristics can be found which considerably influence the cost. In the case of water 
distribution, for example, one could typically mention the area size, morphology of the area, 
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water resource used, and treatment level. Also, any time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity 
is captured in the cost inefficiency. This is the reason why in the network industries 
inefficiency scores estimated by the fixed-effects model are generally found to be 
considerably higher compared to the other models. This confounding of variation in cost 
inefficiency with variation in other effects as well as unobserved heterogeneity motivates 
interest in other panel data models. 
 
5.2.2.1.2 Random-Effects Model  
 
If we do not make any distributional assumptions on ui but maintain the assumption that ui 
are uncorrelated with the vit and with the regressors, we can use the random-effects approach 
to estimate the following model:  
 
** );,(ln
i
uvcC itititit +++= βwyα , (5.22) 
 
where )(* iuE+= αα  and [ ] 0)()( * =−= iii uEuEuE . Now ui are no longer fixed as in the 
fixed-effects model but are randomly distributed with a constant mean and variance. We do 
not make any distributional assumptions on the ui. The model can be estimated with the 
feasible Generalised Least Square (GLS) method as proposed by Schmidt and Sickles 
(1984). After the estimation of Eq.(5.22), an estimate of cost inefficiency iuˆ  is obtained 
from the regression residuals as { } 0ˆminˆˆ ** ≥−= iiii uuu , where: 
 
[ ])ˆ;,(ˆln)/1(ˆ ** ∑ −−= t itititi cCTu βwyα . (5.23) 
 
The random-effects panel data model also produces consistent estimates of cost inefficiency 
when N → ∞ and T → ∞ (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). As opposed to the LSDV 
estimator, the GLS estimator allows for the inclusion of time-invariant regressors. 
Consequently, the primary advantage of the random-effects model is that inefficiency 
estimates do not contain time-invariant firm characteristics. They may, however, still capture 
the effect of time-invariant, firm-specific unobserved heterogeneity.  
 
The GLS estimator is based on the assumption that firm-specific effects are uncorrelated 
with the regressors, whereas the LSDV estimator is not. If this assumption does not hold, the 
GLS estimator may produce biased estimates of the parameters. As already pointed out, this 
assumption may not hold for network industries since output heterogeneity may result in the 
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presence of unobserved heterogeneity in the specified model. Nevertheless, the 
independence assumption can be tested by performing a Hausman-Taylor (1981) test. 
Moreover, Mundlak (1978) suggested how to overcome this problem and proposed a method 
to relax the independence assumption between the individual effects and regressors.75  
 
5.2.2.1.3 Maximum Likelihood Estimation 
 
The fixed and random-effects models allow us to avoid the strong distributional assumptions 
made in the cross-sectional frontier models. Nevertheless, if such assumptions are plausible 
in a panel data context then a Maximum Likelihood estimation is feasible. Pitt and Lee 
(1981) extended the model of Aigner et al. (1977) to a panel data setup, where the 
inefficiency term is treated as time-invariant. The resulting Random Effects model is 
estimated using the Maximum Likelihood estimation method.  
 
The ML estimation of a stochastic cost frontier panel data model in Eq.(5.20) with time-
invariant cost inefficiency ui is, technically speaking, similar to the procedure applied to the 
cross-sectional data. It is based on the same normal-half normal distributional assumptions. 
The density function of 0≥u , which is independent of time, is given by Eq.(5.7). The 
density function of v = (v1, …, vT)', which is time dependent, is given by the following 
generalisation of Eq.(5.6): 
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The joint density function of u and v is used to construct the joint density function of u and 
),...,( 1 ′++= uvuv Tε , from which the log likelihood function for N producers each 
observed for T time periods is derived. The log likelihood function is then maximised to 
obtain ML estimates of .and,,, 22 uv σσα β  Estimates of producer-specific time-invariant cost 
inefficiency are obtained as follows:76 
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 See Section 5.2.2.3.3.  
76
 For details, see Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000).  
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where )( 222
* uviui TT σσεσµ += , )( 22222* uvvu Tσσσσσ += , and ∑= t itTi εε 1 .  
 
The appeal of the ML method is that it should produce more efficient parameter estimates 
than either LSDV or GLS, but it requires strong distributional assumptions. This technique is 
widely used in empirical analysis. As in the cross-sectional case, other distributional 
assumptions on the one-side error component ui can be utilised as an alternative to the half-
normal distribution.  
 
5.2.2.2 Models with Time-Varying Cost Inefficiency 
 
The assumption of time-invariant cost inefficiency is a strong one, particularly in long 
panels. It might be plausible in a non-competitive operating environment, for example in the 
case of public utilities that operate in a given service area as local monopolies. However, 
where competitive pressures are present or we have many time periods it is desirable to relax 
this assumption. This can be done at the cost of additional parameters to be estimated. 
Hence, we turn to the panel data cost frontier models where cost efficiency is allowed to vary 
across producers and over time. These models were first proposed by Cornvell, Schmidt and 
Sickles (1990) and Kumbhakar (1990).  
 
Cornvell, Schmidt and Sickles (1990) specified the following model:  
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+++=
βwy
βwy
α
α
 (5.26) 
 
where αt is the cost frontier intercept common to all producers in period t and αit = α + uit is 
the intercept for producer i in period t. Besides obtaining estimates of parameters in β and 
σv
2
, this requires the estimation of additional N×T intercepts which is with N×T observations 
clearly impossible. This problem was addressed by specifying 
 
2
321 tt iiiit θθθα ++= , (5.27) 
 
which reduces the number of intercept terms to 3N. Nevertheless, there is still a lot of 
parameters to be estimated. The authors propose a fixed-effects and random-effects approach 
to estimate the model. The fixed-effects model in Eq.(5.26) is estimated by first ignoring uit. 
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In the second step, the residuals constructed as )ˆ;,(lnˆ βwy itititit cC −=ε  are regressed on a 
constant, t and t2 for each producer separately to obtain estimates of  θ1i, θ2i and θ3i. If N/T is 
relatively small, another way to estimate αit is to keep uit in Eq.(5.26), estimate θ1i by 
including producer dummies, and to estimate θ2i and θ3i as coefficients of producer dummies 
interacted with t and t2, respectively. After creating estimates of αit, the cost frontier intercept 
is estimated as { }itit αα ˆminˆ =  and cost inefficiency terms uit are estimated from 
.ˆˆˆ tititu αα −=  By construction, in each period at least one producer is found to be fully cost 
efficient. Cornvell, Schmidt and Sickles (1990) also developed a GLS estimator for a 
random-effects model. The estimation of intercepts and inefficiencies of this model proceeds 
as in the fixed-effects approach. The only difference here is that different residuals are used. 
The advantage of the random-effects model compared to the fixed-effects model is that it can 
incorporate time-invariant regressors. GLS is also more efficient than the fixed-effects 
estimator. However, GLS is an inconsistent estimator if cost inefficiencies are correlated 
with the regressors. For such cases, the authors developed an efficient instrumental variables 
estimator. Kumbhakar (1990) also developed a maximum likelihood estimator for the model 
in Eq.(5.26).  
 
Lee and Schmidt (1993) proposed an alternative formulation in which the inefficiency 
effects for each firm in a different time period is defined as a product of individual 
inefficiency and time effects: 
 
iit utu )(δ= , (5.28) 
 
where ∑= t tt Dt δδ )(  and Dt is a dummy variable for period t. One of the coefficients tδ  is 
normalised at 1. The cost inefficiency ui can be estimated either by a fixed- or random-
effects model.77  
 
Kumbhakar (1990) proposed another model in which uit in Eq.(5.26) is specified as the 
following function of time: 
 
[ ] iit uttu 12 )exp(1 −++= δγ . (5.29) 
 
                                               
77
 A generalised method of moments was proposed in Ahn, Lee and Schmidt (1994). 
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This model requires only two additional parameters to be estimated, γ and δ. The function in 
parentheses is bounded between 0 and 1 and can be monotonically decreasing or increasing, 
concave or convex, depending on the values of γ and δ. The model is estimated by the 
Maximum Likelihood procedure where, apart from the time-varying assumption and two 
additional parameters to be estimated, other assumptions remain the same as in the Pitt and 
Lee (1981) time-invariant model.  
 
Battese and Coelli (1992) suggested an alternative to Kumbhakar (1990) in which 
inefficiency component uit is assumed to be an exponential function of time:  
 
[ ] iit uTtu )((exp −−= η . (5.30) 
 
Here only one additional parameter η needs to be estimated. The function in parentheses is 
positive and decreases (increases) at an increasing rate if η > 0 (η < 0) or remains constant if 
η = 0. The authors assumed a normal distribution for vit and a truncated normal for ui and 
estimated the model using the Maximum Likelihood method. According to Eq.(5.30) 
inefficiency effects of different firms in any given time period are equal to the same 
exponential function of the corresponding firm-specific inefficiency effects in the last period 
of the panel. This implies that the ordering of the firms with respect to the efficiency scores 
is the same in all time periods which is quite a limiting feature of the model. There is no 
reason for all the firm-specific deviations to obey the same trajectory. This systematic 
movement of inefficiency retains a rigid model structure. The model does not account for 
those situations in which some firms may be initially relatively inefficient but become 
relatively more efficient in subsequent periods. The Cornvell, Schmidt and Sickles (1990) 
model does accommodate this possibility and is considered to be more flexible than the 
Kumbhakar (1990) and Battese and Coelli (1992) specifications. However, this comes at the 
expense of having many more parameters to estimate.  
 
Besides the time-varying cost efficiency, in long panels it is also desirable to allow for 
technical change. A time indicator can be included among explanatory variables in a time-
varying cost efficiency model enabling one to disentangle the effect of technical change from 
that of efficiency change (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). The same can be done in the time-
invariant cost efficiency models.  
 
As can be seen, several alternatives were proposed to model cost inefficiency. Nevertheless, 
some issues still need to be properly addressed. One of them is dealing with heterogeneity, 
which is typically present in the network industries. Excluded variables may result in biased 
coefficient estimates and inefficiency estimates. By accounting for exogenous factors the 
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problem is only partially solved since one can control for observed heterogeneity, whereas 
the problem of unobserved heterogeneity remains. As a result, the unobserved heterogeneity 
may also produce biased results. Therefore, we now turn to models that have been recently 
proposed that try to deal with this issue.  
 
5.2.2.3 Recently Proposed Models 
 
The conventional panel data stochastic frontier methods assume that inefficiency is time-
invariant. In a lengthy panel, this is likely to be a particularly strong assumption. Moreover, 
the conventional fixed and random-effects estimators force any time-invariant cross unit 
heterogeneity into the same term that is being used to capture the inefficiency. It is thus 
argued that these models fail to distinguish between individual heterogeneity and 
inefficiency and thus mistakenly measure that heterogeneity as inefficiency. Time-varying 
inefficiency panel data models relax the unrealistic assumption of unchanging cost 
inefficiency but do not satisfactory solve the problem of separating heterogeneity and 
inefficiency. The same holds for those models that account for exogenous factors as they can 
only control for observed heterogeneity. Nevertheless, not all relevant data are always 
available and some factors may even be too complex to be properly measurable. This results 
in unobserved heterogeneity which is beyond the firms’ control but may affect their costs 
significantly.  
 
To deal with the unobserved heterogeneity, the alternative ‘true’ fixed-effects and ‘true’ 
random-effects models proposed by Greene (2002a, 2002b) are considered. Further, 
Mundlak’s (1978) specification of a random-effects model in the stochastic frontier 
framework as proposed by Farsi, Fillipini and Kuenzle (2005) is considered to avoid possible 
problems due to the correlation between firm-specific effects and explanatory variables.  
 
5.2.2.3.1 The ‘True’ Fixed-Effects Model  
 
The motivation for a true fixed-effects model is to treat fixed effects and inefficiency 
separately and in this way to try to remedy some shortcomings of the conventional fixed-
effects model. The latter model can be viewed as the reinterpretation of the linear regression 
model, while the former is more explicitly built on the stochastic frontier model and uses 
results that specifically employ the nonlinear specification. There are two issues to be 
considered, that is the practical problem of computing the fixed-effects estimator and the 
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bias and inconsistency of the fixed-effects estimator due to the incidental parameters 
problem.  
 
The true fixed-effects model is specified as follows (Greene, 2002a): 
 
ititititiit uvcC +++= );,(ln βwyα . (5.31) 
 
Eq.(5.31) can be estimated from the stochastic frontier model using the ML procedure by 
simply creating dummy variables for each firm. Since the number of dummy variables can 
be quite large, the method is also known as a ‘brute force’ approach. However, this approach 
has seldom been used in the literature. It will be discussed in what follows, after we mention 
other possible approaches. 
 
The fixed-effects model discussed in Section 5.2.2.1.1 is based on a linear regression. There, 
by using group mean deviations, fixed effects are removed from the model. Consequently, 
the slope estimator β is not a function of fixed effects and is thus consistent (unlike the 
estimator of fixed effects α). The same holds for nonlinear models in which there are 
minimal sufficient statistics for the individual effects α. In these cases, the log likelihood 
conditioned on the sufficient statistics is a function of β that is free of fixed effects. 
However, this cannot be done for the true fixed-effects model so the method is not useful in 
our case.  
 
Heckman and MaCurdy (1980) suggested a ‘zig-zag’ approach to maximisation of the log 
likelihood function, dummy variable coefficients and all. In the first step, a known set of 
fixed-effects coefficients α = (α1,…,αN)' is assumed. From the log likelihood function 
conditioned on these values (logLa1,…,aN), the estimation of β is straightforward. In the 
second step, with a given estimate of β obtained in the first step (denoted by b), the 
conditional log likelihood function for each αi (logLib) is now a known function. 
Maximising this function is straightforward but somewhat tedious since it has to be done for 
each i. This two-step optimisation presumes iterating back and forth between these two 
estimators until convergence is achieved. In principle, this approach could be adapted with 
any model. However, there is no guarantee that this back and forth procedure will converge 
to the true maximum of the log likelihood function because the Hessian is not block 
diagonal. Whether either estimator is consistent in dimension N, even if T is large, depends 
on the initial estimator being consistent (Greene, 2002a).  
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Polachek and Yoon (1994, 1996) essentially applied this approach to a fixed-effects 
stochastic frontier model, which was the first study to fully implement true fixed effects in 
the stochastic frontier setting. They specified the frontier and constructed a likelihood 
function based on an exponential distribution rather than the half-normal. In the first step 
they proposed to estimate a fixed-effects panel data model with the Least Square Dummy 
Variables as in Section 5.2.2.1.1., then the computation of the fixed effects by the within 
group residuals. In the second step, true fixed effects αi in the log likelihood are replaced by 
these estimates ai and the resulting function is maximised with respect to the small number 
of remaining parameters (β, σ, λ). Then, fixed effects are recomputed by the same method 
and returned to the log likelihood function to re-estimate the other parameters. These steps 
are repeated until convergence is reached. While the initial OLS estimator of β is consistent, 
the subsequent estimators, which are functions of the estimated fixed effects ai, are not 
because of the incidental parameters problem. More will be said on this below. The initial 
OLS estimator obeys the familiar results for the linear regression model, but the second step 
MLE does not since the likelihood function is not the sum of squares. Also, the asymptotic 
standard errors of the estimators are found to be underestimated. The differences between the 
OLS and ML estimators are, however, extremely small. Since the authors were interested in 
the structural parameters of the model they did not carry on analysing technical inefficiency 
terms.  
 
An alternative approach to computing the fixed-effects estimator is by the direct 
maximisation proposed by Greene (2001). The maximisation of an unconditional log 
likelihood function is done by ‘brute force’. This approach is feasible even in the presence of 
possibly thousands of nuisance parameters. A nonlinear model is defined by the density of 
εit, which for the fixed-effects stochastic cost frontier model is defined as: 
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where );,(ln βwy ititiitit cC −−= αε = uit + vit. A set of group dummy variables αi is 
created and included in the model. It is assumed that vit is normally distributed and uit 
follows a half-normal distribution. The unconditional likelihood function, L, is constructed 
as follows: 
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Then, the log likelihood function, logL is maximised by ‘brute force’. The gradient of the log 
likelihood g and the Hessian H are provided in Greene (2002a). Newton’s method is used to 
produce estimates of parameters in each iteration in the following way: 
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where subscript k indicates the updated value, subscript k-1 indicates a computation at the 
current value and ∆ stands for the update. The full Hessian H is of the dimension 
(Kγ+N)×(Kγ+N), where Kγ stands for the number of parameters in γ = (β´, σ, λ). However, the 
difficulty of this approach is not in the computation, as may appear. Greene (2001) 
demonstrated that neither update vector requires the storage or inversion of a (Kγ+N)×(Kγ+N) 
matrix; each is a function of the sums of scalars and Kγ × 1 vectors of first derivatives and 
mixed second-order derivatives.78 The practical implication is that calculation of the fixed-
effects model is a computation only of order Kγ. Storage requirements for α and ∆ are linear 
in N, not quadratic, which is well within the capacity of current computers. Hence, with this 
approach it is possible to directly compute both the joint maximisers of the log likelihood 
and the appropriate submatrix of the inverse of the analytic second-order derivatives for 
estimating asymptotic standard errors. 
 
What remains to be addressed is a statistical problem related to the fixed-effects estimator, 
namely the incidental parameter problem. The incidental parameter problem is a persistent 
bias that arises in nonlinear fixed-effects models when the number of periods is small. With 
a small T many fixed-effects estimators of model parameters are inconsistent and subject to a 
small sample bias.79 Beyond the theoretical and methodological results there is almost no 
systematic analysis of this problem. Greene (2002a, 2005) uses a Monte Carlo analysis to 
provide some empirical econometric evidence of the severity of the incidental parameter 
problem in the case of an estimator for the stochastic frontier model.80 He also analyses how 
systematic biases in the parameter estimates (if they exist) are transmitted to estimates of the 
inefficiency scores, which are of primary interest in the stochastic frontier analysis.  
                                               
78
 Similar holds for the asymptotic variances and covariances.  
79
 The inconsistency results from the fact that the asymptotic variance of the Maximum Likelihood 
estimator does not converge to zero as N increases.  
80
 The data were taken from the Commercial Bank Holding Company Database maintained by the 
Chicago Federal Reserve Bank. A random sample of 500 banks from a total of over 5000 US 
commercial banks was used to estimate the Cobb-Douglas cost frontier function over the 1996-2000 
period. 
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Greene (2002a) discovers that for the structural coefficients in the model the biases in the 
slope estimators are quite moderate, especially in comparison to some other models like 
probit, logit or ordered probit. The economies of scale bias is estimated with a very small 
bias (0.48%), which is smaller than the estimated sampling variation of the estimator itself 
(roughly 7%). In contrast, the estimator of the constant term seems to be widely 
underestimated (in some cases the bias is found to be -300% or more). Overall, the 
deviations of the regression parameters (with the exception of the constant term biases) are 
found to be small, in particular given the small T (5 years). The bias appears to be toward 
zero, not away from it as in some other models. Greene (2005) finds that the force of the 
incidental parameters problem actually shows up in the variance estimators, not in the slope 
estimators. The estimate of σ appears to have absorbed the force of inconsistency and is 
considerably overestimated. A similar result appears for λ, but towards rather than away 
from zero, indicating that the true fixed-effects model does not perform so well after all. 
Since σ and λ are crucial parameters in the computation of inefficiency estimates, this leads 
us to expect some large biases in these estimators. The overestimation error of inefficiency 
estimates is found to be about 25%. Greene (2005) also compares these results with the 
conventional fixed-effects model. He discovers similar descriptive statistics for the two sets 
of estimates. However, the correlation of the inefficiency estimates obtained by the true 
fixed-effects and regression-based fixed-effects model is very weak. Nonetheless, Greene 
(2002b) concludes that the pessimism about the fixed-effects estimator is overstated.  
 
5.2.2.3.2 The ‘True’ Random-Effects Model  
 
The random-effects model introduced in Section 5.2.2.1.2 parallels the linear regression 
model. It has already been discussed that this model is unable to properly distinguish 
between time-invariant heterogeneity and inefficiency since both effects are captured by the 
same term. Therefore, (Greene, 2002b) specifies the true random-effects model in the 
following way: 
 
ititiititit uvcC ++++= ωα );,(ln βwy , (5.35) 
 
where ωi is a time-invariant, firm-specific random effect meant to capture cross-firm 
heterogeneity. The difference between this formulation and the true fixed-effects model is 
the additional assumption that ωi and all other terms in the model are uncorrelated. The 
model seems to have a three-part disturbance which raises questions of identification. This 
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interpretation would be misleading as the model actually has a two-part composed error, ωi 
and εit = uit + vit. This is an ordinary random-effects model, albeit one in which the time-
varying component εit has an asymmetric distribution. Conditioned on ωi, the T observations 
for firm i are independent so the joint density for the T observations is: 
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where );,()(ln βwy ititiitit cC −+−= ωαε . In order to be able to estimate the model 
parameters, it is necessary to integrate the heterogeneity out of the log likelihood. The 
unconditional joint density is obtained as:  
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The log likelihood, Σi logLi, can be then maximised with respect to the parameters (α,β,σ,λ) 
and any additional parameters characterising the distribution of ωi that appear in the 
maximand. However, the maximisation problem just stated is not solvable because there is 
no closed form for this integral. By rewriting Eq.(5.37) in the equivalent form: 
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the log likelihood can be computed by simulation. Averaging Eq.(5.38) over sufficient draws 
from the distribution of ωi will produce a sufficiently accurate approximation of the integral 
to allow an estimation of the parameters. The simulated log likelihood is: 
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where θ is used for the parameters in the distribution of ωi, and ωir is the r-th simulated draw 
for observation i. If ωi is normally distributed, then θ is its standard deviation. Estimation of 
the true random-effects model can be extremely time consuming. In order to achieve a 
reasonable approximation to the true likelihood function, a large number of random draws is 
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required. The process can be accelerated by using draws such as Halton sequences. The use 
of Halton sequences can reduce the number of draws required by a factor of five or ten.  
 
Greene (2002a, b) compared the results of the true random effects, true fixed effects, Pit and 
Lee (1981) and cross-sectional models and found that all models produce similar parameter 
estimates of the stochastic cost frontier, but the correlation between the cost inefficiency 
estimates is quite loose.81 He finds that the regression- and likelihood-based treatments of 
inefficiency bring striking differences in the results. These differences might be undetected if 
one focuses only on descriptive statistics of the inefficiency estimates. What the nature and 
source of these differences is remains to be discovered in future research.  
 
Due to the novelty of the true random-effects model only a few applications of this model 
can be found so far. Farsi, Filippini and Greene (2005) used true random effects to estimate 
the cost inefficiency of Swiss railway companies, while Farsi, Filippini and Kuenzle (2005, 
2006) used this model in the case of Swiss nursing homes and regional bus companies, 
respectively. In all three cases, the performance of the true random-effects model was 
compared to the other panel data stochastic frontier models examined in this chapter. Only a 
moderate correlation between the cost inefficiency estimates resulting from different models 
was found.  
 
The advantage of the true random-effects over the true fixed-effects model is that time-
invariant explanatory variables can be included in the model. The problem of these two 
models, however, is that any time-invariant or persistent component of inefficiency is 
completely absorbed in the firm-specific constant term. Whereas the earlier fixed and 
random-effects models tend to overestimate the inefficiency component, it is possible that 
the latter two forms will underestimate it. Whether those time-invariant effects belong to 
unobserved heterogeneity or inefficiency is debatable. Clearly, it is not obvious on 
inspection how one should treat time-invariant effects in a data set. How this issue is handled 
has a large influence on the findings. Ultimately, (αi + uit + vit) or alternatively (ωi + uit + vit) 
contains both firm-specific heterogeneity and inefficiency and both might have time-
invariant and time-varying elements. Unfortunately, there is no perfect way to disentangle 
them based on observed data.  
 
                                               
81
 The data were taken from the Commercial Bank Holding Company Database mentioned earlier (see 
previous footnote). Greene (2003) also reports similar findings for the WHO panel data set on the 
country effectiveness of the delivery of health care. Different specifications of the stochastic 
production frontier model bring substantial changes to the technical efficiency estimates.  
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5.2.2.3.3 Mundlak’s Formulation 
 
When unobserved heterogeneity, captured by the inefficiency term, is correlated with 
explanatory variables, the random-effects panel data models are affected by ‘heterogeneity 
bias’.82 In contrast, the fixed-effects estimator produces consistent estimates but has other 
shortcomings. As noted, time-invariant variables cannot be included in the model so these 
effects are contained in the firm-specific terms. This in turn results in very high inefficiency 
estimates. An additional drawback is the ‘incidental parameter’ problem. Since T is usually 
small, the estimates of individual effects may incur large errors which directly affect 
inefficiency estimates.  
 
Mundlak (1978) thus proposed an alternative specification of the RE model that controls for 
the correlation between unobserved heterogeneity and explanatory variables. In this way 
‘heterogeneity bias’ is avoided and inefficiency estimates are adjusted for the heterogeneity 
that is correlated with explanatory variables. In the stochastic frontier context this approach 
has only been recently used by Farsi, Fillipini and Kuenzle (2005). 
 
Mundlak (1978) suggested modelling the correlation of firm-specific effects αi with 
explanatory variables in an auxiliary regression given by: 
 
iii δαα +′+= xγ0 , (5.40) 
 
where ∑=
T
iti T 1)1( xx  and ),0(iid~
2
δσδ Ni . Here, xi stands for the vector of all 
explanatory variables (output, output characteristics, and input prices)83 and γ is the vector of 
corresponding coefficients. In this formulation it is assumed that unobserved heterogeneity is 
correlated with the group-means of the explanatory variables. The individual effects of 
Eq.(5.31) are divided into two components; the first part can be explained by the exogenous 
variables, whereas the remaining part δi is orthogonal to the explanatory variables. The 
resulting GLS estimator of the RE model is identical to the ‘within’ estimator of the FE 
model, thus unbiased.84  
 
                                               
82
 The term ‘heterogeneity bias’ refers to the bias caused by the correlation between individual effects 
and regressors in the general RE model (Farsi, Fillipini and Kuenzle, 2005).  
83
 The variables are considered to be properly transformed (e.g., in logarithms).  
84
 For proof of the identity, see Hsiao (2003), pp. 44-46. 
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Mundlak’s (1978) formulation can be applied to the stochastic frontier panel data model by 
incorporating Eq.(5.40) in Eq.(5.21), which results in:  
 
itiiitit vC ++′+′+= δα xγβx0ln . (5.41) 
 
We use the same method described in Section 5.2.2.1.2 to estimate a RE model with δi 
playing the role of ui. The resulting GLS estimator, which is equivalent to the within 
estimator, is unbiased. At the same time, we manage to separate (some of the) unobserved 
heterogeneity which is correlated with explanatory variables from inefficiency. Since we 
used the RE model, time-invariant factors can also be included in the model. Mundlak’s 
(1978) formulation can also be employed in the other RE models, i.e. in the Maximum 
Likelihood model by Pitt and Lee (1981) and Greene’s (2002a, 2002b) ‘true’ RE model. 
These models assume an asymmetric error term and, since they are nonlinear and thus 
estimated by ML procedure, the equivalence argument with ‘within’ estimator does not 
strictly apply. Nevertheless, the ‘heterogeneity bias’ is expected to be at least partly avoided 
(Farsi, Fillipini and Kuenzle, 2005).  
 
5.2.3 Summary 
 
We have analysed different parametric methods for estimating cost inefficiency. The main 
stochastic frontier models and their corresponding features are summarised in Table 5.1. 
Some models need strong distributional assumptions (e.g. models based on the ML 
estimation) and/or impose non-realistic assumptions on the inefficiency term (e.g. time-
invariant inefficiency). As discussed, cross-sectional models need to be estimated by the ML 
procedure and do not allow for the firm-specific factors. Therefore, we have put the main 
focus on the panel data models which offer a much broader set of possibilities for modelling 
inefficiency. Among other things, we established that some panel data models are unable to 
distinguish between (unobserved) heterogeneity and inefficiency. For that reason, we 
introduced Mundlak’s (1978) formulation of the random-effects model as proposed by Farsi, 
Fillipini and Kuenzle (2005) that controls for the correlation between unobserved 
heterogeneity and explanatory variables. In this way inefficiency estimates are adjusted for 
the heterogeneity that is correlated with explanatory variables. We also considered recently 
developed true fixed- and true random-effects models by Greene (2002a, 2002b) which 
capture the effects of time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity with a separate term. Based 
on the observed data, one cannot conclude with certainty whether those time-invariant 
effects belong to unobserved heterogeneity or inefficiency. The choice of appropriate model 
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is also based on the researcher’s belief whether there is some time-invariant unobserved 
heterogeneity in the model or whether the inefficiency does not in fact vary over time.  
 
So far, we have not put much stress on the issue of consistency of the efficiency estimates 
resulting from different stochastic frontier models. The results can be sensitive to the model 
specification, choice of variables and functional form employed. It is thus important to 
analyse the consistency of the inefficiency scores obtained from different models, especially 
if SFA is supposed to serve as a benchmarking tool in the price regulation. If different 
methods produce very different results, we cannot use them directly in economic policy-
making. We will turn to this issue and discuss it in more detail in the empirical part of the 
thesis, more specifically in Section 7.1.  
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Table 5.1: Summary of the different stochastic frontier models 
 
Authors Error structure 
specification 
Estimation 
method 
Distribution of ui and 
assumptions on ui 
I.   Cross sectional models 
Aigner, Lovell and 
Schmidt (1977) iii
uv +=ε  ML ),0(iid~ 2ui Nu σ+  
mutual independence between 
ui, vi and the regressors 
Kumbhakar, Ghost 
and McGuckin 
(1991) 
iii eu +′= zγ  ML ),(~ 2ui Nu σizγ′+  
mutual independence between 
ui, vi and the regressors 
II.   Panel data models 
Schmidt and Sickles 
(1984) iitit
uv +=ε  
{ }iiiiu αα ˆminˆˆ −=  
FE (LSDV) time-invariant inefficiency (ui ) 
Schmidt and Sickles 
(1984) iitit
uv +=ε  
{ }** ˆminˆˆ iiii uuu −=  
RE (GLS) ui  time-invariant,  
ui are uncorrelated with vit and 
the regressors 
Pitt and Lee (1981) iitit uv +=ε  ML ),0(iid~ 2ui Nu σ+  
uit, vit and the regressors are 
mutually independent 
Cornvell, Schmidt 
and Sickles (1990) ititit
uv +=ε
 
2
321 tt iiiit θθθα ++=  
{ }itiititu αα ˆminˆˆ −=  
FE / RE / 
EIV 
no assumptions /  
uit, vit and the regressors are 
mutually independent / uit 
correlated with the regressors 
Lee and Schmidt  
(1993) ititit
uv +=ε  
iit utu )(δ= , 
∑= t tt Dt δδ )(  
FE / RE no assumptions /  
mutual independence between 
ui, vi and the regressors 
Kumbhakar (1990) ititit uv +=ε  [ ] iit uttu 12 )exp(1 −++= δγ  
ML ),0(iid~ 2ui Nu σ+  
mutual independence 
Battese and Coelli 
(1992) ititit
uv +=ε  
[ ] iit uTtu )((exp −−= η  
ML ),(~ 2ui Nu σµ+  
mutual independence 
Battese and Coelli 
(1995) ititit
uv +=ε  
itit eu +′= itzγ  
ML ),(~ 2uit Nu σitzγ′+  
mutual independence 
Wang (2002) ititit uv +=ε  
itit eu +′= itzγ  
ML ),(~ 2ititit Nu σµ+  
itzγ′=itµ , )exp(2 itzγ′=itσ  
mutual independence 
Mundlak’s (1978) 
formulation  
iiii u δααα +′+=+= xγ00  
itiit v+= δε  { }** ˆminˆˆ iiii δδδ −=  
RE 
 
inefficiency term δi is 
uncorrelated with vit and the 
regressors 
Greene (2002a, b) 
ititit uv +=ε , 
group dummy variables 
αi 
‘Brute force’ 
ML  
 
),0(iid~ 2uit Nu σ+  
mutual independence 
Greene (2002a, b) 
iti
ititiit uve
εω
ω
+=
++=
 
Simulated 
ML 
),0(iid~ 2uit Nu σ+  
),0(iid~ 2ωσω Ni  
mutual independence 
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6 Estimation of the Cost Frontier Function for 
Slovenian Water Distribution Utilities 
 
The findings from the economic and econometric theory described in previous chapters are 
applied to the Slovenian water industry with the goal of estimating the cost frontier function. 
First, a review of the literature on previous studies of water companies will be provided. 
Studies covering an estimation of the cost (frontier) function, economies of density, 
economies of scale and cost efficiency will be considered. The previous empirical findings 
will then serve as a starting point for specifying the stochastic cost frontier model for 
Slovenian water distribution companies. Before estimating the model, a panel data sample of 
water distribution utilities will be described together with the variables included in the 
model. Since the estimation of the cost frontier function requires a specification of a 
functional form, a choice of the most appropriate functional form will be made. Several 
parametric frontier models will be employed when estimating the (stochastic) frontier total 
cost function. Based on the estimated results, cost efficiency scores and economies of density 
and scale in Slovenian water distribution utilities will be obtained in the following chapter.  
 
6.1 Literature Review of Cost Studies of Water Distribution 
Companies 
 
In the literature we find two types of studies on the costs of water distribution companies: (i) 
studies estimating the cost function and economies of output density, customer density and 
economies of scale;85 and (ii) studies estimating the cost frontier function and cost efficiency. 
In what follows, we provide a short review of the most relevant papers covering sample 
description, model specification, functional form, variables included in the cost function, the 
method of estimation and the results. The review is fundamentally given in a chronological 
order; there is only one exception made in order to discuss studies referring to the same 
country in the one place. The definitions of economies of scale and density in Section 3.5.2 
are based on a cost model that includes the output delivered, number of customers and area 
size (or alternatively, network length) in specifying the cost function. In this case, one can 
distinguish between the economies of output density, customer density and scale. However, 
                                               
85
 More accurately, the reviewed studies estimate economies of size. See Section 3.5.2 for the 
distinction between economies of scale and size. Nevertheless, no study uses the latter expression so 
we will also stick to economies of scale.  
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the empirical studies are found to be quite heterogeneous with respect to how they measure 
economies of scale and density. Some of them only use output as explanatory variables, 
some use output and customers or output and area size, while others use all three variables. 
Consequently, the results obtained regarding economies of scale and density are not fully 
comparable. Also, in the case of a variable cost function some estimates refer to the short run 
while others refer to the log run. We will pay close attention to these issues when 
interpreting the results from different studies. For the literature review, we will keep the 
definitions proposed by the authors unless they do not correspond to the theoretical findings 
in Section 3.5.2. It is recalled that, as a general rule, one does not speak of short-run 
economies of scale.  
 
Kim and Clark (1988) examined the multi-product nature of water supply relative to 
economies of scale and scope.86 The data used in the study came from a cross-section of 60 
water utilities in the United States for 1973, collected mainly by the US Environmental 
Protection Agency. The water utility is viewed as a multi-product firm providing residential 
and non-residential (i.e., industrial, commercial, wholesale and other uses) services. Thus, in 
estimating the total cost function two outputs are considered: the volumes of water delivered 
to residential and non-residential users. To take the spatial variation of demand into account 
service distance is included, which is the distance from the treatment plant to the service 
area. Due to the capital-intensive nature of the operation, a capacity utilisation rate measured 
by the load factor of a water system is incorporated in the model. The input prices included 
in the model are the price of labour, the price of capital and the price of energy.87 The 
translog multi-product total cost function is estimated jointly with the cost share equations 
forming a multivariate regression system, subject to the parameter restrictions imposed by 
symmetry and linear homogeneity in input prices.88 No significant economies of scale in the 
utility’s overall operation are discovered, where overall economies of scale for the sample 
mean are estimated to be 0.99. Small utilities exhibit quite marked economies of scale (1.33), 
                                               
86
 Kim and Clark (1988) also pointed out that a number of studies have been conducted to estimate the 
water supply cost function, for example, Crain and Zardkoohi (1978), Bruggink (1982), Feigenbaum 
and Teeples (1983). Unfortunately, the authors ascertain that most of the previous studies suffer from 
severe shortcomings in the methodology and specification employed. Also, Teeples and Glyer (1987) 
compared their model to those in previous studies by Crain and Zardkoohi (1978), Bruggink (1982) 
and Feigenbaum and Teeples (1983). They argued that the differing conclusions can be put down to 
the model restrictions implicit in these earlier papers.  
87
 The price of capital is the percentage interest rate on long-term debt plus 2%, which is an average 
depreciation rate.  
88
 Zellner’s iterative seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) method is used. The choice of the translog 
is somewhat surprising due to the small sample size. 
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while large utilities exhibit moderate diseconomies of scale (0.88). The utilities are found on 
the whole to enjoy considerable economies of scale for non-residential water supply, but 
suffer from diseconomies in residential supply. The utilities also experience economies of 
scope associated with the joint production of the two services (0.166). It is estimated that the 
costs of providing residential and non-residential services separately are about 17% higher 
than the costs of providing them jointly. The shortcoming of this study is that it does not 
consider output characteristics in estimating the total cost function. Due to the excluded 
variables of number of customers and area size, the results may be biased.  
 
Bhattacharyya et al. (1995) used a stochastic frontier cost function to specify the costs and 
inefficiency of publicly- and privately-owned urban water utilities in terms of their different 
ownership structures and firm-specific characteristics. The data were obtained from a 1992 
survey of water utilities in cities serving a population of over 25,000 in the US. The number 
of utilities in the sample is 221, of which 190 are publicly-owned and 31 privately-owned 
firms. A translog functional form is employed to estimate the variable cost function. The 
explanatory variables used are the output (total quantity of water sales), input prices (price of 
energy, labour and material), the stock of capital and the network variables. The capital stock 
is measured as the residual of the revenue less the variable cost divided by the opportunity 
cost of capital, which can be viewed as a very rough approximation of the actual capital 
stock. The opportunity cost of capital is defined as the sum of the average depreciation rate 
and the long-term interest rate. Network configuration variables include the different types of 
water sources used (a dummy for surface water only and a dummy for a mix of surface and 
underground water), the total quality of water produced and the total system loss. The error 
term is composed of a random noise and cost inefficiency term. Both the mean and variance 
of inefficiency are specified in the model as functions of firm-specific factors. These factors 
are the ownership dummy variable, the number of emergency breakdowns, the length of 
distribution pipelines and a dummy variable distinguishing those companies that are only 
residential suppliers from those that supply both residential and commercial water. The 
translog variable cost function, the cost share equations and equations specifying the error 
terms (including the inefficiency term) constitute a system of equations that is estimated 
simultaneously using the Iterative SUR method. A two-step estimation procedure is 
conducted. The advantage of the two-step method compared to the single-step ML 
estimation method is that it does not require strong distributional assumptions regarding the 
stochastic term. However, the two-step procedure has some serious econometric flaws which 
results in biased and inconsistent estimators.89 The results obtained confirm the presence of 
firm-specific inefficiency effects where both private and public utilities are shown to be 
                                               
89
 Recall the discussion in Section 5.2.1.2. 
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significantly cost inefficient. The mean cost inefficiency is estimated to be 11.1%. The 
public water utilities on average outperform the private water companies; the estimated mean 
cost inefficiencies are 9.8% and 18.7%, respectively. The results show that when the 
operation is small privately-owned water utilities are comparatively more efficient. Public 
water utilities are comparatively more efficient when the scale of operation is large. Returns 
to density, at the mean, for the privately-owned utilities are estimated to be 1.25 and 0.93 for 
publicly-owned utilities. While private companies are operating with increasing returns to 
density and are, given the level of their capital stock, underutilising their capacities, publicly-
owned firms experience diminishing returns to density. These results refer to the short run 
since the numerator of the expression used to calculate economies of (output) density is not 
adjusted in accordance with Eq.(3.40). Again, the estimated economies of density may be 
biased since output characteristics are not included in the model. Another important thing to 
note is that the coefficient of the capital stock has a positive sign. This occurs quite often in 
the applied literature, although it contradicts the cost theory.90 One possible reason for this in 
this particular case may be the poorly specified capital stock variable. 
 
Stewart (1993) estimated the operating expenditure of water supply companies to identify 
the impact of operating conditions on the costs of companies and any differences in company 
costs that may not be attributable to variations in operating conditions (i.e., cost 
inefficiencies). The data collected by the OFWAT provide information for the 32 water 
companies of England and Wales for 1992/93. The dependent variable modelled is the total 
water operating expenditure (OPEX) which corresponds to the variable cost.91 A number of 
plausible models are examined. A preferred model is derived within which OPEX is found to 
be related to the volume of water delivered, the length of the distribution system, the amount 
of pumping required and the proportion of water delivered to measured non-household 
properties.92 Very serious weaknesses of this model specification are that it does not include 
input prices and the capital stock. It is thus questionable whether the function obtained can 
be actually regarded as the variable cost function. The Cobb-Douglas functional form is 
employed. Econometric modelling techniques are used with (C)OLS as the main method and 
                                               
90
 See Section 3.3.2. 
91
 Operating expenditures (OPEX) and capital expenditures (CAPEX) sum up to total expenditures 
(TOTEX).  
92
 Due to the very high correlation between the explanatory variables the volume of water delivered, 
the length of the distribution system, the volume of water put into the distribution system and the 
number of properties billed (correlation coefficients in excess of 0.97 between any pair) not all of the 
variables were included in the model. Other variables like the proportion of groundwater, proportion 
of water from river abstraction, various treatment variables, mains bursts, and ratio of peak to average 
water delivered were also considered.  
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SFA as the alternative method, which is viewed as an examination of the robustness of the 
(C)OLS results. The cost elasticity of the volume of water delivered is estimated to be 0.57 
and that of the length of the main to be 0.38. Based on these results, economies of utilisation 
or short-run economies of output density are estimated to be 1.75 while, as already pointed 
out, one cannot speak of short-run economies of scale. Considerable variation across 
companies as regards the extent of cost inefficiency is discovered. The mean sample 
efficiency is estimated to be 83.6% or, alternatively, the inverse, which is the mean cost 
inefficiency, equals 19.7%.93 The estimated cost reductions needed to achieve the best 
practice vary between 0% for the most efficient company to 33% for the least efficient 
company. SFA is used to examine the sensitivity of the COLS results.94 The sample is, 
however, too small to obtain reliable estimates by employing SFA. The (C)OLS results were 
employed by the OFWAT in the price-regulation process, i.e. in setting company-specific 
price caps. This may seem a doubtful decision since, due to the identified weaknesses of the 
model, i.e. the small sample size used, non-inclusion of input prices and non-inclusion of the 
capital stock in specifying the variable cost function, the results could be seriously biased.  
 
Ashton (2000) considers water and sewerage companies as integrated firms and investigates 
water and sewerage costs together. The relative efficiency of 10 privatised regional UK 
water and sewerage companies between 1987 and 1997 is estimated from the stochastic 
frontier cost function. The panel data set is unbalanced and contains a total of 92 firm 
observations. A one-component fixed-effects panel data model is used to estimate a variable 
cost function from which distribution-free firm-specific estimates of cost efficiency are 
derived. Thus, the paper uses the fixed-effect stochastic frontier panel data model proposed 
by Schmidt and Sickles (1984).95 The translog functional form is used as a representation of 
productive technology. Again, cost in this study is defined as operating cost only, excluding 
the effects of depreciation and infrastructural renewal. Explanatory variables are the level of 
output, price of labour, price of consumables and price of other costs. The level of output is 
proxied by the overall number of households connected to the distribution system and by 
applying some additional adjustments. The price of labour is defined as the level of staff cost 
                                               
93
 The cost efficiency of UK water distribution companies was analysed in a number of papers that 
followed. Cubbin and Tzanidakis (1998) and Thanassoulis (2000) employed a similar model to 
Stewart (1993). They compared the COLS results to the results obtained by the DEA method. The 
same shortcomings as in the model proposed by Stewart (1993) can be identified. 
94
 The coefficient estimates of the stochastic cost function and ranking of the companies are almost 
identical to those obtained by the OLS model, but the estimated inefficiency scores are very different 
and depend on the distributional assumption used in the SFA (exponential or truncated, while the half-
normal model did not converge).  
95
 See Section 5.2.2.1. 
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divided by the number of full-time-equivalent employees. The price of consumables is 
expressed as the level of spending on consumable inputs (including power, materials and 
taxes) divided by the level of fixed assets. The price of other costs, incorporating service 
charges and other direct costs, is outlined as other costs divided by fixed assets. The partial 
derivative of cost with respect to the output is estimated to be 0.466 which indicates that 
substantial economies of output density (2.15) are observable in the water and sewerage 
industry in the short run. Again, it is noted that one does not speak of short-run economies of 
scale. Overall operating cost efficiency is estimated to be 84%. A moderate level of 
dispersion in operational cost efficiency is recorded. Since output characteristics are not 
included in the model, the inefficiency may comprise both diversity of the operating 
environment as well as differences in performance. Another important variable missing in 
the estimation of the variable cost function is the capital stock. Nonetheless, due to the use of 
the fixed-effects model the problem of biased results is probably less serious than in the 
previous study.  
 
Estache and Rossi (2000) compare the performance of water companies in Asia and the 
Pacific region. Hence, international frontier benchmarking is conducted. The data published 
by the Asian Development Bank cover 50 firms surveyed in 1995. Due to some missing 
values, the final sample consists of 44 companies. The log-log variable cost frontier function 
is estimated using the COLS and SFA methods. The costs comprise operational and 
maintenance costs. The explanatory variables included in the model are the price of labour, 
number of clients, population density in the area served, number of connections, percentage 
of residential sales in total sales, number of hours of water availability (quality variable) and 
a dummy variable for concessioned firms. The average efficiency score obtained by the 
COLS and SFA methods are 0.733 and 0.639, respectively. This is somewhat surprising 
since it would be expected that the COLS method would produce lower efficiency scores 
compared to the SFA method, simply due to the fact that the error term in the former case 
might not only include an inefficiency effect. However, with just 44 observations and 
possibly some data comparability issues we can hardly claim that the results are reliable, 
with this holding particularly for the SFA method. The correlation coefficient of 0.861 
between the ranks resulting from the COLS and SFA methods indicates there is some 
consistency between the two approaches. Besides the small sample size used in the study, 
other shortcomings can be identified. Problems of data comparability are usually more 
severe in international studies since the heterogeneity of utilities is typically larger. There are 
also some problems in specification of the variable cost function. The capital stock is left out 
of the model and output is also not incorporated in the cost function. In the latter case it may 
be argued that the number of customers can serve as a proxy for the output distributed. 
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Finally, not all input prices are included in the model (e.g., the price of material and price of 
energy). 
 
Fabbri and Fraquelli (2000) analyse costs, economies of scale and economies of output 
density in the Italian water industry. The cross-sectional dataset consists of 150 water 
companies observed in 1991. These companies represent 3% of the water companies 
operating in Italy; however, they account for nearly 50% of the volume supplied. The size of 
the average firm in the sample is thus much bigger than the average size of all Italian water 
companies. A translog total cost function is used, which is jointly estimated with the cost 
share equations using Zellner’s SUR technique. The authors state they are estimating a 
hedonic cost function but in fact they use a general specification of the translog cost 
function.96 The chosen explanatory variables are the volume of water delivered, the price of 
labour, the price of energy and the price of capital-material, along with the following output 
characteristic variables: the number of consumers, a proxy for population density obtained as 
the ratio between the population served and the length of pipelines, the cost of water input 
purchased and the treatment costs as a percentage of total costs.97 The price of capital-
material is computed by dividing the sum of depreciation and the cost of material by the 
length of the network. The estimated cost elasticities at the sample means suggest that 
economies of output density are present, while economies of scale are not confirmed. 
Returns to output density are found to equal 1.58 at the expansion point, 14.3 at the 
minimum point and 0.90 at the maximum. Returns to scale are found to be high at the 
minimum point (2.38), at the expansion point they are not significantly different from 1 
(0.99), while at the maximum point there are instead diseconomies of scale (0.68). Since area 
size is not included in the model, the estimated economies of scale do not entirely 
correspond to the definition in Eq.(3.39).  
 
Antonioli and Filippini (2001) also explore economies of scale and density in the Italian 
water industry. The difference compared to Fabbri and Fraquelli (2000) is that in this paper a 
panel data set is used and the variable cost function is estimated. The panel consists of 32 
water distribution firms over the 1991-1995 period. The total variable cost equals the sum of 
                                               
96
 Recall the discussion on the hedonic vs. general specification of the cost function in Section 4.1.8. 
Besides the general specification of the translog function, the authors also estimate the translog cost 
function without output characteristics and a Cobb-Douglas cost function with and without output 
characteristics. Since the general translog cost function is proven to be the preferred specification, we 
only provide results for this function. The variables are normalised around their own sample means. 
Results for other functional forms are pretty much in line with the general translog specification.  
97
 As water purchased and treatment costs may take on zero values, the Box-Cox transformation has 
been applied.  
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direct costs and labour costs. The explanatory variables employed are the amount of water 
distributed, the price of labour, the number of customers, the length of the pipes (as a proxy 
for area size), the percentage of water losses, the number of water wells (as a proxy for the 
capital stock), a treatment dummy variable and a time variable to capture shifts in 
technology. To avoid the multicollinearity problem a Cobb-Douglas functional form is 
employed. The variable cost function is estimated using the OLS and random-effects model. 
Due to the time-invariance of some explanatory variables, the fixed-effects model was 
disregarded. The estimated functions are well behaved with most of the parameter estimates 
carrying the expected sign and being statistically significant. The paper obtains a negative 
sign for the capital stock coefficient which is in line with theoretical expectations. However, 
the coefficient is not significant. The inclusion of the output, number of customers and the 
size of the service area in the cost function allows for the distinguishing of economies of 
output density, economies of customer density and economies of scale. The results obtained 
refer to the long run since the numerator of the expression to calculate respective economies 
is adjusted according to Eq.(3.40). Since returns to scale are estimated to be 0.95, the results 
based on the random-effects model suggest the presence of weak diseconomies of scale. On 
the contrary, there are economies of output and customer density, with the estimates being 
equal to 1.46 and 1.16, respectively. Since the random-effects model is unable to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity the results may be biased.  
 
Mizutani and Urakami (2001) analyse the optimal size and economies of scale and output 
density for Japanese water supply companies. The observations used in the study comprise 
112 water supply organisations for the 1994 fiscal year. As far as the functional form is 
concerned, the log-log, the translog and the translog with a hedonic specification of the 
output are used. The cost measure used is the total cost which is estimated as the function of 
output (total volume of water delivered), factor prices (labour, energy, material and capital 
prices) and network characteristics (network length and utilisation rate).98 In addition, in the 
hedonic specification of the cost function the output measure is specified as a function of the 
output and output quality measures (treatment or purifier level, household ratio, non-dam 
water acquisition index, and non-underground water index).99 To estimate the cost models 
with input share equations the SUR method is used. The preferable model is found to be the 
                                               
98
 The material price is obtained by dividing repair expenditures by fixed assets. The capital price is 
defined as the sum of depreciation rate and the interest rate on short-term bonds held by governments. 
The utilisation rate is defined as the ratio of the daily water delivery volume to the designated volume 
of water-intake. Since not all variables were available they had to be estimated. Such variables are the 
network length and the energy consumption needed for the energy price calculation.  
99
 The treatment level is defined by dividing the clear water volume by a designated volume of water-
intake. 
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translog with a hedonic specification of the cost function. The authors confirm economies of 
output density. On the contrary, no evidence of scale economies is found. It should be noted 
that the definition of economies of scale in this study does not fully correspond to Eq.(3.39) 
since the number of customers is not included in the model. For average-sized water supply 
companies, returns to output density based on the estimated hedonic specification of the cost 
function are 1.10, while returns to scale are reported to be 0.92.100 The same functional form 
is used to estimate the optimal size of a company, i.e. the size with the minimum average 
cost (in terms of output and network length). The minimum average cost is found to be at the 
point of 261,084,000 m3 of water supplied and 1,221 km of network length.  
 
Garcia and Thomas (2001) examine the cost structure of French municipal water utilities. 
The sample is composed of 55 water utilities from the Bordeaux region for the years 1995 to 
1997. The Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) procedure is used to estimate the system 
of variable cost and input cost shares.101 A multi-product translog cost function is employed. 
Several measures of returns are assessed as well as the economies of scope associated with 
the joint production of water delivered to final customers and water losses. Variable cost is 
defined as the sum of total operating and maintenance cost. The following explanatory 
variables are used: the output variables (volume sold to final customers and water losses), 
factor prices (labour price, energy price, material price) and technical variables. Water losses 
are measured as the difference between the water distributed and the water sold. The price of 
material is obtained by dividing material costs with the volume of water distributed, whereby 
the material costs include heterogeneous categories of costs such as stocking, maintenance 
work and subcontracting. The technical variables used are the number of customers, the 
number of municipalities supplied (as a proxy for area size), and several variables 
representing the existing capital stock: network length, production capacity, stocking and the 
pumping capacity. Estimated economies of scope at the variables sample mean are positive 
(0.237), indicating that there are potential gains in the production of water losses 
(undesirable output) jointly with the water sold to final customers (desirable output). A 
possible explanation of this is that the costs associated with network repairs and maintenance 
in order to decrease water losses are higher than the costs involved in satisfying customer 
demand by simply increasing water production. Further, returns estimates at the sample 
mean show that, in the short run, there are economies of output density (1.14) as well as 
                                               
100
 Companies are grouped in five categories according to their size (measured by the amount of water 
supplied). For all groups and all functional forms applied similar results are obtained, i.e. economies 
of output density and diseconomies of scale are found.  
101
 In the linear regression model, the GMM method is equivalent to the Instrumental Variables (IV) 
method.  
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economies of customer density (1.05). In the long run, economies of output density are found 
(1.21), while there are no longer any economies of customer density present (0.87). Finally, 
(long-run) scale economies are estimated to be 1.002.  
 
Table 6.1 summarises all of the abovementioned studies – the data set used, method and 
functional form employed, and reports the main findings regarding the economies of density, 
economies of scale and cost (in)efficiencies of the water distribution companies. Based on 
the studies reviewed, several shortcomings can be identified:102 
 a small sample size is used;  
 the non-inclusion of input prices (or non-inclusion of all input prices) in the cost 
function;  
 the non-inclusion of output characteristics in the cost function; 
 studies estimating variable cost should incorporate capital stock in the model; 
 not distinguishing in a precise way between the short-run and long-run economies of 
scale and density; and 
 several deficiencies in the methods chosen to estimate cost inefficiency can be found.  
 
The consequences of the weaknesses identified above may be quite severe. One of the main 
issues to be stressed is the non-inclusion of output characteristics to account for output 
heterogeneity and the non-inclusion of some other relevant variables in the model. Due to the 
excluded variables, the estimated coefficients of the cost function could be seriously biased. 
In particular, the exclusion of output characteristics which are typically highly correlated 
with the output results in biased estimates of economies of scale and density. Further, cost 
inefficiency estimates may be sensitive to the stochastic frontier method employed. Another 
main problem that failed to be recognised by the authors of the reviewed studies is that none 
of the stochastic frontier methods employed is able to differentiate between unobserved 
heterogeneity and inefficiency. Consequently, unobserved heterogeneity is simply attributed 
to cost inefficiency. This is particularly undesirable in the case of network industries where 
heterogeneity is usually found to be rather high. There can be found several environmental 
and non-discretionary factors that are beyond managerial control, but can affect the 
performance of the firms. Some of these factors can be observed and included in the cost 
function to control for the cost differences that occur merely due to differences in operating 
environment. However, the problem of unobserved heterogeneity may still be present. It is 
thus essential to be able to make a distinction between different sources of cost differentials, 
namely between unobserved heterogeneity and inefficiency. This may, in turn, have very 
important implications from the regulatory point of view. If differences in costs are 
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 Of course, not all of the studies suffer from (all of) the above listed shortcomings. 
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attributed to differences in the cost inefficiency, the policy implications will be completely 
different than if these differences are attributed to differences in operating environment.  
 
With respect to the previous studies, the contribution of this study is that it notably improves 
on stochastic frontier methods used to estimate cost inefficiency. It explicitly recognises the 
problem of unobserved heterogeneity in measuring the cost inefficiency and tries to address 
this problem in several ways. The most recent findings on stochastic frontier estimation 
methods are considered. The novelty is to use the TFE model as proposed by Greene (2002a) 
and the RE model with Mundlak’s formulation as recently proposed by Farsi, Filippini and 
Kuenzle (2005). Additionally, we are interested in analysing to what extent the estimated 
inefficiency scores are found to be sensitive to the SFA method employed. Thus, the 
consistency of the results obtained by employing different stochastic frontier methods will as 
well be analysed. We will be especially interested to find out whether the established 
inconsistency can be explained by different ability of the models to distinguish unobserved 
heterogeneity from inefficiency.  
 
It should be also noted that this is one of the first studies to measure inefficiency in the 
network industries from Central and Eastern European transition countries and the first such 
study relating to the water sector in these countries.103 Only recently have the transition 
countries recognised the importance of this issue. Thus, for economic policy decision-
making it is important to have at least some indication of the presence of inefficiencies in 
these countries’ network industries. The results can also provide a useful input when 
designing the appropriate regulatory framework. 
 
 
                                               
103
 By becoming a new EU member state on May 1 2004, the transition process of Slovenian economy 
has been formally completed. Thus, we can now speak of ex-transition countries. 
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Table 6.1: Summary of the findings from the literature review 
Author(s) of the 
paper 
Data sample  Model and functional 
form 
Method of estimation 
or calculation 
Estimated economies 
of scale (size) 
Estimated economies of 
density 
Estimated cost 
efficiency 
Kim and Clark 
(1988) 
60 US water utilities in 
1973 
Translog multi-
product TC function  
SUR method  0.992 (sample 
average)1 
/ / 
Bhattacharyya et 
al. (1995) 
221 US water utilities 
from a 1992 survey 
Translog VC function SFA (SUR and two-
step estimation) 
/ 1.246 (EOD, SR, private); 
0.932 (EOD, SR, public)2; 
group means 
0.901 (average; public 
more efficient) 
Stewart (1993) 
 
32 UK water companies 
in 1992/93 
Log-log VC function3 OLS and COLS 
method 
/ 1.75 (EOD, SR) 0.836  
Ashton (2000) 
 
10 UK water and 
sewerage companies 
between 1987-1997 
Translog VC function3 SFA (fixed-effects 
panel data model) 
/ 2.15 (EOD, SR, sample 
average) 
0.84  
Estache and 
Rossi (2000) 
44 water utilities in Asia 
observed in 1995  
Log-log VC function COLS 
SFA (pooled model) 
/ / 0.733 (COLS) 
0.639 (SFA) 
Fabbri and 
Fraquelli (2000) 
150 Italian water utilities 
observed in 1991 
Translog TC function SUR method 0.99 (sample 
average) 
1.58 (EOD, sample 
average) 
/ 
Antonioli and 
Filippini (2001) 
32 Italian water utilities 
between 1991-1995 
Log-log VC function OLS and RE panel 
data model 
0.95 (LR) 1.46 (EOD, LR) 
1.16 (ECD, LR) 
/ 
Mizutani and 
Urakami (2001) 
112 Japanese water 
companies in 1994 
Log-log, translog, 
hedonic TC function 
SUR method 0.921 (sample 
average) 
1.103 (EOD, sample 
average) 
/ 
Garcia and 
Thomas (2001) 
55 French water utilities 
between 1995-1997 
Multi-product translog 
VC function 
GMM (IV method), 
SUR method 
1.002 (LR, sample 
average) 
1.21 (EOD, LR); 
0.87 (ECD, LR);4 
sample average 
/ 
1 Economies of scope in providing residential and non-residential services jointly are also confirmed (ESCOPE = 0.166). 
2 EOD stands for economies of output density, while ECD stands for economies of customer density. SR stands for short run, while LR denotes long run.  
3 Instead of VC, the authors actually speak of operating expenditures (OPEX). 
4
 In the short run, EOD = 1.14 and ECD = 1.05. Economies of scope associated with the joint production of water delivered to final customers and water losses are also found ( ESCOPE = 0.24).  
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6.2 Model Specification and Methodology  
 
The main purpose of water distribution companies is to produce water of sufficient quality 
from a resource (groundwater or surface water) that may necessitate preliminary treatments 
to make drinking water safe, and to distribute water by continuously adapting supply to daily 
demand while preserving water quality during its transportation in the transmission pipelines 
and distribution mains. Underlying technological constraints clearly play an important role in 
constructing the water cost function. Municipal water supply covers all operations from 
resource extraction through to consumer taps (Garcia and Thomas, 2001).  
 
The water-production process consists of the following activities (Fabbri and Fraquelli, 
2000, and Garcia and Thomas, 2001): 
 Production and treatment covers the operations of water extraction (from 
groundwater or surface water) through to preliminary treatment in treatment plants 
(disinfection, iron removal, filtering, softening);  
 Transfer is the carrying of water from production facilities to transmission pipelines 
that can be gravity or pump-operated if a ground storage system is employed; 
 Storage of water in facilities such as water tanks and water towers; 
 Pressurisation of water pipelines, either by a gravity main system or with the help of 
a pumping station; and 
 Distribution of water to final customers through distribution mains and customer 
service lines; it also includes quality monitoring and metering.  
 
A special feature of water utilities worth mentioning is that the water delivered to final 
customers is obtained from raw, untreated water, which has no acquisition costs. This is why 
it is not treated in the same way as other inputs (labour, energy, material and capital). The 
production and delivery processes of water distribution companies are highly dependent on 
their capital stock consisting of pumps, network pipelines, storage facilities and other 
facilities. The technical environment in which water utilities operate can be very different. In 
the production activity, water utilities can be distinguished based on the water source used: 
groundwater or surface water. Groundwater implies higher drilling and pumping costs, 
whereas treatment costs are usually higher with surface water. Differences in average costs 
can also be found in the distribution process, depending on the size of the service area, 
population density, customer mix (share of household vs. non-household customers), water 
leakages from the network system etc. Therefore, in order to deal with such heterogeneity it 
is necessary to incorporate in the cost function, along with the factor prices and the output 
128                   Estimation of the cost frontier function for Slovenian water distribution utilities 
 
(i.e., water delivered to final customers), variables that represent output characteristics and 
differences in the environmental conditions of the water utilities.  
 
The costs of operating a water distribution system are the costs of building and maintaining 
the water system (wells and springs, pumps, treatment facilities, distribution pipes and other 
facilities), and of measuring and billing water. The main factors influencing the cost of water 
distribution companies are: 
a) the total water sold; 
b) the input prices;  
c) the total number of customers served;  
d) the type of consumers; 
e) the customer density; 
f) the size and morphology of the distribution area; 
g) the length of distribution pipes;  
h) the water resource (underground water or surface water); 
i) water losses from the distribution system; 
j) the load factor (ratio between the average and maximum demand of water); and 
k) the water treatment needed. 
 
For a specification of the cost model, we consider a water distribution company which uses 
three inputs, labour, capital and material, to distribute a single output to a number of 
customers within its service area. The number of customers and the network size can be 
considered as output characteristic variables. The output characteristics are included as 
explanatory variables to control for the cost differences that occur merely due to the 
heterogeneity of output. 
 
In estimating a cost function, a decision has to be made whether to employ a short-run or a 
long-run cost function. From the literature review on water distribution companies it can be 
seen that some studies estimated a variable cost function, while others decided for the total 
cost function (see Table 6.1). The decision is generally based on our belief as to whether the 
utilities use all inputs at their optimal levels. If it is assumed that utilities are in a long-run 
static equilibrium with respect to all inputs employed and that they minimise total cost, a 
total cost function is utilised. On the other hand, if it is believed that utilities do not use a 
certain input at its optimal level, a variable cost function is utilised. In the latter case, capital 
is typically considered to be a fixed input since time is required to adjust it to its optimal 
level through the investment process. Besides that, the decision on which concept to employ 
may be influenced by the availability of the data and econometric considerations.  
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It is the case that with water distribution utilities the capital is long-lived and adjustments to 
a change in water demand are costly. However, over the last few decades we have not 
witnessed any notable changes in water demand in Slovenia so the demand for water can be 
considered to have been relatively stable. There is thus no reason to believe that utilities are 
considerably deviating from the optimal level of capital employed. Therefore, the adoption 
of a long-run concept seems an appropriate choice. Another reason we prefer the total cost 
function is to avoid possible manipulations related to the allocation of costs to different cost 
categories. It may happen that some companies may view a certain cost item as a variable 
cost, while others consider it to be a capital cost item (e.g., maintenance as opposed to 
investment expenditure). Also, if only variable costs were considered in the efficiency 
analysis we would implicitly allow for some inefficiency with respect to the capital costs. If 
utilities realised that capital costs are exempt from assessing inefficiency they might try to 
move some cost items from variable to capital costs in order to be perceived as more 
efficient.  
 
Hence, based on the above discussion a decision is made to employ a total cost function, 
which can be written as: 
 
),,,,,,,,,,( TDDDDASCUPPPQCC USTREATLOSLKML= , (6.1) 
 
where C represents total cost and Q is the output represented by the total cubic metres of 
water delivered. PL, PM, and PK are the price of labour, the price of material and the price of 
capital, respectively. CU stands for the number of customers served, while AS is the size of 
the service area. DLOSL is a dummy variable of water losses bearing a value of 1 if the firm 
has low percentage of water losses, and a 0 value otherwise. DTREAT is a dummy variable for 
water treatment and takes on a value of 1 if the firm distributes water that has to be treated 
chemically before distribution and a 0 value otherwise. Treatment is necessary in a situation 
where, from a medical point of view, the quality of the water does not reach a predefined 
standard and it is therefore unsuitable for drinking. Water distribution utilities can use 
different water resources: surface water, underground water or a mix of both sources. DS 
represents a dummy variable for surface water only and DU is a dummy variable for 
underground water only. Finally, T is a time variable, which captures the shift in technology. 
 
Estimation of the cost function requires a specification of a functional form. In Chapter 4 we 
considered several functional forms and discussed the criteria for choosing a functional form 
prior to estimation. To review, a functional form is considered to be appropriate if it satisfies 
properties indicated by economic theory, because of its flexibility, possibility and ease of 
statistical estimation and application, and consistency with empirical facts. Following these 
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criteria we selected three functional forms: Cobb-Douglas, general translog and hedonic 
translog function. This is also in line with the studies examined in the literature review (see 
Table 6.1).  
 
Other functional forms were not found to be appropriate for estimating the cost function with 
output characteristics since they did not satisfy one or more criteria for choosing a functional 
form. To meet theoretical consistency conditions, the cost function has to be nondecreasing 
in output, linearly homogeneous in input prices and nondecreasing and concave in input 
prices. Therefore, the quadratic cost function is disregarded since it is not linearly 
homogeneous in input prices nor can homogeneity be imposed without sacrificing the 
flexibility of the form. The same holds for the quadratic mean of order one. Further, the 
generalised Leontief functional form is not locally flexible whereas the locally flexible 
version of a generalised Leontief is defined only for a single output firm and does not allow 
the inclusion of output characteristics. The hybrid Diewert multi-product cost function is also 
not a locally flexible functional form and, from the point of view of the present study, the 
fact that it imposes constant returns to scale is particularly unwelcome. Finally, a general 
Box-Cox model and the models nested within it are eliminated from the set of possible 
alternatives since they do not meet the criterion regarding the ease of statistical estimation. 
Since the general Box-Cox model is nonlinear in parameters it has to be estimated by a 
nonlinear maximum likelihood technique. In a preliminary analysis, in fact, an attempt was 
made to estimate the general Box-Cox model as well as some of its nested versions. 
However, the Nonlinear Least Squares (NLS) method used to estimate these models did not 
converge so these models had to be eliminated.  
 
Hence, we end up with three possible functional forms all nested within the translog 
functional form, namely the Cobb-Douglas, the general translog and the hedonic translog 
cost function. The Cobb-Douglas is not a locally flexible form but, because of its simplicity 
of application and the clearness of interpretation of its parameters, it is widely used and will 
therefore be tested against the translog. The major limit of the Cobb-Douglas functional form 
is that the estimated values of the economies of scale and density do not vary with the size of 
the firms in the sample but are assumed to be constant. Generally speaking, the translog cost 
function, which is a more flexible functional form, appears to be an appropriate functional 
form for answering questions about economies of scale and density. In the general translog 
specification, output characteristics are included directly in the cost function, i.e. in a general 
manner without imposing any restrictions. An alternative way to include output 
characteristics is by estimating the translog with a hedonic specification of output. Its appeal 
is that far fewer parameters need to be estimated compared to the general translog 
specification. However, the hedonic translog cost function also has some shortcomings. It 
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requires the separability of the arguments in each hedonic aggregator from all other 
arguments in the cost function. As a result of this restrictive assumption, the translog cost 
function with a hedonic output specification is no longer capable of providing a second-order 
approximation to any unknown arbitrary separable cost function.  
 
By applying the translog functional form, Eq.(6.1) can be rewritten as: 
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with εit the error term. Notice that the normalisation of cost and input prices by one of the 
input prices is used to impose linear homogeneity in input prices. Hence, the total cost, the 
price of labour and the price of material are divided by the price of capital. In what follows, 
we use the following notation for the normalised variables: C*, PL* and PM*. Other 
properties of the cost function remain to be verified after the translog cost function is 
estimated.  
 
The Cobb-Douglas functional form is estimated by imposing the following restrictions on 
the translog cost function in Eq.(6.2): 
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In the translog specification in Eq.(6.2), output characteristics are included directly in the 
cost function, i.e. in a general manner without imposing any restrictions. An alternative way 
to include output characteristics is by estimating the translog with a hedonic specification of 
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output. Consistent with Section 4.1.8, the following Cobb-Douglas output aggregator 
function is employed: 
 
itASitCUitQ AShCUhQhASCUQY lnlnln),,(ln ++= , (6.4) 
 
where hQ = 1. In Eq.(6.4) only two output characteristics are taken into account, namely the 
number of customers served and the size of the service area. Unfortunately, the other output 
attributes appearing in the cost function specified by Eq.(6.1) are all dummy variables and 
could not be incorporated into the output aggregator function but were included directly in 
the cost function. The translog cost function in Eq.(6.2) now takes the following form: 
 
),,,,,,,(ln *** TDDDDPPYCC USTREATLOSLML= . (6.5) 
 
By substituting Eq.(6.4) in Eq.(6.5) a general translog function is obtained. A hedonic 
translog cost function can then be estimated through a set of nonlinear constraints on the 
parameters of the general translog function. In our case, the following restrictions are 
imposed on Eq.(6.5):104 
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The estimation results and the choice of the most appropriate form will be made in Section 
6.4.1, after the description of data that is provided in Section 6.3. 
 
Finally, we have to make a decision on the method used to estimate the cost frontier 
function. Since the main objective of this work is to measure cost inefficiency, several SFA 
methods will be applied to estimate the chosen functional form of the specified cost function 
in Eq.(6.1). The stochastic frontier cost function will be estimated using several of the 
methods discussed in great detail in Chapter 5. The differences between the various 
specifications are related to the assumptions imposed on the error term (εit) introduced in 
Eq.(6.2), cost inefficiency and firm-specific effects. Six different estimation methods are 
considered. Table 6.2 summarises the models used in the analysis. The purpose of estimating 
different models is to check the consistency of the coefficients and efficiency scores 
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 Restrictions are derived by comparing the parameters of Eq.(6.2) and Eq.(6.5). 
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obtained. In order for the SFA analysis to be applied in a regulation process it has to produce 
reliable results.  
 
Model I is based on the COLS method which is, in fact, a deterministic frontier method. It 
does not allow for stochastic errors and it assumes that all deviations of observations from 
the theoretical minimum are attributed solely to the inefficiency of firms. We can overcome 
this shortcoming by using stochastic frontier methods. Model II is a pooled frontier model 
estimated by the ML method proposed by Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977). Since it does 
not assume any firm-specific effects, it does not have the ability to distinguish between the 
cost inefficiency and unobserved heterogeneity of the firms. This shortcoming can be 
improved by some of the panel data stochastic frontier models.  
 
Table 6.2: Econometric specification of the models employed 
 
Model Firm-specific 
component αi 
Random error 
εit 
Inefficiency 
uit 
Model I 
COLS 
None ),0(iid 2εσ  { }itit εε ˆminˆ +  
 
Model II 
Pooled (ML) 
 
None ititit
uv +=ε  
),0(iid~ 2uit Nu σ+  
),0(iid~ 2vit Nv σ  
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TFE 
 
Fixed (group 
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In Model III we first consider the random-effects model proposed by Schmidt and Sickles 
(1984). The model is estimated by the feasible Generalised Least Squares (GLS) method. If 
we allow stronger distributional assumptions on the inefficiency term to hold, we can use the 
ML procedure to estimate the RE model, which will be done in Model IV. The latter method 
was introduced by Pitt and Lee (1981). The FE estimator is considered inappropriate since its 
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precision relies on the within variation which is very low in our case. The within variation in 
our sample accounts for just 0.7% of the total variation of the dependent variable total cost. 
Also, time-invariant variables which are often presented in the network industries cannot be 
included in the FE model. Nonetheless, the appeal of the FE model as opposed to the GLS 
estimator is that the former produces unbiased estimates of the regression coefficients even if 
the firm-specific effects are correlated with the regressors. On the other hand, the FE model 
produces biased inefficiency estimates due to the incidental parameter problem. Based on the 
above arguments we decided not to employ this model.  
 
The main weakness of Model III and Model IV is that time-invariant cost inefficiency is 
assumed.105 Consequently, these models do not have the ability to distinguish between time-
invariant unobserved heterogeneity and cost inefficiency. Any time-invariant firm-specific 
effects are treated as inefficiency. Therefore, we additionally estimate the stochastic frontier 
cost function by applying true fixed effects (Model V) introduced by Greene (2002a). The 
true fixed effects (TFE) model treats firm-specific fixed effects and inefficiency separately 
and is therefore able to distinguish between the unobserved heterogeneity and inefficiency. 
In this way it tries to overcome some limitations of the conventional fixed effects model. 
Since the model is estimated by ‘brute force’ maximum likelihood, its results do not depend 
on the within variation. The remaining shortcoming of the TFE model is the incidental 
parameters problem.106 Further, time-invariant firm characteristics cannot be included in the 
model as explanatory variables. Nevertheless, these effects are viewed as unobserved 
heterogeneity and are (at least partially) captured by the firm-specific time-invariant term 
additionally specified by this model. The true random effects (TRE) model proposed by 
Greene (2002b) was also applied, but the simulated maximum likelihood estimation method 
did not converge. Therefore, this method cannot be considered in estimation of the cost 
function since the obtained results are unreliable. In Section 6.3.2, where the estimation 
results of different methods are presented, we also provide a possible explanation why the 
TRE model was not found to perform well in our case. Finally, Model VI is used to control 
for the correlation between unobserved heterogeneity and explanatory variables. It uses 
Mundlak's (1978) specification of the RE model (Model III). This specification was 
introduced to stochastic frontier analysis by Farsi, Filippini and Kuenzle (2005). The 
resulting GLS estimator of the RE model is unbiased and identical to the ‘within’ estimator 
                                               
105
 Battese and Coelli’s (1992) parameterisation of time effects (time-varying decay model) was 
applied as well, where the results did not much differ from Model IV. The Battese and Coelli (1992) 
model was estimated by Stata 8.0. 
106
 Greene (2005) finds the bias to be small with respect to the estimates of the regression coefficients. 
For the inefficiency estimates the bias is found to be larger, where an overestimation error of about 
25% is reported.  
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of the FE model. Therefore, due to the low within variation in our sample the regression 
coefficients may be imprecisely estimated.  
 
6.3 Data Description 
 
The study is based on a panel data set for Slovenian water distribution utilities over the 
1997-2003 period. Since water supply utilities fall within the responsibility of local 
communities, the data on their operation were not collected systematically in the past. 
Nevertheless, the Ministry of the Environment and Spatial Planning realised that gathering 
data at the national level is needed in order to monitor and compare companies’ 
performances. In addition, new legislation on the price regulation of these companies 
envisages the benchmarking of utilities in the future. Thus, the data were collected from the 
public utilities via a questionnaire issued by the Ministry of the Environment and Spatial 
Planning.107 In this way we obtained data on 52 water supply utilities over the 1997-2003 
period. The number of observations for each utility varies from 2 to 7 years; on average, 
there are 6.38 observations per utility. The sample is an unbalanced panel consisting of a 
total of 332 observations.  
 
Utilities included in the sample supply 153 out of the 192 municipalities in Slovenia, that is 
almost 80% of all municipalities. All Slovenian regions are covered by the utilities in the 
sample. In Appendix II a list of the utilities included in the sample is provided, ranked from 
the largest to smallest in size with respect to the output delivered. There is also information 
on the legal form, region and number of municipalities served by the utility. Only four 
companies in the sample are not public utilities, they operate as private companies or have a 
concession. The utilities differ in terms of size and as well in some environmental 
conditions. Some utilities also provide other services like wastewater treatment, solid waste 
disposal etc. Usually, in smaller municipalities all communal activities are joined within a 
single company, while in larger municipalities communal activities are provided separately 
by several companies.  
 
Since 1997, utilities have been obliged to maintain separate accounts for the different 
regulated activities. This was facilitated by a modification to the Slovenian Accounting 
Standards (‘SRS’) which since 1997 have included a special standard (SRS 35) to deal with 
issues specific to public sector utilities. According to the SRS 35, utilities providing public 
services are obliged not only to have separate accounts for regulated and unregulated 
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 The questionnaire was prepared by the Faculty of Economics at the University of Ljubljana.  
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activities but also, within regulated activities, they should have separate accounts for their 
different regulated activities. The separation of activities is usually carried out in order to 
avoid cross subsidisation, increase transparency and enable the easier monitoring of 
regulated utilities. It also facilitates the cost efficiency analysis of each public service 
activity separately.  
 
In this study the data collected refer to the supply of drinking water only. In this way the 
comparability of the data is assured. However, since data on other activities is unavailable it 
is impossible to study the multi-product cost function and economies of scope. Further, this 
also raises the question of potential data manipulation since it is not evident whether the 
multi-utility companies use the same methodology to allocate costs between different 
activities. If some kind of data manipulation is present in the public utilities, this would have 
a considerable influence on the estimated cost inefficiencies of the water distribution 
activity. Unfortunately, based on the data available this issue cannot be investigated any 
further. 
 
The dataset on Slovenian water distribution utilities contains data from income statements, 
balance sheets, physical quantities, environmental characteristics and technical data referring 
to the water distribution activity. Descriptive statistics of the variables included in the model 
are presented in Table 6.3. The total distribution cost (C) equals the operating and capital 
expenditure. The price of labour (PL) is equal to the average annual wages, estimated as 
labour expenditures divided by the average number of employees for a given year. The price 
of capital (PK) is calculated as the ratio of capital cost and the capital stock, which is 
approximated by the capacity of pumps measured in litres per second. Capital cost consists 
of depreciation and interests. The price of material (PM) is obtained by dividing material cost 
by the length of the distribution network in kilometres. Material cost consists of various 
groups of costs obtained when subtracting capital and labour costs from the total company’s 
costs. Material cost thus includes the cost of energy, material and services. All input prices 
and costs were deflated to 2000 constant Slovenian tolars (SIT) using the producers’ price 
index and are expressed in thousands of tolars.  
 
The output (Q) is measured as the amount of water supplied to the final customers expressed 
in cubic metres. The number of final customers (CU) is the sum of household and non-
household customers. The size of the service area (AS) is expressed in square kilometres. 
Water losses are obtained as the difference between the amount of water pumped into the 
distribution system and the amount of water supplied to final customers. The share of water 
losses is calculated as the ratio of water losses and the water pumped into the pipes. It is 
considered that the utility has low water loss levels if the share of water losses does not 
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exceed the first quartile, which equals 20% of water losses. The variable is included in the 
model as a dummy variable DLOSL with a value of 1 if the firm has low water losses, and 0 
otherwise.108 In some cases, water needs to be treated in order to be suitable for drinking. A 
dummy variable DTREAT takes a value of 1 if the firm distributes water that has to be treated 
chemically before distribution and a 0 value otherwise. Only demanding chemical treatment 
is taken into the account; simple chemical treatment (disinfection and chlorination) is not 
considered. Since water distribution utilities can use surface water, underground water or a 
mix of both resources, the type of water resource is also included in the model. DS is a 
dummy variable for the use of surface water only and DU is a dummy variable for the use of 
underground water only.  
 
Table 6.3: Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable description Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Total annual cost  
(103 SIT)1  TOTEX 
 304,698.2 538,387.0 7,208.0 2,997,533.8 
Price of labour  
(103 SIT/ employee) PL  3,047.7 397.1 2,131.9 4,162.7 
Price of capital  
(103 SIT/ litre per sec.) PK  449.4 564.9 13.5 1,484.0 
Price of material  
(103 SIT/ km of network) PM  312.0 244.3 46.9 1,412.0 
Water supplied (m3) 
 
Y  2,298.780 3,835,452 106,627 25,507,653 
Number of customers 
 
CUST  7,402.1 7,777.4 515.0 43,272.0 
Size of service area 
(km2) AREA  336.9 240.0 57.8 949.1 
Treatment dummy 
 
DTREAT 0.120 0.326 0 1 
Dummy for surface 
water DS 0.199 0.400 0 1 
Dummy for underground 
water DU 0.355 0.479 0 1 
Dummy for low water 
losses DLOSL 0.250 0.434 0 1 
1
 The average official exchange rate of Slovenian tolar (SIT) in 2000 was 1 EUR = 205,0316 SIT 
(Bank of Slovenia, 2001).  
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 We did not include the numerical variable measuring percentage water losses in the model since 
this would increase the number of coefficients to be estimated. Due to the high correlation between 
the output, number of customers, size of the service area and water losses, multicollinearity problems 
could arise. Thus, we decided instead to create the dummy variable for water losses.  
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6.4 Parameter Estimates of the Cost Frontier Function  
 
6.4.1 Choice of the Functional Form 
 
In Section 6.2 we narrowed the choice of the functional form to choosing between Cobb-
Douglas, general translog and hedonic translog functions. Having selected three estimable 
functional forms with plausible theoretical and applicative properties, we will base our final 
decision on statistical criteria and data-specific considerations. Accordingly, a likelihood 
ratio test is performed to determine the functional form that provides the best fit for the data.  
 
The Cobb-Douglas and general translog cost functions are both linear in parameters so the 
parameters can easily be estimated by using linear least squares techniques. Since the 
hedonic translog function is non-linear in parameters, a nonlinear maximum likelihood 
technique has to be employed to estimate the parameters. It should be noted that at this point 
we are not yet interested in an estimation of cost inefficiencies but rather on determining the 
functional form that provides the best fit for the data. Therefore, the functional form should 
be chosen independently of assumptions regarding the distribution of inefficiency. Rather 
than employing SFA methods at this stage, the OLS method is used to obtain preliminary 
parameter estimates of the Cobb-Douglas and the translog cost function, and the Nonlinear 
Least Squares (NLS) method is used for the hedonic translog function. The estimated 
parameters of the Cobb-Douglas, the general translog and the hedonic translog cost function 
are given in Appendix III, Table III.1. The Cobb Douglas and translog functions were also 
estimated by the GLS estimator, which led us to the same conclusion with respect to the 
preferable functional form as in the OLS case. Since the panel data structure is not taken into 
account in the NLS estimation of the hedonic cost function, we compare its estimates with 
the OLS estimates of the Cobb-Douglas and translog functions. It can also be noted that the 
time trend t is not included in the estimation because the choice of the functional form 
should be driven by the data and not by the assumption regarding technical change. 
However, including the time trend does not significantly change the results.  
 
To compare the translog specification against Cobb-Douglas and, alternatively, against the 
hedonic translog specification, the likelihood ratio (LR) test is used. The null hypothesis of 
the LR test imposes restrictions on the parameters of unrestricted model, in our case the 
general translog. If the restrictions are valid, then imposing them should not lead to a large 
reduction in the log-likelihood function. The likelihood ratio equals   λ = LR/LU, where LR and 
LU are the likelihood functions of the restricted and unrestricted models evaluated at the 
estimated vector of the parameters of the respective model. The limiting distribution of –2ln 
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λ is χ2, with degrees of freedom equal to the number of restrictions imposed (Greene, 
2000).109 The respective chi-square statistics resulting from the comparison of alternative 
functional forms for our model are reported in Appendix III, Table III.2. The chi-square 
statistics are highly significant in both cases, i.e. translog vs. Cobb-Douglas and translog vs. 
hedonic, indicating that restrictions in the null hypothesis should be rejected. This indicates 
that the general translog functional form is the most appropriate one and should therefore be 
applied to estimate the cost function. Since both the Cobb-Douglas and hedonic functional 
forms impose certain restrictive assumptions, the locally flexible translog specification is 
also the most appropriate form from the theoretical point of view. Hence, the translog 
functional form is utilised to estimate the total cost function of Slovenian water distribution 
utilities.  
 
6.4.2 Estimation Results 
 
The estimation results of the translog cost frontier function of Slovenian water distribution 
utilities obtained by the six different models are given in Table 6.4.110 The expansion point of 
the stochastic frontier cost function specified in Eq.(6.2) is chosen to be the sample median, 
i.e. the median values of variables included in the model. Since total cost and all the 
continuous explanatory variables are in logarithms and normalised by their medians, the 
estimated first-order coefficients can be interpreted as cost elasticities evaluated at the 
sample median.  
 
In terms of the coefficients’ significance and expected coefficients’ sign, Model I (the COLS 
model), Model II (the Pooled ML model) and Model V (the ‘true’ FE model) seem to 
perform better than Model III (the RE model estimated by the GLS technique), Model IV 
(the RE model estimated by the ML estimation procedure) and Model VI (Mundlak’s 
formulation of the RE model estimated by GLS). In particular, the coefficients of Model VI 
are mostly insignificant, likely due to the large number of explanatory variables included in 
the model and the high correlation between them.  
 
                                               
109
 In our case, 15 restrictions had to be imposed on the translog to obtain the Cobb-Douglas 
specification, and 12 restrictions for the hedonic specification.  
110
 The models are estimated using NLogit 3.0.  
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Table 6.4: Estimation results of the frontier cost function  
 
Coefficient 
 
Model I 
COLS 
 
Model II 
Pooled 
(ML) 
Model III 
RE (GLS) 
 
Model IV 
RE (ML) 
 
Model V 
TFE 
 
Model VI 
RE (GLS) 
+ Mundlak 
ln a  11.321**** 
(0.037) 
11.570**** 
(0.036)  
11.856**** 
(0.054)  
11.424**** 
(0.079)  - 
11.816**** 
(0.069)  
cPL 0.585**** 
(0.024) 
0.579**** 
(0.024) 
0.405**** 
(0.024) 
0.401**** 
(0.041) 
0.521**** 
(0.030) 
0.374**** 
(0.029) 
cPM 0.188**** 
(0.023) 
0.180**** 
(0.022) 
0.341**** 
(0.020) 
0.339**** 
(0.042) 
0.193**** 
(0.028) 
0.354**** 
(0.025) 
bQ 0.361**** 
(0.063) 
0.329**** 
(0.059) 
0.289**** 
(0.063) 
0.290*** 
(0.091) 
0.258**** 
(0.069) 
0.157* 
(0.092) 
bCU 0.433**** 
(0.063) 
0.449**** 
(0.059) 
0.471**** 
(0.071) 
0.454**** 
(0.095) 
0.503**** 
(0.072) 
0.298* 
(0.168) 
bAS 0.172**** 
(0.024) 
0.193**** 
(0.023) 
0.201**** 
(0.040) 
0.218*** 
(0.074) 
0.158**** 
(0.032) 
0.200 
(0.132) 
cPL,PL -0.110** 
(0.051) 
-0.097** 
(0.047) 
0.034 
(0.037) 
0.015 
(0.069) 
-0.178*** 
(0.060) 
0.070 
(0.042) 
cPM,PM -0.084** 
(0.038) 
-0.052 
(0.036) 
0.014 
(0.028) 
-0.005 
(0.044) 
-0.109** 
(0.046) 
0.033 
(0.032) 
cPL,PM 0.159**** 
(0.041) 
0.144**** 
(0.037) 
0.023 
(0.029) 
0.040 
(0.050) 
0.222**** 
(0.050) 
-0.010 
(0.033) 
bQ,Q 0.426*** 
(0.149) 
0.587**** 
(0.152) 
0.330** 
(0.124) 
0.248 
(0.239) 
0.673**** 
(0.149) 
0.176 
(0.164) 
bCU,CU 0.010 
(0.236) 
0.122 
(0.226) 
-0.029 
(0.189) 
-0.094 
(0.281) 
-0.184 
(0.252) 
-0.051 
(0.258) 
bAS,AS 0.122* 
(0.063) 
0.195**** 
(0.055) 
0.086 
(0.116) 
0.026 
(0.163) 
0.287**** 
(0.078) 
0.673 
(0.973) 
bQ,CU -0.301* 
(0.179) 
-0.432** 
(0.177) 
-0.209 
(0.139) 
-0.149 
(0.228) 
-0.350* 
(0.183) 
-0.138 
(0.164) 
bQ,AS 0.009 
(0.083) 
0.022 
(0.076) 
-0.032 
(0.088) 
-0.031 
(0.121) 
-0.103 
(0.089) 
-0.058 
(0.128) 
bCU,AS 0.173** 
(0.082) 
0.155** 
(0.078) 
0.127 
(0.092) 
0.185 
(0.174) 
0.250*** 
(0.093) 
-0.024 
(0.259) 
dPL,Q 0.097 
(0.081) 
0.096 
(0.080) 
0.104 
(0.063) 
0.117 
(0.118) 
0.089 
(0.089) 
0.112 
(0.074) 
dPL,CU -0.107 
(0.079) 
-0.056 
(0.078) 
-0.137** 
(0.066) 
-0.157 
(0.119) 
-0.060 
(0.093) 
-0.157* 
(0.077) 
dPL,AS -0.014 
(0.039) 
-0.065* 
(0.037) 
0.031 
(0.039) 
0.028 
(0.076) 
-0.105** 
(0.048) 
0.060 
(0.049) 
dPM,Q -0.078 
(0.061) 
-0.109* 
(0.059) 
-0.101** 
(0.050) 
-0.092 
(0.069) 
-0.148** 
(0.069) 
-0.074 
(0.059) 
dPM,CU 0.092 
(0.066) 
0.094 
(0.065) 
0.126** 
(0.051) 
0.135** 
(0.067) 
0.093 
(0.079) 
0.107* 
(0.059) 
dPM,AS 0.023 
(0.037) 
0.046 
(0.035) 
-0.055* 
(0.030) 
-0.081 
(0.081) 
0.124*** 
(0.044) 
-0.095*** 
(0.036) 
hT -0.001 
(0.005) 
0.002 
(0.005) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.008* 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
gS 0.176**** 
(0.033) 
0.202**** 
(0.029) 
0.097 
(0.069) 
0.216* 
(0.116) - 
0.209*** 
(0.074) 
gU 0.057** 
(0.028) 
0.090**** 
(0.026) 
0.040 
(0.059) 
0.219 
(0.201) - 
0.059 
(0.064) 
gTREAT 0.117*** 
(0.037) 
0.120*** 
(0.037) 
0.212*** 
(0.080) 
0.287* 
(0.164) - 
0.082 
(0.088) 
gLOSL -0.175**** 
(0.029) 
-0.156**** 
(0.027) 
-0.037* 
(0.020) 
-0.020 
(0.022) - 
-0.042* 
(0.022) 
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Table 6.4: Continuation  
 
Coefficient 
 
Model I 
COLS 
 
Model II 
Pooled 
(ML) 
Model III 
RE (GLS) 
 
Model IV 
RE (ML) 
 
Model V 
TFE 
 
Model VI 
RE (GLS) 
+ Mundlak 
a PL - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
0.185*** 
(0.066) 
a PM - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
-0.170*** 
(0.064) 
a Q - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
0.158 
(0.190) 
a CU - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
0.201 
(0.232) 
a AS - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
-0.049 
(0.145) 
a PL,PL - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
-0.244 
(0.173) 
a PM,PM - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
-0.189 
(0.118) 
a Q,Q - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
0.258 
(0.461) 
a CU,CU - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
-0.132 
(0.711) 
a AS,AS - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
-0.479 
(0.986) 
a PL,PM - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
0.242* 
(0.132) 
a PL,Q - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
0.081 
(0.257) 
a PL,CU - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
0.007 
(0.239) 
a PL,AS - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
-0.106 
(0.113) 
a PM,Q - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
-0.056 
(0.178) 
a PM,CU - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
-0.033 
(0.197) 
a PM,AS - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
0.201* 
(0.112) 
a Q,CU - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
-0.074 
(0.543) 
a Q,AS - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
0.006 
(0.245) 
a CU,AS - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
0.238 
(0.333) 
σ
 v  (sv) 0.1856 0.0976 0.0712 0.0698 0.1542 0.0741 
σ
 u  (su) - 0.2502 0.1714 0.4282 0.2611 0.1616 
2/122 )( vu σσσ +=  - 0.2686**** - 0.4338**** 0.3032**** - 
λ = σ u /σ v 
 
- 
2.564**** 
(0.3397) - 
6.137** 
(3.0475) 
1.693**** 
(0.2079) - 
Notes: standard errors in brackets;  
*
 – significant at 10%, ** – significant at 5%, *** – significant at 1%, **** – significant at 0.1% (two-
sided significance level) 
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As mentioned, we also tried to apply the true random effects model but the estimation 
method did not converge. The TRE estimates are provided in Appendix IV. The results of 
the TRE model are in line with the reported results from other models, however, they cannot 
be regarded as reliable since the method did not converge. A possible explanation why this 
model did not perform well is that the model specification is too rich for our data and, as a 
result, some of the error terms degenerate to zero. In our case, this happens to the error term 
uit that is supposed to capture the cost inefficiency (σu is not found to be significantly 
different from zero). It seems that all effects are already captured by the random error vi and 
the firm-specific term ωi (σv and σω are found to be significant), so there is nothing left to be 
captured by the inefficiency term uit. Recall that in the TRE model the time-invariant firm-
specific effect ωi is additionally introduced in the model to capture unobserved 
heterogeneity.  
 
In all other ML models (Model II, IV and V) the inefficiency term is found to be significant, 
as confirmed by the λ statistic that compares σu and σv (see Table 6.3). By comparing the 
estimated variance of the random error (sv) and firm-specific effects (su) in Models III and VI 
we can also confirm the relative importance of firm-specific effects that are supposed to 
capture cost inefficiency. We turn to the analysis of inefficiency estimates in the next 
chapter. 
 
The results of the six models show that the output coefficient (bQ) is positive and highly 
significant in all models. It suggests that, on average, a one percent increase in the amount of 
water supplied will increase the total cost of Slovenian water distribution utilities by 0.25% 
to 0.36%, depending on the model considered. Model VI produces a much lower estimate, 
amounting to 0.157. A possible explanation is that the resulting estimator of Model VI 
equals the within estimator and, due to the very low within variation in our sample, the 
results of this model may be imprecise. Similarly, the coefficients of the two output 
characteristics, the number of customers (bCU) and the size of service area (bAS), are found to 
be significantly positive. The coefficient of the number of customers varies between 0.43 and 
0.50, with the exception of Model VI where the coefficient is again much lower. The 
coefficient of the service area size is found to be between 0.16 and 0.22. In Model VI, bAS is 
not found to be significant. The sum of the three coefficients (bQ, bCU and bAS) at the sample 
median does not exceed 1, which will prove to be important when analysing the economies 
of scale of Slovenian water distribution utilities.  
 
With respect to input prices, the cost function has to satisfy the properties of being non-
decreasing, linearly homogeneous and concave in input prices. The property of linear 
homogeneity in input prices holds since it was imposed prior to the estimation. The cost 
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function is non-decreasing in input prices since both the labour price coefficient as well as 
the material price coefficient are positive and highly significant. The estimated coefficient 
for the labour price (cPL), representing the share of costs attributed to labour at the median 
point, amounts to around 0.4 in the two RE models (Models III and IV), more than 0.5 in the 
TFE model (Model V) and slightly less than 0.6 in Model I and Model II, where the last two 
models do not take the panel aspect of the data into account. The estimated coefficient for 
the material price (cPM) is found to be less than 0.2 in Models I, II and V and around 0.34 in 
Models III and IV. Again, in Model VI the estimated coefficients cPL and cPM are much 
lower. At the same time, the significant coefficients aPL and aPM indicate the presence of a 
correlation between the explanatory variables and unobserved heterogeneity captured by 
individual effects in the RE models. Model VI controls for this heterogeneity and produces 
unbiased results given enough within variation, which is not the case in our study. The sum 
of the two coefficients (cPL and cPM) in the six models varies from 0.71 to 0.77 implying that 
the share of the capital cost is estimated to be between 0.23 and 0.29.111 Thus, the variation 
of the share of capital cost across the models is lower than the variation of the respective 
shares for labour and material.  
 
The concavity in input prices and twice-continuous differentiability of the cost function 
imply that the Hessian is negative semidefinite. The elements of the Hessian also represent 
conditional input demand responses to changes in input prices. The coefficients cPL,PL, cPM,PM, 
and cPL,PM, are only significant in Models I, II and V. In these models they also hold the 
expected sign. The coefficients cPL,PL and cPM,PM, have the negative sign, implying that as 
labour or material becomes more expensive you buy less of that input. The positive sign of 
cross-product cPL,PM indicates that as labour (material) becomes more expensive you buy 
more material (labour).112 The negative semidefiniteness of the Hessian, comprising second-
order derivatives of the cost function with respect to all three input prices (labour, material 
and capital), is confirmed at the sample median for Models I, II and V. In other models, the 
respective coefficients are not found to be significant. 
 
Time does not seem to have a significant influence on the costs of Slovenian water 
distribution utilities. By assuming a one-sided hypothesis, only in Model V are costs found 
to be significantly decreasing over the analysed period. Based on the results it cannot be 
                                               
111
 Due to the imposed linear homogeneity, the capital price coefficient is obtained as: cPK=1–cPL–cPM. 
The observed data on shares of labour and material correspond more closely to the two RE models, 
while the data on capital share closely correspond to the estimate obtained from the TFE model. 
112
 From the estimated frontier cost function we can also derive the respective coefficients for capital 
prices (cPK,PK, cPK,PL and cPK,PM), which for Models I, II and V also have the expected signs.  
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concluded that total cost has considerably changed over time. This is largely consistent with 
non-competitive environment in which the public utilities operate. Also, price regulation is 
not designed in a way that would stimulate utilities to decrease their costs and operate more 
efficiently.  
 
On the other hand, some models show that the dummy variables relating to the water 
resource used, water losses and level of water treatment can significantly influence the cost. 
Since these variables are time-invariant they had to be omitted from Model V. Nevertheless, 
they are captured by the firm-specific time invariant term additionally introduced in Model V 
to capture the effect of unobserved heterogeneity. Using only surface water (gS) or only 
underground water (gU) increases the costs compared to the use of a water resource mix. 
These two dummies are shown to be significant in Model I and Model II. The coefficient gS 
is also significant in Model VI and, if we make a one-sided hypothesis, gS is in addition 
significant in Model IV. Further, the use of heavy chemical treatment (gTREAT) significantly 
increases the costs, with this holding for Models I – IV. Again, in Model IV we have to 
assume a one-sided test. Finally, low water losses (gLOSL) significantly decrease total costs in 
Model I and Model II and, with a one-sided test, also in Models III and VI.  
 
After estimating the different models, their performance is usually evaluated and the choice 
of the preferred model is made. The decision has to consider the performance of the analysed 
models with respect to the coefficient estimates as well as the inefficiency estimates. Hence, 
before opening this discussion the inefficiency scores obtained by the different models have 
to be analysed. This is done in the following chapter.  
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7 Cost Inefficiency, Economies of Scale and 
Alternative Uses of the Estimated Cost 
(Frontier) Function 
 
In this chapter, the cost inefficiency of the utilities is estimated based on the results obtained 
in the previous chapter. The consistency of the inefficiency estimates resulting from the 
different models is tested. Estimates of economies of output density, customer density and 
economies of scale will also be obtained from the estimated cost frontier function. In 
addition, alternative uses of the cost (frontier) function will be explored, namely for cost 
predictions and for the decomposition of total factor productivity growth. TFP growth as 
another important measure of firm performance is analysed. We as well consider possible 
implications of the obtained econometric results for economic policy-making and discuss in 
what way the results could be used in the price regulation of Slovenian water utilities.  
 
7.1 Estimated Inefficiency Scores and Their Consistency 
 
Table 7.1 provides descriptive statistics on the cost inefficiency estimates of Slovenian water 
distribution utilities obtained from Models I – VI. We can observe some notable differences 
in the estimated cost inefficiency levels.113 As expected, the average estimated cost 
inefficiency of 70.4% is the highest in the COLS model (Model I) since this method does not 
allow for the random error and attributes all deviations from the frontier to inefficiency. By 
employing the pooled stochastic frontier model (Model II), the average cost inefficiency 
drops considerably and is estimated to be 22.5%. The shortcoming of this model (and of 
Model I) is that it does not take into account the panel aspect of the data. In the case of the 
RE panel data stochastic frontier models, the estimated average cost inefficiencies are again 
quite high; the inefficiency amounts to 66.3% in the RE GLS model (Model III) and 50% in 
the RE ML model (Model IV). By applying the Mundlak formulation of the RE GLS model 
and thus avoiding possible problems resulting from correlation between firm-specific effects 
and explanatory variables, the estimated inefficiency drops to 43.4% (Model VI). The 
relatively high inefficiency levels of the RE models might to some extent be attributed to 
unobserved firm-specific time-invariant effects. The RE models treat these effects as time-
                                               
113
 A cost-efficiency score (EFi) can be obtained as the inverse of a cost-inefficiency score (EFFi). 
The value 1 – EFi represents the reduction in total costs needed to achieve the minimum efficient cost 
level.  
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invariant cost inefficiency so the cost inefficiency estimates obtained by these models are 
most likely overestimated. This is not the case of the pooled model since each observation is 
treated as independent and, accordingly, the inefficiency is considered to vary across utilities 
and over time. It is thus unlikely that the inefficiency term in this model would capture time-
invariant firm-specific effects. Further, in the RE models the median values of cost 
inefficiency are considerably lower compared to the means, indicating that the means are 
influenced by the extreme values. 
 
Table 7.1: Estimated cost inefficiency scores 
 
Inefficiency 
score 
(EFFi) 
Model I 
COLS 
 
Model II 
Pooled 
(ML) 
Model III 
RE (GLS) 
 
Model IV 
RE (ML) 
 
Model V 
TFE 
 
Model VI 
RE (GLS) 
+ Mundlak 
Mean 1.704 1.225 1.663 1.500 1.191 1.434 
Median 1.660 1.181 1.556 1.378 1.182 1.378 
Std. Dev. 0.319 0.162 0.376 0.346 0.057 0.242 
Minimum 1.000 1.031 1.000 1.118 1.067 1.000 
Maximum 3.146 1.710 2.690 2.599 1.514 2.142 
 
Finally, the average cost inefficiency based on the true fixed effects model (Model V) is 
estimated to be 19.1%, which is in line with Model II. Relatively low inefficiency estimates 
are expected since the true fixed effects model (contrary to the RE models considered) is 
able to distinguish unobserved firm-specific fixed effects from inefficiency and is thus able 
to treat the two effects separately. However, one cannot be certain whether the time-invariant 
effects belong to the unobserved heterogeneity or to the cost inefficiency. The choice of 
appropriate model is also based on our belief whether some time-invariant unobserved 
heterogeneity exists in the model or whether inefficiency does not in fact vary over time. In 
the latter case, the inefficiency scores obtained by the TFE model could in fact be 
underestimated. Taking into account the non-competitive environment in which Slovenian 
water distribution utilities operate, the cost inefficiency levels estimated by the TFE model 
are probably slightly underestimated. Since companies were not obliged to decrease costs 
and improve efficiency in the analysed period, at least some time-invariant cost inefficiency 
is expected to be present in these companies. However, remember that the dummy variables 
of water source used, water losses and level of water treatment could not be included in this 
model. It is thus reasonable to believe that time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity is 
present in the model and that the firm-specific time-invariant term mainly captures these 
effects rather than inefficiency. Further, inefficiency estimates according to the TFE model 
are found to closely correspond to the pooled model. It may thus be concluded that these two 
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models set the lower bound for the cost inefficiency of Slovenian water distribution utilities. 
The actual cost inefficiency is probably slightly higher than the estimates indicated by these 
two models. Conversely, the RE models are found to largely overestimate the cost 
inefficiency.  
 
We can now turn to selecting the most appropriate model. The choice has to take into 
account the performance of the model with respect to both the coefficient estimates and the 
inefficiency estimates. Conventional panel data models were primarily designed to estimate 
coefficients of a given function. Theoretical findings imply that, given sufficient within 
variation, the FE model produces unbiased coefficient estimates while on the other hand the 
RE estimator is found to be more efficient than the FE estimator given that firm-specific 
effects are uncorrelated with the random error and with the regressors. These two models 
were, however, not originally designed to estimate inefficiency. It is therefore not surprising 
that they possess several shortcomings with respect to estimating inefficiency. In contrast, 
stochastic frontier models were primarily constructed for modelling the inefficiency. Their 
primary interest is the error term and its structure and not the coefficients of the specified 
function so they are generally found to perform better with respect to the former issue. 
Hence, there is a trade-off present between performing well as regards the coefficient 
estimates on one side and performing well with respect to the inefficiency estimates on the 
other. Nevertheless, based on the coefficient estimates in Table 6.4 in our case pooled model 
and TFE model are found to perform better than other models in terms of the coefficients’ 
significance and expected coefficients’ sign. These two models are also found to be the 
preferred models in a cost inefficiency estimation since in the other models a large part of 
unobserved heterogeneity is mistakenly treated as inefficiency. Since the TFE model also 
takes the firm-specific effects into account and explicitly deals with the problem of 
separating unobserved heterogeneity and inefficiency, it is chosen as the preferred model.  
 
To be able to reliably use stochastic frontier methods in the price regulation of utilities, 
different methods should provide similar results regarding the utilities’ inefficiency scores 
and rankings. Therefore, it is important to check the consistency of the inefficiency results 
obtained. If consistency is not established, the regulator cannot directly use inefficiency 
estimates to set requirements for cost reductions but can merely use the results to determine 
the range in which the inefficiency scores of the utilities may be located. In this case, SFA 
can only be used as a complementary instrument in the price-regulation process. Bauer et al. 
(1998) proposed a set of consistency conditions which frontier efficiency measures should 
meet so as to be most useful for regulatory purposes. The consistency conditions are: 
(i) the efficiency scores generated by the different approaches should have comparable 
means, standard deviations and other distributional properties; 
148     Cost inefficiency, economies of scale and alternative uses of the estimated cost function 
 
(ii) the different approaches should rank the companies in approximately the same order; 
(iii) the different approaches should identify mostly the same companies as the best 
practice and the worst practice; 
(iv) the different approaches should demonstrate reasonable stability over time (i.e., tend 
to identify the same companies as relatively efficient and inefficient in different years, 
rather than varying markedly from one year to the next); 
(v) the efficiency scores generated by different approaches should be reasonably 
consistent with competitive conditions in the market; and 
(vi) the efficiencies from the different approaches should be reasonably consistent with 
standard non-frontier performance measures, such as return on assets or the 
cost/revenue ratio. 
 
Consistency conditions (i), (ii) and (iii) measure the degree to which the different methods 
are mutually consistent, while conditions (iv), (v) and (vi) measure the degree to which the 
efficiencies generated by the different models are consistent with reality (Bauer et al., 1998).  
 
Descriptive statistics of the cost inefficiency estimates obtained by the six different models 
have already been provided. Based on the results reported in Table 7.1 we established 
notable differences in the cost inefficiency levels and provided a possible explanation for 
these differences. The three random effects models (Model III, IV and VI) resulted in 
comparable mean efficiency levels which are, as expected, lower than the average 
inefficiency level of the COLS model and significantly higher than the average inefficiency 
levels of the pooled and TFE models. We can also notice differences in standard deviations 
of the inefficiency scores. Again, the three RE models as well as the COLS model produce 
comparable standard deviations of the inefficiency scores, which are considerably higher 
than in the pooled and the TFE models. Similar conclusions can be drawn with respect to the 
estimated maximum cost inefficiency and the range of variation of inefficiency scores.  
 
In Appendix V (Figure V.1 – 6), the distributions of the inefficiency scores resulting from 
Models I – VI as represented by the kernel distribution functions are given.114 Except for the 
COLS method, where the inefficiency term is by construction normally distributed, it can be 
noticed that the inefficiency terms are positively skewed. In fact, the ML methods need 
                                               
114
 The Kernel density estimator is a useful substitute for the histogram as a descriptive tool for the 
underlying distribution that produced a sample of data. Particularly for small samples and widely 
dispersed data, histograms tend to be ‘rough’ and difficult to make informative. Thus, the kernel 
density estimator can be employed as a device to describe the distribution of a variable 
nonparametrically, that is, without any assumption of the underlying distribution (Greene, 2000).  
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skewed errors in order for the SFA model to be computable, while the GLS estimator can be 
estimated even in the presence of non-skewed errors. Once again, the resulting distributions 
of the inefficiency estimates obtained by the RE models are relatively similar. Compared to 
the RE models, the range in which the inefficiency estimates can be found is relatively 
narrow in the pooled model case and particularly narrow in the TFE model. We can also 
observe that the MLE estimation techniques (Models II, IV and V) produce smoother kernel 
density functions with fewer irregularities than the GLS methods (Models III and VI). To 
test for the equality of the cost inefficiency distributions pair-wise, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
test (K–S test) is used. The statistics from a two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov equality-of-
distributions test are given in Table 7.2. Based on the reported results the null hypothesis of 
equal distributions is rejected. It can be concluded that the six models we considered all 
produce different distributions of cost inefficiency scores. Nevertheless, the consistency 
conditions only require similar and not the same distributions of inefficiency scores.  
 
Table 7.2: Kolmogorov-Smirnov equality-of-distributions test (K–S test)  
 
K-S test (D)1 Model II Model III Model IV Model V Model VI 
Model I 0.7169** 0.1869** 0.4578** 0.8916** 0.4458** 
Model II  0.6777** 0.5000** 0.2741** 0.5361** 
Model III   0.3343** 0.8554** 0.3434** 
Model IV    0.6717** 0.1325 * 
Model V     0.7108** 
Notes: * – significant at 1%; ** – significant at 0.1%; (two-sided significance level); 
1 The combined K-S test is based on the biggest absolute difference between the inefficiency estimates from 
the two distributions. 
 
What remains to be tested is whether the models provide similar rankings of the utilities with 
respect to the cost inefficiency scores. From the regulatory point of view, this issue is 
considered to be vital. Table 7.3 provides the pair-wise Pearson correlation coefficients 
between the cost inefficiency estimates. We can observe that, with the exception of Model V, 
the correlation between the inefficiency scores resulting from different models is positive, 
significant and, overall, not particularly high. The correlation is especially high between the 
inefficiency scores from Model I and Model II (non-panel data models), and between the 
inefficiency scores from Model III and Model IV (RE panel data models). The correlation 
between the inefficiency scores from Model VI and those from Models I – IV is also 
relatively high. The correlation between inefficiency scores from Model V and Model I or 
Model II is significant but quite moderate, whereas the correlation between Model V and 
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Models III, IV or VI is not significantly different from zero. Again, the reason may be found 
in the fact that the TFE model treats firm-specific fixed effects (αi) separately from the 
inefficiency (uit). Thus, some effects that might be attributed to inefficiency by other models 
are here captured by the firm-specific effects and thus attributed to firm heterogeneity rather 
than inefficiency. This may be a plausible reason for the no correlation with all three RE 
panel data models.  
 
Table 7.3: Correlation between inefficiency scores (Pearson’s correlation coefficients) 
 
R 
Model I 
COLS 
 
Model II 
Pooled 
 
Model III 
RE (GLS) 
 
Model IV 
RE (ML) 
 
Model V 
TFE 
 
Model VI 
RE (GLS) 
+ Mundlak 
Model I 1 0.956* 0.694* 0.627* 0.434* 0.827* 
Model II  1 0.667* 0.614* 0.399* 0.838* 
Model III   1 0.932* 0.023 0.767* 
Model IV    1 0.027 0.696* 
Model V     1 0.037 
Model VI      1 
Note: * – significant at 0.1% (two-sided significance level) 
 
The conclusions based on the rank correlation between the inefficiency scores from different 
models (Spearman correlation coefficients) are very similar to those found in Table 7.3. With 
respect to identifying the same best and worst practices for Slovenian water distribution 
companies, again all models but Model V identify the same (group of) companies as being 
the most or the least efficient. In contrast, companies identified as the best by Model V are 
not performing particularly well in the other models. This indicates that the models do not 
only differ in their estimated inefficiency levels but also in their ranking of the companies. 
There is more consensus when identifying the worst practice – the worst companies 
identified by Model V are also not performing that well in the other models.  
 
Figure 7.1 demonstrates that the inefficiency scores of Slovenian water distribution utilities 
are relatively stable over time. In Models III, IV and VI the inefficiency estimates are 
constant by construction; they vary only due to the different number of observations across 
the years. In Models I, II and V the inefficiency estimates are also relatively stable. This is 
more or less in line with the non-competitive environment in which these utilities operate. 
Also, there were no regulatory changes during the examined period that would provide 
incentives for the more efficient production of local monopolies supplying water to final 
customers.  
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Figure 7.1: Estimated average inefficiency scores by years 
 
Based on the above discussion and interpretation of the results relating to cost inefficiencies 
it can be concluded that the mutual consistency conditions proposed by Bauer et al. (1998) 
are not satisfied.115 These results show the sensitivity of the frontier benchmarking methods 
in our sample. This is not particularly encouraging since the results cannot be considered as 
reliable, especially if they are to be applied in the price-regulation process. Therefore, the 
direct use of inefficiency estimates in the regulation of water distribution utilities may be 
misleading. Nevertheless, some inconsistency of inefficiency estimates is expected since the 
various models employ different assumptions regarding cost inefficiency and heterogeneity. 
We thus cannot expect the results to be completely invariant to these different assumptions.  
 
Whether time-invariant effects belong to unobserved heterogeneity or cost inefficiency is 
debatable. If there is some time-invariant inefficiency, the inefficiency scores obtained by 
TFE model could be underestimated. On the other hand, if there is some unobserved time-
invariant heterogeneity present the other panel data models treat it as cost inefficiency and 
thus tend to overestimate it. How we handle time-invariant effects obviously has a large 
influence on the findings. Ultimately, firm-specific heterogeneity and inefficiency both 
might contain time-invariant and time-varying elements and there is no perfect way to 
disentangle them based on the observed data (Greene, 2002a, b). However, we believe that 
                                               
115
 For example, the inconsistency of inefficiency scores obtained from different models is also 
established by Farsi and Filippini (2004).  
EFFi 
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the results obtained by the TFE model can be regarded as a good approximation of the actual 
cost inefficiency of Slovenian water distribution utilities. Of course, the mechanical use of 
these results in the price-regulation process is not recommendable. In this case, SFA as a 
benchmarking tool can only be used as a complementary instrument when regulating prices. 
 
7.2 Prediction Errors 
 
In this section we look at another possibility for employing benchmarking in the price 
regulation of network utilities. As proposed by Farsi and Filippini (2004), the estimated cost 
function can also be used to predict the costs of individual companies. Based on this, the 
regulator can construct confidence intervals for the costs of the companies. In fact, this 
approach reflects the idea of yardstick competition originally proposed by Schleifer (1985). 
In his paper it is shown that the yardstick competition concept can be applied to firms 
producing heterogeneous outputs if these outputs only differ in observable characteristics. To 
correct for observed heterogeneity, the cost function is used whereby the observable 
characteristics are included in the cost function in order to correct for cost differences that 
occur merely due to the heterogeneity of output. The regulator can then use the estimates of 
the cost function to set corrected yardstick prices for individual firms.116  
 
In order to be able to reliably use the above proposed approach for the purpose of price 
regulation, it has to be confirmed that the model predicts costs with sufficient accuracy. 
Therefore, the predictive power of the model has to be analysed. To obtain the prediction 
error of our model, the predicted total costs are compared with the observed total cost. The 
relative prediction error is then defined as ,/)ˆ(ˆ itititR CCC −=ε  where itC is the actual total 
cost and itCˆ  is the predicted total cost of the regression.  
 
To estimate the cost function the GLS estimator is chosen. Several arguments can be given 
in support of this decision. As already pointed out, the FE estimator is unbiased however its 
precision relies on the within variation. Due to the very low within variation of the total costs 
in our case, the FE estimator is not considered appropriate. Further, time-invariant variables 
cannot be included in the FE model so the heterogeneity cannot be fully captured by this 
model. An advantage of the GLS estimator compared to the SFA models based on the ML 
estimator is that the former imposes less distributional assumptions on the error term. The 
only assumption required by the GLS estimator is that the firm-specific effects are not 
                                               
116
 Recall the discussion in Section 2.2.3. 
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correlated with the explanatory variables and random error. Moreover, the GLS estimator 
does not require the composed error term to be positively skewed whereas the ML methods 
do. Since the main focus here is no longer on the error term structure and inefficiency we are 
unwilling to make these additional assumptions. In addition, employing the yardstick 
concept essentially implies that we are reverting from frontier benchmarking to average 
benchmarking which also has to be reflected in the chosen estimation method.  
 
After estimating the total cost function, the in-the-sample relative prediction errors are 
calculated. Then we proceed in two directions: (i) by obtaining out-of-sample predictions of 
costs; and (ii) by forecasting costs. The out-of-sample prediction of the costs involves 
predicting the costs of a given firm using the estimations obtained from the sample 
consisting of other firms. Forecasting, on the other hand, involves the prediction of costs in a 
given year using estimations based on the data previous to this year. One-, two- and three-
year-ahead forecasts are considered. The results are summarised in Table 7.4.  
 
As expected, out-of-sample prediction errors and forecast errors are higher than the in-
sample prediction errors. From a practical point of view, the results are generally within an 
acceptable range. The average prediction bias is particularly low for in-sample and out-of-
sample prediction errors, 0.2% and -0.3%, respectively. In absolute terms, the average 
prediction bias is somewhat higher in the case of forecasted errors. A negative sign implies 
that the forecasted costs tend to be slightly overestimated.  
 
Table 7.4: Relative prediction errors of the RE model (in percent) 
 
Prediction error 
(GLS estimator) 
In-the-
sample 
Out-of-
sample 
1 year 
ahead 
2 years 
ahead 
3 years 
ahead 
Average error 
(absolute value) 4.977 5.860 5.887 7.511 7.174 
Average error / 
prediction bias 0.210 -0.317 -2.162 -2.320 -0.740 
Standard  
Deviation 6.537 8.050 7.294 9.649 9.568 
Minimum -21.017 -39.647 -24.385 -28.097 -30.165 
Maximum 19.442 24.512 12.310 17.529 19.848 
90th percentile 
(absolute value) 10.948 13.205 11.075 12.464 12.895 
No. of predictions 332 332 52 52 52 
 
The average of the absolute predicted errors is slightly less than 5% for in-sample 
predictions and somewhat less than 6% for the out-of-sample predictions and 1-year-ahead 
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forecasts. For the two- and three-year-ahead forecast the respective value is more than 7%, 
the latter value being surprisingly lower. For 90% of the companies the absolute value of the 
predicted error is limited to 11% for in-sample predictions, to 13.2% for out-of-sample 
predictions, and to 11.1%, 12.5% and 12.9% for the one-, two- and three-year-ahead 
forecasts, respectively.  
 
These results suggest that the random effects panel data model can predict individual total 
costs with reasonable precision. The regulator could therefore use this model to predict 
confidence intervals for the utilities’ costs. Using such predictions, the regulator could hold 
utilities within a reasonably well-predicted range of cost efficiency. This approach can in 
essence be viewed as the rate-of-return regulation combined with benchmarking. The 
regulator could also deal with the problem of those models with somewhat weaker predictive 
power by allowing regulated utilities to renegotiate the prices. In this case, the utilities are 
expected to present credible evidence that would explain why the actual costs are higher than 
predicted.  
 
7.3 Economies of Scale and Density 
 
In this section we turn to the issue of economies of scale, which can also be an important 
source of cost reductions in Slovenian water distribution utilities. In addition to the output 
distributed, several output characteristics can influence the cost of network industries. The 
inclusion of the number of customers and the size of service area in the cost function allows 
us to distinguish between economies of output density, economies of customer density and 
economies of scale (more accurately, economies of size).  
 
From the translog function specified in Eq.(6.2), economies of output density are obtained as 
follows:  
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The existence of economies of output density (EOD > 1) implies that the average cost of water 
distribution utility decreases as the physical output increases. Further, if the average cost 
decreases as the output and number of customers are proportionally increased, then 
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economies of customer density exist (ECD > 1). Using Eq.(6.2), economies of customer 
density are calculated as: 
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Finally, economies of size exist when ES > 1 and are obtained from Eq. (6.2) in the following 
way: 
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As already noted in Section 3.5.2, economies of size and economies of scale do not 
necessarily correspond. Economies of size measure the percentage increase in cost due to a 
proportional increase in output, number of customers and size of the service area, while 
economies of scale measures a percentage increase in output as a result of proportional 
increase in all inputs. These two measures only correspond in the case of a homothetic 
production function (Chambers, 1988). However, in the applied literature (also recall the 
literature review in Section 6.1) the authors do not make a distinction between economies of 
size and economies of scale. They speak of economies of scale but they are in fact estimating 
economies of size. Thus, in what follows we will not maintain a strict distinction between the 
two expressions.  
 
Estimated economies of output density, customer density and economies of scale for 
Slovenian water distribution utilities can be found in Table 7.5. The respective measures for 
all six models are calculated using Eq.(7.1), Eq.(7.2) and Eq.(7.3), where the input prices are 
held fixed at their median values. With respect to the amount of water distributed, the 
number of customers, and the size of service area three types of representative companies are 
chosen – a first-quartile company (small companies), a median company (medium-sized 
companies) and a third-quartile company (large companies). Based on the discussion in 
Section 7.1, the TFE model is believed to be our reference model. Here the results from 
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different models as reported in Table 7.5 demonstrate far more consistency than in the case 
of cost-inefficiency scores. All results follow the same pattern and, except for Model VI, 
lead us to the same conclusions. It can be noticed that the respective measures estimated by 
Model VI are considerably higher than those obtained by other models. This can again be 
attributed to the very low within variation in our model. As a result, the obtained estimates of 
Model VI may be imprecise.  
 
Table 7.5: Economies of output density (EOD), customer density (ECD) and scale (ES) 
 
Economies Quartile Model I 
COLS 
 
Model II 
Pooled 
 
Model III 
RE (GLS) 
 
Model IV 
RE (ML) 
 
Model V 
TFE 
 
Model VI 
RE (GLS) 
+ Mundlak 
 
1st Quartile 2.839 3.099 3.485 3.500 4.605 5.041 
EOD Median 2.767 3.042 3.455 3.448 3.874 6.380 
 
3rd Quartile 1.934 1.846 2.509 2.689 2.029 5.503 
 
1st Quartile 1.190 1.214 1.222 1.277 1.109 1.607 
ECD Median 1.259 1.286 1.316 1.344 1.313 2.198 
 
3rd Quartile 1.172 1.182 1.265 1.263 1.208 2.809 
 
1st Quartile 1.239 1.289 1.121 1.157 1.311 2.077 
ES Median 1.035 1.030 1.040 1.039 1.088 1.526 
 
3rd Quartile 0.854 0.816 0.933 0.925 0.846 1.138 
 
Economies of output density (EOD) are present for all three types of companies with respect 
to size. Since EOD > 1, a 1% increase in cost (C) is associated with a more than 1% increase 
in the amount of water distributed (Q), holding the number of customers (CU) and the size of 
the service area (AS) constant. It would therefore be beneficial for water companies if they 
managed to distribute larger amounts of output to the existing customers within their service 
areas. EOD are the highest for small utilities, followed by medium-sized utilities and large 
utilities. In Model VI, EOD are highest for the median company. The economies of customer 
density (ECD) are also confirmed for all three different types of companies. A 1% 
proportional increase in both the output and the number of customers leads to an increase in 
cost by less than 1% (ECD > 1), holding the area size constant. Thus, it would be beneficial 
for companies if the existing service area were to become more densely populated or if the 
companies could manage to get new customers. ECD are the highest for the median company 
(in Model VI they are the highest for the third-quartile company). 
 
The economies of scale (ES) equal the inverse of the percentage change in costs when the 
output, number of customers and area size increase by 1%. The results show that substantial 
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economies of scale are present in smaller companies (ES > 1). It would be thus rational for 
the smaller companies to merge. Economies of scale are also present in medium-sized 
companies, where they are close to one. This is also an indication that the optimal size of 
Slovenian water distribution utilities is relatively close to the median point of the sample. 
The median company corresponds to a company with an annual water supply of 1,17 million 
cubic metres, 5,168 customers and 264 square kilometres of service area size. On the other 
hand, diseconomies of scale prevail in large companies (Es < 1). Only Model VI finds 
economies of scale in all three cases. Apparently, the largest water distribution utilities in the 
sample have already exhausted their potential for cost savings resulting from economies of 
scale and their operations are found to be on the interval where average costs already start to 
rise.  
 
7.4 Total Factor Productivity Growth Decomposition 
 
Another way in which the cost frontier function may be employed is to decompose total 
factor productivity growth. Measures of productivity and associated productivity growth are 
also of great interest when analysing firm performance. Total factor productivity growth is 
one of the most widely employed measures of overall productivity change. Productivity 
growth also plays an important role in incentive-based price regulation. Recall the discussion 
of price-cap (RPI-X) regulation in Section 2.2.2 where it was established that the X factor is 
typically set to reflect the expected growth in total factor productivity based on past TFP 
growth. Therefore, regulatory authorities may be interested in measuring TFP growth and in 
determining those components that make the most significant contribution to the TFP 
growth.  
 
Following the index number approach, a TFP index is generally constructed as the ratio of an 
output index to an input index where the weights reflect the relative importance of the 
various inputs and outputs (i.e., the weights equal the revenue shares and cost shares, 
respectively). In a single output case, TFP growth in defined as (Jorgenson and Griliches, 
1967):  
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where a dot over a variable indicates its rate of growth: )/()/1(/ln dtdzzdtzdz ==& . The 
observed output is denoted by y, wi is the i-th input price, xi is the observed use of i-th input, 
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C is the observed cost, and F stands for an aggregate measure of an observed input usage, 
with weights equalling the observed cost shares of the inputs used.  
 
In order to decompose TFP growth, we apply a cost function approach.117 Here the cost 
frontier function is, in addition, allowed to be a function of time so C* = C (y, w, t). 
Accordingly, the definition of cost efficiency in Eq.(3.24) can be rewritten as:  
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Taking the natural logarithm of both sides of Eq.(7.5) and totally differentiating with respect 
to time yields: 
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where εy (y, w, t) is the elasticity of cost with respect to the output, as defined in Eq.(3.33). 
Using the definition of TFP growth in Eq.(7.4) and making some minor substitutions and 
rearrangements of Eq.(7.6), the decomposition of the observed TFP growth can be written as 
follows (Bauer, 1990): 
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where Si (y, w, t) = wi  xi(y, w, t) / C(y, w, t) is the cost-minimising cost share of i-th input, as 
defined in Eq.(3.8), and Si = wi xi / Ci is the observed cost share of the i-th input. According to 
Eq.(7.7) TFP growth is decomposed into terms related to: (i) cost efficiency change; (ii) 
technical change; (iii) scale efficiency change; and (iv) a residual price effect term.  
 
The first component captures the contribution to productivity change of change in cost 
efficiency, which is composed of a technical and allocative efficiency change. The second 
                                               
117
 There are two main ways to derive TFP growth decomposition, the total differential method (see, 
for example, Bauer, 1990, and Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000) and the index number method (see, for 
example, Caves, Christensen and Diewert, 1982, and Orea, 2002). The two approaches result in 
almost identical formulas, the only difference being that the first approach chooses just one data point 
in time for derivative evaluation, while the latter approach evaluates derivatives at two data points. 
Here, consistent with the previous analysis a differential approach is used.  
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component is a technical change effect that shifts the cost frontier down if technological 
progress is present, or up if technical change is regress. The third component is a scale effect 
which makes no contribution to productivity change if either the elasticity of cost with 
respect to the output equals one or there is no change in the output produced. Output growth 
in the presence of scale economies (εy (y, w, t) < 1) contributes to productivity growth, as 
does output contraction in the presence of diseconomies of scale (εy (y, w, t) < 1). 
Conversely, output growth in the presence of diseconomies of scale retards productivity 
growth, as does output contraction in the presence of economies of scale (Kumbhakar and 
Lovell, 2000). 
 
The fourth component, the price effect term, occurs because the aggregate measure of input 
usage is biased when the firm is allocatively inefficient. If the firm is allocatively efficient, 
then Si = Si (y, w, t) and the price effect term is equal to zero.118 The price term effect is 
present because TPF is defined as an observable quantity and therefore relies on observed 
input usage which might be biased due to the cost inefficiency. Alternatively, an unbiased or 
pure measure of TFP growth could be defined by omitting the price effect term but the link 
to an observable quantity would be lost (Bauer, 1990).  
 
The TFP growth decomposition can be extended to the multiple output case. For the multi-
product firm, the rate of growth of TFP can be defined in the following way (Jorgenson and 
Griliches, 1967):  
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where yP is a revenue-weighted index of output, y is now a vector of outputs, p is a vector of 
output prices, R = pT y is total revenue, and everything else is defined as before.  
 
Using the same basic steps and manipulations as in the single-output case, the observed TFP 
growth for a multi-product firm can be shown to equal the following (Bauer, 1990): 
 
                                               
118
 This term is also equal to zero when input prices change at the same rate, since [ ]∑ −i ii tySS ),,( w = 
0. 
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where ∑∑= j yj jy
C
jj
yy εε &&  and jy yt,Cj ln/),(ln ∂∂= wyε .  
 
In a similar manner, Eq.(7.9) decomposes TFP growth into change in cost efficiency,  
technical change, scale efficiency change, the price effect term, and an additional term 
capturing the effect that non-marginal cost pricing may have on the observed measure of 
TFP. The last effect occurs when observed revenue shares are not equal to the output 
elasticity shares (Bauer, 1990). The TFP decomposition thus provides useful conceptual and 
empirical tools for assigning the observed changes in TFP to various sources. 
 
For network industries, output characteristics have an important influence on the cost of 
providing a certain output. Thus, these characteristics are incorporated in the cost function 
and also have to be taken into the account in the TFP growth decomposition. To allow for 
the effect of output characteristics on the TFP growth, Eq.(7.7) and Eq.(7.9) have to be 
properly modified (Bauer, 1990). In our single-output case with two output characteristics, 
the TFP growth decomposition is obtained in the following way:  
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The first term on the left-hand side of Eq.(7.10) represents the cost efficiency change (CEC), 
the second term embodies the technical change (TC), the third term characterises the scale 
efficiency change (SEC), the fourth and fifth terms correspond to a change in output 
characteristics (OCC), while the last three terms capture the residual price effect (PER). If an 
increase in a given network characteristic increases (decreases) the cost given that the output 
remains unchanged, then increasing the level of that variable decreases (increases) TFP 
growth.  
 
itCˆ  is the predicted total cost obtained by estimating Eq.(6.2). Here, time variable t is 
considered to be a neutral technical change. Interactions of t with other variables are not 
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considered since insignificant coefficients were obtained.119 In estimating the translog cost 
frontier function, Model V (TFE model) is employed since its performance compared to the 
other models is found to be superior with respect to both estimated coefficients and 
inefficiency scores. All components of the TFP growth can be then obtained from the 
estimated cost frontier function. CE is a cost-efficiency score which is the inverse of cost 
inefficiency and is obtained from the estimated cost frontier function by using Eq.(5.3). 
Technical change is calculated by taking the derivative of estimated cost frontier function 
with respect to time and in our case equals to ht. Further, εQ, εCU and εAS are elasticities of 
cost with respect to the output delivered (Q), number of customers (CU) and area size (AS), 
respectively. LS, MS and KS stand for the observed cost shares of labour (L), material (M) 
and capital (K), while LS*, MS* and KS* are the respective cost-minimising shares obtained 
by taking the derivative of the estimated cost frontier with respect to the price of labour, 
material and capital.  
 
The decomposition of the TFP growth of Slovenian water distribution utilities in the 1997-
2003 period based on the TFE model is reported in Table 7.6. Since the mean values can be 
influenced by the extreme values, mean and median yearly percentage growth rates are 
reported. Outliers can be noticed from the histograms of TFP growth which can be found in 
Appendix VI (Figures VI.1-VI.6). Such histograms are provided for all six models. From the 
histograms it can also be seen that the total factor productivity growth for the sample of 
Slovenian water distribution utilities is concentrated around a zero rate of growth.  
 
From Table 7.6 it can be observed that cost efficiency in the TFE model practically remained 
unchanged. The mean cost efficiency change does not significantly differ from zero, 
implying that this component did not contribute to the TFP growth. Further, the technical 
change had a positive contribution to the TFP growth as costs are found to have been 
decreasing over the examined period. Annual technical progress of 0.77% is established, 
with this effect being significantly different from zero under the one-sided test. With respect 
to scale efficiency change, a positive contribution to the TFP growth is found. In absolute 
terms, this effect does not have a notable contribution to the TFP growth and is not shown to 
be significantly different from zero. On the other hand, changes in output characteristics 
have a stronger influence on the TFP growth. A change in output characteristics is found to 
be positive and significant, with this resulting in higher total costs and therefore a negative 
contribution to the TFP growth. Apparently, the companies have expanded their networks to 
include less populated areas, this resulting in less than a proportional increase of output 
supplied. With respect to the residual price effect, the median percentage growth rate is 
                                               
119
 For example, Bauer (1990) also considered a neutral technical change. 
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found to be negative while the mean value is estimated to be positive. This is due to the fact 
that the median as opposed to the mean is not affected by the outliers. Nevertheless, the 
residual price effect is not found to be significant.  
 
Table 7.6: TFP growth decomposition (average and median annual relative changes in 
percent) 
 
Model V (TFE) TFP growth component 
Mean Median 
Cost efficiency change  
(CEC) 0.077 -0.090 
Technical change  
(TC) -0.771
* 
-0.771 
Scale efficiency change  
(SEC) 0.187 0.143 
Change in output 
characteristics (OCC)  0.794
**
 0.292 
Residual price effect  
(PER) 0.497 -0.255 
TFP growth  
(TFPC) 0.739 0.277 
Pure TFP growth  
(without PER) 0.241 0.532 
Note: * – significant at 10% (two-sided significance level);  
** – significant at 5% (two-sided significance level) 
 
Putting all these effects together, we obtain TFP growth which is found to be slightly 
increasing over the examined period. The same conclusion can be made if we observe only 
pure TFP growth, i.e. without the residual price effects. However, the established positive 
TFP growth is not found to be significant. It seems that the two components that have 
significantly contributed to the TFP growth over the examined period, namely technical 
progress and changes in output characteristics, cancel each other out since the first has a 
positive contribution while the contribution of the second component is negative. On the 
other hand, cost efficiency improvements are not found to have contributed to the TFP 
growth. Once again, this is in line with the absence of proper incentives to stimulate 
Slovenian water distribution utilities to operate in a more efficient way.  
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8 Conclusions 
 
Despite the ongoing reforms of network industries in the direction of market liberalisation 
and privatisation, some form of regulation is still needed in order to prevent the abuse of a 
monopoly position and to enhance the efficient production of natural monopolies operating 
within network industries. In this respect, incentive-based regulation schemes appear to be 
superior to the traditional rate-of-return regulation. While the incentive-based price-cap 
(RPI-X) mechanism provides firms with incentives for efficient production it is not, 
however, without its shortcomings. If firms recognise that prices ultimately follow costs, 
they may well not reduce costs to efficient levels. To remove or at least lessen the 
informational asymmetry problem between regulators and firms operating in regulated 
industries, the regulator needs reliable estimates of the efficiency potential of a regulated 
firm. This can be obtained by performing some form of benchmarking analysis.  
 
In the thesis we examined several parametric frontier benchmarking methods to estimate 
firms’ (in)efficiency. The main methodology chosen to be applied was Stochastic Frontier 
Analysis (SFA), where a special focus is put on the panel data stochastic frontier models. 
The models are found to differ in distributional assumptions required and in the method of 
estimation employed. The models also differ in their ability to account for firm-specific 
effects and to distinguish between firm heterogeneity and inefficiency. While conventional 
fixed and random effects panel data models take firm-specific effects into account in the 
estimation of inefficiency, they are unable to distinguish between unobserved heterogeneity 
and inefficiency. Any time-invariant firm-specific effects are treated as inefficiency. 
Although this can have a huge influence on the estimated cost inefficiencies, this problem 
has been ignored for a long time. In network industries, the problem of unobserved 
heterogeneity is even more severe since utilities operate in different regions that typically 
differ in their environmental and network characteristics. It has only been recently 
recognised that it is important to be able to separate unobserved heterogeneity from 
inefficiency. An interesting extension of the conventional panel data models is Mundlak’s 
(1978) formulation of a random effects model which can be employed to control for the 
correlation between unobserved heterogeneity and regressors. The newly proposed ‘true’ 
fixed and random effects models proposed by Greene (2002a, b) attempt to distinguish 
between unobserved heterogeneity and inefficiency by adding an additional term into the 
model which is supposed to capture time-invariant and firm-specific effects. Nevertheless, 
this novelty does not fully resolve the problem since any time-invariant firm-specific effects 
are treated as unobserved heterogeneity, including time-invariant inefficiency. As the 
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conventional FE and RE models tend to overestimate the inefficiency, it may be the case that 
the TFE and TRE models underestimate it.  
 
In the empirical part of the thesis, our aim was to estimate the cost frontier function of 
Slovenian water distribution utilities in order to estimate their cost inefficiency and, further, 
to consider the possible use of the results in the price regulation of these utilities. The 
Slovenian water industry is currently facing a range of problems. At present, the prices for 
delivering water in Slovenia vary significantly between local communities and typically do 
not reach the full-cost level. The current price regulation resembles the rate-of-return 
regulation. In addition, the upper limit on permissible price increases is fixed by a special 
decree. In order to comply with the EU legislation relating to water policy and water pricing, 
the reform of the Slovenian water industry is inevitable. Based on the presented best-practice 
examples of water price regulation from Italy and the UK, the most important tasks to be 
accomplished in the Slovenian water industry appear to be the introduction of cost-reflective 
prices of supplied water, new investments in the distribution network, and establishing a new 
(incentive-based) regulatory framework. An independent regulatory authority should be 
established to supervise water distribution utilities, which is currently the task of the relevant 
ministries and can thus be subjected to policy considerations. In setting prices for the water 
supplied, an incentive-based scheme should be introduced to provide utilities with incentives 
to reduce their costs and increase their efficiency. In fact, the currently issued Rules on Price 
Determination of Obligatory Local Public Utilities for Environment Protection (2004) 
envisage the use of determination of prices based on justified costs, the identification of the 
best-practice performance and benchmarking, but they have not yet been put into practice.  
 
In the thesis, the possible use of parametric frontier benchmarking methods for price-
regulation purposes is explored. Several stochastic frontier methods were employed to 
estimate the cost inefficiency of Slovenian water distribution utilities. A translog total cost 
frontier function was employed on an unbalanced panel data set of 52 utilities over the 1997-
2003 period. The estimation results suggest that considerable cost inefficiency is present in 
Slovenia’s water distribution companies. In estimating inefficiency, our main objective was 
to take the unobserved heterogeneity into account and to analyse how the results are 
influenced by the separation of unobserved heterogeneity from inefficiency. Conventional 
RE models are found to highly overestimate cost inefficiency since the inefficiency estimates 
also contain unobserved heterogeneity. The TFE model is able to distinguish between 
unobserved heterogeneity and inefficiency but it may slightly underestimate the inefficiency 
since all time-invariant effects are treated as unobserved heterogeneity. Nevertheless, since 
the inefficiency estimates obtained by the TFE model closely correspond to the pooled 
model it is believed that the mean cost inefficiency of Slovenian water distribution utilities is 
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close to or slightly above 20%. Also, by taking into consideration the expected signs and 
significance of the obtained coefficients of the cost frontier function the TFE model is found 
to perform better than the other models and is therefore chosen as our preferable model.  
 
Further, the inefficiency scores obtained from different methods are not found to be 
consistent in their levels and rankings of the utilities. The established inconsistency of the 
inefficiency estimates from different models is not specific to our sample but is quite 
common in the applied economic literature. A possible explanation of the inconsistent results 
can be found in the differences seen in stochastic frontier methods when accounting for 
unobservable heterogeneity. Nevertheless, if SFA is supposed to serve as a benchmarking 
tool in price regulation the inconsistency of the different models is particularly undesirable. 
If different methods produce very different results for inefficiency scores, we cannot rely on 
the findings from SFA and use them directly in economic policy-making. In this case, SFA 
as a benchmarking tool should only be used as a complementary instrument for setting 
efficiency requirements as part of price regulation. However, benchmarking can still be 
viewed as a useful instrument for reasonably mitigating the informational asymmetries 
between the regulator and utilities. Since the regulators can only imperfectly observe the 
utilities’ performance, the benchmarking results should merely be viewed as a starting point 
in providing information about the range in which the inefficiency can be located. This is 
largely consistent with the practice of the UK regulator OFWAT.  
 
Since the cost function estimated by the GLS method is found to predict the total cost of 
companies with reasonable precision, the results can be alternatively used by the regulator to 
predict utilities’ costs and to thus set the interval for allowable costs. This solution 
essentially implies reverting from frontier benchmarking to yardstick competition as 
proposed by Shleifer (1985) and is in line with the practice followed by the Italian 
Regulation Authority. When applying this approach to the price-regulation process, the 
utilities may be given the possibility to renegotiate prices with the regulator by justifying 
higher than expected costs. This situation would be even more likely if the model is not 
shown to have a very strong predictive power.  
 
Finally, with respect to economies of scale and density the results are more consistent. The 
estimated economies of scale close to one for the sample median point indicate that medium-
sized utilities closely correspond to the optimal size of water distribution utilities in 
Slovenia. Large utilities are found to operate at levels where diseconomies of scale are 
already present, while smaller utilities should be interested in mergers since this would lead 
to a decrease in average operating costs. Economies of output density and customer density 
are confirmed for all three different types of utilities with respect to the size of the operation. 
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Therefore, it would be beneficial for the utilities if they managed to increase the volume of 
water supplied to their existing customers as well as to acquire new customers.  
 
Hence, significant scope for cost reductions exists within the water distribution utilities. Two 
possible sources of cost savings in the Slovenian water industry are recognised, namely 
improving on cost efficiency and scale efficiency. So far, no significant improvements in this 
direction have been made. This is confirmed by the estimated total factor productivity (TFP) 
growth which is found to be concentrated around zero. TFP growth is also an important 
measure for analysing firm performance and it is widely used in price-cap regulation to set 
the productivity requirements of regulated companies. The estimated cost frontier function 
can be alternatively used to decompose TFP growth into different components and to 
establish their contribution to TFP growth. The results based on the TFE model suggest that 
the cost efficiency of Slovenian water distribution utilities did not improve significantly over 
the examined period, whereas technical progress did have a marked contribution on TFP 
growth. Overall, TFP growth in the water distribution utilities is not found to be significantly 
different from zero. Once again it is confirmed that the present non-competitive environment 
in which utilities operate as well as the current regulatory framework do not provide utilities 
with sufficient incentives for improving their efficiency and reducing their costs. In order to 
facilitate the improved performance of water distribution utilities a regulatory reform is 
urgently needed.  
 
 
From the scientific point of view, the main findings of the thesis are the following: 
 The inclusion of output characteristics in the cost function is important for modelling 
the production process of utilities operating in a network industry and it allows for a 
distinction between economies of density and economies of scale. The different models 
are found to be fairly consistent in estimating economies of output density, customer 
density and economies of scale.  
 In the stochastic frontier analysis it is important to account for firm heterogeneity and 
to be able to distinguish between unobserved heterogeneity and inefficiency. If not, a 
heterogeneity bias may result in both biased inefficiency estimates as well as biased 
coefficient estimates. However, it remains debatable whether certain firm-specific 
effects should in fact be attributed to unobserved heterogeneity or inefficiency.  
 The inefficiency scores obtained from the different cost frontier models are not found 
to be consistent. The levels of inefficiency estimates as well as the rankings depend on 
the econometric specification of the model. The established inconsistency can at least 
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to some extent be contributed to the different ability of the models to separate 
unobserved heterogeneity from inefficiency. 
 
From an economic policy point of view, the findings imply that: 
 Reforms of the Slovenian water industry in the direction of introducing cost-reflective 
prices, an incentive-based regulation mechanism and an independent regulatory 
authority are needed.  
 Significant cost inefficiencies are present in Slovenian water distribution utilities. An 
incentive-based price regulation might help resolve this problem.  
 The inconsistency of the inefficiency scores obtained suggests that benchmarking 
should only be used as a complementary method in the price-setting process. The 
mechanical use of SFA results is not recommended. The benchmarking results can only 
be viewed as a starting point for providing information on the range in which the 
inefficiency scores can be located. 
 The presence of economies of output and customer density in Slovenian water 
distribution utilities is established. Economies of scale are found in small-sized utilities, 
median-sized utilities demonstrate economies of scale close to one, while large 
companies exhibit diseconomies of scale. The optimal size of a company thus closely 
corresponds to the sample median while, in order to exploit economies of scale, it 
would make sense to merge the smaller utilities.  
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Table I.1: Prices of water supplied in Slovenia in the period 1991-2000 
1
 SIT stands for the Slovenian currency (Slovenian tolar). For international comparisons, the exchange rate at the end of 1991 was 1 EUR = 75,756 SIT, while at the end of 2000 
the exchange rate rose to 1 EUR = 211,506 SIT (Bank of Slovenia, 1999, 2001). 
2
 Prices of water supplied refer to the end prices paid by the customers and include other items as well (contribution in addition to the price, state fee, local fee and other items).  
3
 Until 1998, official rate of inflation in Slovenia was measured by the Retail Price Index (RPI); from 1998, the official inflation is expressed by the Consumer price index 
(CPI). 
4
 Inflation indices provided in the table above refer to the general price level at the end of the current year relative to the end of the previous year. There are two exceptions. For 
1991, the inflation index refers to the inflation rate in the second half of the year, which amounted to 123,9%. For 1997, the inflation rate for the first four months was 3,8%, 
while the inflation rate at the end of 1997 compared to the end of 1996 was 9,4%.  
 
Source: Štruc (1997), Svetovalni center (1997, 2001), Hrovatin (2002) and Statistical Yearbook of the RS (2001)  
Variable  31.6.91 31.12.91 31.12.92 31.12.93 31.12.94 31.12.95 31.12.96 30.4.97 31.12.98 31.12.99 31.12.00 
Average household prices PH 
(SIT/m3)1,2  10,2 15,5 28,1 35,3 45,4 51,8 55,9 60,1 64,0 74,8 87,7 
Average business prices PB 
(SIT/m3) 20,9 31,4 55,6 69,2 85,8 98,6 104,6 109,7 113,8 122,7 136,3 
Ratio of max to min price for 
households  10,5 9,7 13,8 10,3 8,3 9,0 8,4 9,0 8,5 8,8 8,3 
Ratio of max to min price for 
businesses  10,5 12,6 16,3 11,9 8,4 9,1 8,6 8,6 9,4 10,1 9,2 
Ratio of household to 
business prices PB/PH 2,05 2,02 1,98 1,96 1,89 1,90 1,87 1,83 1,78  1,76 1,64 
Inflation index (RPI)3, 4  
 223,9 192,9 122,9 118,3 108,6 108,8 103,8 (109,4) 107,5 108,8 110,6 
Fixed household prices 
(30.4.1997=100) 78,7 53,4 50,0 51,2 55,7 58,5 60,8 60,1 56,5  50,3 54,0 
Fixed business prices 
(30.4.1997=100) 161,0 107,9 99,2 100,4 105,2 111,3 113,8 109,7 100,4  88,7 88,6 
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Table I.2: Water supplied from the public water supply systems, length of the water 
distribution network and number of connections in Slovenia  
 
Year 1990 1995 2000 2002 
Total water supplied (1000 m3) 262144 259687 235826 183421 
     Households  86217 86475 87968 88470 
     Businesses 79834 56294 46175 37559 
     To other water supply systems 16304 9631 7277  
     Supplied but uncharged water    7376 
     Leakage 79789 107287 94406 50016 
Network length (km) 13630 13433 16164 16598 
Number of connections 328579 353164 406302 415763 
Source: Statistical Yearbook of the RS 2003 
 
Table I.3: Some relevant indicators of Slovenian water supply sector in the period 
1992-2002 
 
Year 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Nr. of utilities 46 46 47 48 50 52 
Nr. of employees  4385 4235 4216 4269 4202 3924 
% of fixed assets in total assets 
  84,1 88,4 89,1 91,0 
Sales (in SIT million) 12762 17380 22244 25168 27976 28291 
Net Overall Profit(+)/Loss(-)  
(in SIT million) 1 375 229 -335 -459 -765 
Net Profit(+)/Loss(-) from 
Regular Activity (in SIT million) 53 438 -196 -566 -1418 -1596 
 
Table I.3: Continuation  
 
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Nr. of utilities 52 52 54 56 56 
Nr. of employees  3866 3854 3786 3833 3896 
% of fixed assets in total 
assets 90,5 90,7 91,0 90,7 89,6 
Sales (in SIT million) 33547 35389 36889 42607 47168 
Net Overall Profit(+)/Loss(-)  
(in SIT million) 
-469  -879 -1422 -402 82 
Net Profit(+)/Loss(-) from 
Regular Activity (in SIT million) 
-1540 -2541 -2804 -1875 -2557 
Source: Svetovalni center (1997), PASEF (1994-2002)  
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Table II.1: List of Slovenian water distribution utilities in the sample, their legal 
form, region and number of local communities they provide with drinking water 
 
Nr. Company1          Region Legal form2 
Nr. of 
municipalities3 
1 VO-KA Ljubljana 1 Osrednjeslovenska PU 6 (+2) 
2 Mariborski vodovod 7 Podravska PU 11 (+2) 
3 Komunala Kranj 3 Gorenjska PU 5 (+1) 
4 Rižanski vodovod Koper 12 Obalno-kraška PU 3 
5 VO-KA Celje 4 Savinjska PU 4 
6 KP Velenje 4 Savinjska PU 3 
7 Komunala Novo mesto 2 Dolenjska PU 5 (+1) 
8 JKP Prodnik Domžale 1 Osrednjeslovenska PU 6 
9 KP Ptuj 7 Podravska PU 16 (+6) 
10 Kraški vodovod Sežana 12 Obalno-kraška PU 4 (+1) 
11 JKP Žalec 4 Savinjska PU 6 
12 KJP Murska Sobota 8 Pomurska PU 5 
13 KSD Ajdovščina 10 Goriška PU 2 
14 OKP Rogaška Slatina 4 Savinjska PU 6 
15 JEKO-IN Jesenice 3 Gorenjska PU 2 
16 Hydrovod Kočevje 1 Osrednjeslovenska PU 5 
17 KSP Kostak Krško 6 Spodnjesavska P 1 (+2) 
18 JKP Grosuplje 1 Osrednjeslovenska PU 2 (+1) 
19 Loška Komunala 3 Gorenjska C 1 
20 Komunala Slovenska Bistrica 7 Podravska PU 2 (+2) 
21 Kovod Postojna 11 Notranjsko-kraška PU 2 
22 Komunala Radovljica 3 Gorenjska PU 1 
23 KSP Brežice 6 Spodnjesavska PU 1 
24 Komunala Tolmin 10 Goriška PU 3 
25 KP Vrhnika 1 Osrednjeslovenska PU 2 
26 KSP Hrastnik 5 Zasavska PU 1 
27 KP Ilirska Bistrica 11 Notranjsko-kraška PU 1 
28 JKP Log - Ravne 9 Koroška PU 3 
29 Komunala Trbovlje 5 Zasavska PU 1 
30 JKP Slovenj Gradec 9 Koroška PU 2 
31 Infrastruktura Bled 3 Gorenjska PU 1 
32 JPK Črnomelj 2 Dolenjska PU 2 
33 KP Ormož 7 Podravska C 1 (+1) 
34 KSP Ljutomer 8 Pomurska PU 4 (+1) 
35 JKP Slovenske Konjice 4 Savinjska PU 1 
36 Komunala Trebnje 2 Dolenjska PU 1 
37 Komunala Lendava 8 Pomurska C 1 (+1) 
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38 KP Tržič 3 Gorenjska PU 1 (+2) 
39 JPK Cerknica 11 Notranjsko-kraška PU 2 
40 JKP Šentjur 4 Savinjska PU 1 
41 KP Logatec 1 Osrednjeslovenska PU 1 
42 KOP Zagorje 5 Zasavska PU 1 
43 KSP Litija 1 Osrednjeslovenska PU 2 
44 JPK Mozirje 4 Savinjska PU 4 
45 Komunala Idrija 10 Goriška PU 1 
46 Komunala Kranjska Gora 3 Gorenjska PU 1 
47 Komunala Metlika 2 Dolenjska PU 1 
48 JPK Sevnica 6 Spodnjesavska PU 1 
49 JKP Brezovica 1 Osrednjeslovenska PU 1 
50 JPK Radeče 4 Savinjska PU 1 (+1) 
51 JKP Dravograd 9 Koroška PU 1 
52 Komunala Gornji Grad 4 Savinjska PU 1 
1
 Companies are ranged from the biggest to the smallest one in terms of water supplied to the 
customers in 2003. 
2
 Meaning of abbreviations: PU – public utility, P – private company, C – concession 
3
 The number of municipalities that are only partially served by the respective company is given in 
brackets. The total number of municipalities in Slovenia in 2003 was 193.  
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Table III.1: Estimation results of the Cobb-Douglas (C-D), general translog (GT) and 
hedonic translog (HT) cost function  
 
Coefficient C-D (OLS) GT (OLS) Coefficient HT(NLS) 
ln a  11,920**** 
(0,024) 
11,834**** 
(0,029) 
ln a  11,881**** 
(0,025) 
cPL 0,704**** 
(0,024) 
0,586**** 
(0,025) 
cPL 0,652**** 
(0,022) 
cPM 0,179**** 
(0,022) 
0,188**** 
(0,023) 
cPM 0,146**** 
(0,019) 
bQ 0,522**** 
(0,037) 
0,363**** 
(0,062) 
bY 0,498**** 
(0,031) 
bCU 0,317**** 
(0,042) 
0,432**** 
(0,062) - - 
bAS 0,170**** 
(0,024) 
0,172**** 
(0,024) - - 
cPL,PL 
- 
-0,110** 
(0,051) 
cPL,PL -0,136*** 
(0,042) 
cPM,PM 
- 
-0,084** 
(0,038) 
cPM,PM -0,105*** 
(0,034) 
cPL,PM 
- 
0,159**** 
(0,041) 
cPL,PM 0,174**** 
(0,042) 
bQ,Q 
- 
0,427*** 
(0,149) 
bY,Y 0,015**** 
(0,004) 
bCU,CU 
- 
0,015 
(0,234) - - 
bAS,AS 
- 
0,122* 
(0,063) - - 
bQ,CU 
- 
-0,304* 
(0,179) - - 
bQ,AS 
- 
0,012 
(0,082) - - 
bCU,AS 
- 
0,171** 
(0,082) - - 
dPL,Q 
- 
0,095 
(0,081) 
dPL,Y 0,007 
(0,015) 
dPL,CU 
- 
-0,106 
(0,078) - - 
dPL,AS 
- 
-0,013 
(0,039) - - 
dPM,Q 
- 
-0,076 
(0,060) 
dPM,Y 0,001 
(0,015) 
dPM,CU 
- 
0,090 
(0,066) - - 
dPM,AS 
- 
0,023 
(0,037) - - 
gS 0,114*** 
(0,037) 
0,176**** 
(0,033) 
gS 0,128**** 
(0,033)  
gU 0,120**** 
(0,032) 
0,057** 
(0,028) 
gU 0,066**** 
(0,027) 
gTREAT 0,251**** 
(0,043) 
0,118*** 
(0,037) 
gTREAT 0,167**** 
(0,037) 
gLOSL -0,273**** 
(0,034) 
-0,176**** 
(0,029) 
gLOSL -0,244**** 
(0,029) 
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- - - 
Coefficient C-D output 
aggregator 
- - - 
hQ 
(imposed) 1 
- - - 
hCU 
 
0,677**** 
(0,110) 
- - - 
hAS 
 
0,280**** 
(0,044) 
logL 4,308 101,657 logL 66,194 
Notes: standard errors in brackets; * – significant at 10%, ** – significant at 5%, *** – significant at 1%, **** – significant at 0.1% 
(two-sided significance level)  
 
Table III.2: Results of the likelihood ratio test 
 
LR test Translog vs. C-D 
(OLS) 
Translog vs. hedonic 
-2(logLR - logLU) 194,70 70,93 
Significance level 0,000 0,000 
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Appendix IV 
 
Table IV.1: Estimation results of the true random effects model (TRE)*  
Coefficient TRE model  Coefficient TRE model  
ln a  11,825**** 
(0,009) 
σ
 ω   0,2361**** 
(0,0038) 
cPL 0,391**** 
(0,007) 
σ
 u   0,0006 
cPM 0,350**** 
(0,006) 
σ
 v    0,0684**** 
bQ 0,258**** 
(0,016) 
2/122 )( vu σσσ +=  0,0684
**** 
(0,0013) 
bCU 0,470**** 
(0,016) 
λ = σ u /σ v 
 
0,0092 
(0,0567) 
bAS 0,229**** 
(0,006) 
  
cPL,PL 0,055**** 
(0,013) 
  
cPM,PM 0,033**** 
(0,010) 
  
cPL,PM -0,002 
(0,011) 
  
bQ,Q 0,328**** 
(0,038) 
  
bCU,CU 0,012 
(0,060) 
  
bAS,AS 0,149**** 
(0,017) 
  
bQ,CU -0,173**** 
(0,046) 
  
bQ,AS -0,034* 
(0,020) 
  
bCU,AS 0,022 
(0,021) 
  
dPL,Q 0,126**** 
(0,019) 
  
dPL,CU -0,152**** 
(0, 019) 
  
dPL,AS 0,034**** 
(0,010) 
  
dPM,Q -0,107**** 
(0,014) 
  
dPM,CU 0,128**** 
(0,015) 
  
dPM,AS -0,067**** 
(0,037) 
  
hT -0,002* 
(0,001) 
  
gS 0,044**** 
(0,009) 
  
gU 0,077**** 
(0,007) 
  
gTREAT 0,285**** 
(0,010) 
  
gLOSL -0,027**** 
(0,007) 
  
    
*
 The estimation method did not converge.  
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Figure V.1: Kernel density for Model I (COLS) 
 
 
 
U P O O L 
.72
1.44
2.17
2.89
3.61
.00
.0000 .0750 .1500 .2250 .3000 .3750 .4500 .5250 .6000-.0750
K er nel density  estim a te for      U P O O L
De
n
s
ity
 
 
 
Figure V.2: Kernel density for Model II (Pooled MLE) 
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Figure V.3: Kernel density for Model III (RE GLS) 
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Figure V.4: Kernel density for Model IV (RE MLE) 
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Figure V.5: Kernel density for Model V (TFE) 
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Figure V.6: Kernel density for Model VI (RE GLS + Mundlak) 
 
178      Appendix 
 
Appendix VI 
 
1,0000,8000,6000,4000,2000,000-0,200-0,400
TFPC1
100
80
60
40
20
0
Fr
eq
u
en
cy
Mean =0,01225
Std. Dev. =0,130735
N =280
TFPC1
 
 
Figure VI.1: Histogram of TFP growth as calculated from Model I (COLS) 
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Figure VI.2: Histogram of TFP growth as calculated from Model II (Pooled MLE) 
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Figure VI.3: Histogram of TFP growth as calculated from Model III (RE GLS) 
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Figure VI.4: Histogram of TFP growth as calculated from Model IV (RE MLE) 
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Figure VI.5: Histogram of TFP growth as calculated from Model V (TFE) 
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Figure VI.6: Histogram of TFP growth as calculated from Model VI (RE GLS + Mundlak) 
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